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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This is an action arising out of construction of a 
manufacturing plant. Plaintiffs seek confirmation of an arbitra-
tion award and enforcement of a mechanics lien. 
Defendant, Otto Buehner & Company, seeks enforcement of its 
mechanics lien and damages in contract against Plaintiffs. 
Defendant, Joseph Smith Plumbing, seeks damages in contract 
against Plaintiffs. Defendants, C & A Enterprises and C & A 
Development Co. seek vacation of the arbitration award and 
Defendant, C & A Enterprises, seeks damages from Defendant, Otto 
Buehner & Company, for its negligence. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The arbitration award was confirmed on Plaintiffs1 
Motion. The District Court held that the cross-claim of C & A 
Enterprises against Otto Buehner & Company was barred by collater-
al estoppel. The mechanics lien of Otto Buehner & Company was 
granted but the lien of Plaintiffs was denied. Joseph Smith 
Plumbing was awarded damages in contract against Plaintiffs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants herein seek reversal of the judgment and 
remand to the District Court with instructions to vacate the 
arbitration award and to permit Appellant, C & A Enterprises, to 
pursue its cross-claim against Otto Buehner & Company. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 12, 1984, the District Court for Weber County 
confirmed an arbitration award in favor of Appellee, Worthington & 
Kimball Construction Co. Record at pp. 160-161. Said Appellee 
had moved to confirm the award (Record at 41-43) within the time 
provided by statute. The motion had been opposed by Appellants 
who also moved the court to vacate the award. Record at 69-70. 
Trial was held with respect to additional claims of the parties 
which were not concluded by confirmation of the arbitration award. 
The trial resulted in the Corrected Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law (Record at 1116-1137) and a Corrected Order, Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure (Record at 1108-1115) on April 18, 1985. 
The arbitration award provided for "interest11 to 
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. (referred to as 
the contractor in the award) at fifteen percent (15%) from 
December 1, 1982. Record at 48-49, paragraph 7. The District 
Court refused to enforce the fifteen percent (15%) "interest" 
award made by the arbitrators because it found that that portion 
of the award, while denominated by the arbitrators as "interest", 
was apparently intended as a penalty. Record at 722 and 1130, 
paragraph 33. The District Court therefore granted Appellee, 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., interest at the rate of 
ten percent (10%) per annum on their Judgment against Appellants. 
Record at 1109-1110, paragraph 1. 
The arbitrators had specified in the award that the 
fifteen percent (15%) "interest" was in part a measure of damages 
to Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. for the unreasonable 
withholding of the balance of the contract price. Record at 
4 8-49, paragraph 7. The District Court's determination that the 
"interest" was in fact a penalty was based on the language of the 
award itself. Record at 1227, lines 8-9. 
By its terms, the arbitration award was not payable by 
Appellants (referred to as the owner in the award) until Appellee, 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., filed with the American 
Arbitration Association lien waivers from the contractor and all 
its subcontractors. Record at 49, paragraph 9. The contract 
between Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. and C & A 
Development Co. ("Contract") specifies with respect to the date 
payments are due thereunder: 
11.7 No payment shall be made under Article 11 
unless Contractor shall have attached to the 
Application for Payment Lien Waivers, from Contrac-
tor and Sub-Contractors, as the Owner and Interim 
Lender shall require. 
Record at 60. It further indicates with respect to the final 
payment: 
11.5 Before issuance of Final Payment, the Contrac-
tor shall submit satisfactory evidence that all 
payrolls, materials bills and other indebtedness 
connected with the Project have been paid or other-
wise satisfied. 
Record at 60. 
Under the Contract, interest was payable on payments due 
but unpaid "provided Contractor shall have timely furnished Owner 
all documentation required for such payment." Record at 60, para-
graph 11.1.4. The arbitrators had indicated to the parties that 
they believed that any award to Appellee, Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Co., should be conditioned upon delivery of lien 
waivers or release. Record at 97, paragraph 8. The District Court 
did not find nor does the record reflect that lien waivers were ever 
provided. 
In a letter specifying issues the arbitrators wished the 
parties to address in their post-hearing briefs, the arbitrators 
indicated they were considering imposing a penalty. Among the 
questions they asked the parties to address were: 
4.a. Did C & A withhold an unreasonable amount 
on contractor's request for final payment? 
b. If so, what penalty, if any, should be 
assessed against C & A? 
Record at 96. 
With respect to arbitration, the Contract provides: 
16.1 All claims, disputes and other matters in 
questions arising out of or relating to this agree-
ment or the breach thereof, except with respect to 
the Architects/Engineers decision on matters relating 
to an artistic effect, and except for claims which 
have been waived by the making or acceptance of Final 
Payment shall be decided by arbitration in accordance 
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of 
the American Arbitration Association then obtaining 
unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. . . . 
16.4 Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the Con-
tractor shall carry on the Work and maintain the 
Contract Time Schedule during any arbitration pro-
ceedings and the Owner shall continue to make pay-
ments in accordance with this Agreement 
Record at 65-66. 
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules referred to in 
paragraph 16.1 of the Contract provide with respect to the scope of 
an award made pursuant thereto: 
The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief 
which is just and equitable and within the terms of 
the agreement of the parties. . . . 
Record at 82, Rule 43. 
The arbitrators stated in the award that the arbitration 
was "to resolve disputes between the parties arising out of the 
performance and interruption of a contract . . . for the design and 
construction of a factory building . . . . " Record at 44. The 
arbitrators awarded Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Co., "the unpaid balance of the contract price as adjusted by change 
orders . . . subject to such deductions therefrom as the arbitrators 
find to be warranted under the terms of the contract and the evi-
dence received with respect to the claims of the owner." Record at 
47, paragraph 4. Among the reasons stated for denial of other 
claims of the owner are: 
a. Not the responsibility of the contractor; 
c. Not authorized by or barred by the terms of the 
contract between the parties, including the plans and 
specifications; 
e. Not included within the scope of work to be 
performed by the contractor;.... 
Record at 48, paragraph 6. Among the reasons given by the Arbitra-
tors for denial of other claims of the contractor are: 
a. Not the responsibility of the owner; 
c. Not authorized by the contract or barred by the 
terms of the contract, including the plans and 
specifications; 
d. Already covered in change orders executed by 
owner and contractor; . . . . 
Record at 49, paragraph 8. 
With the exception of the reference to a penalty, all of 
the issues which the arbitrators requested the parties to consider 
in the post-hearing briefs dealt with claims grounded in the con-
tract between the parties. Record at 95-98. 
Seventeen days of hearings were held in connection with 
the arbitration. Record at 44. At the close of the hearings, 
counsel for Appellants and counsel for the Appellee, Worthington & 
Kimball Construction Co., both indicated that they had no further 
witnesses. Record at 131, line 18 through 132, line 8. The 
arbitrators and the parties had previously agreed on dates for 
submission of briefs and reply briefs, (Record at 130) and agreed 
that the arbitrators would meet thereafter and declare the hearings 
closed, (Record at 132, line 14-133, line 1). The hearings were 
closed by the arbitrators September 2, 1983 and an award was to be 
made on or before October 2, 1983. Record at 83-84. 
On August 30, 1983, after the evidence taking portion of 
the hearing had concluded and the time for filing briefs had passed, 
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., moved to reopen 
the hearing. Record at 85-88. Appellants had argued in their 
arbitration reply brief that no claim had been established against 
two of the respondents in the arbitration, C & A Enterprises and 
C & A Companies, Inc. Record at 85, 89-91. 
In its motion to reopen the hearings, Appellee, 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., claimed assignment of the 
Contract by C & A Development Co. to C & A Enterprises, but did not 
cite testimony in the arbitration of any assignment or consent 
thereto nor did it refer the arbitrators to an assignment of the 
contract or a consent thereto which had been made an exhibit to the 
arbitration. Record at 85, numbered paragraph 1 and 2. Appellee, 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., by its motion, supplemented 
its briefs by proposing theories upon which the joint and several 
liability of all the arbitration respondents could be based. Record 
at 85-88. 
With respect to presentation of evidence, the Construction 
Industry Arbitration Rules specified by the Contract provide in 
part: 
All evidence shall be taken in the presence of all of 
the arbitrators and all of the parties, except where 
any of the parties is absent in default or has waived 
his or her right to be present. 
Record at 81, Rule 31. 
There is no evidence in the record of any default by Appellants or 
either of them at the time the motion to reopen the hearings was 
submitted nor of any waiver of the right to be present at such time. 
The arbitration hearings were reopened (Record at 92) over 
the objection of Appellants, (Record at 89-91). An additional 
hearing was noticed for the purpose of taking additional evidence 
regarding the claims of Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Co., Record at 93. Appellants objected to the hearing and to any 
proceedings which permitted Appellee, Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Co., to further support its claims without also permit-
ting Appellants to present additional evidence in support of their 
claims. Record at 94. When the hearing was held despite their 
objection, Appellants stipulated that the Contract had been assigned 
by Appellants, C & A Development Co., to Appellant, C & A 
Enterprises. Record at 45. 
Appellee asserted in its motion to reopen the hearings 
that reopening the hearings should not delay making the award. 
Record at 88. No award was made as of October 2, 1983, the date 
thirty days from close of the hearings set for making the award. 
Record at 8 3-8 4. The award was not made until November 7, 19 83. 
Record at 50. 
The Contract does not fix a date by which any arbitration 
award must be made thereunder. Record at 51-66. It does provide 
that the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association apply unless the parties otherwise agree. 
Record at 65-66, paragraph 16.1. The record does not reflect any 
other agreement by the parties regarding the time for making an 
arbitration award. 
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules provide with 
respect to time for making an award: 
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator 
and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or 
specified by law, not later than thirty days from the 
date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings 
have been waved, from the date of transmitting the 
final statements and proofs to the arbitrator. 
Record at 82, Rule 41. 
There is no evidence in the record of any agreement by the 
parties for extension of the time for making the award. The 
Construction Industry Arbitration rules provide: 
The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrator at 
will, or upon application of a party at any time 
before the award is made. If the reopening of the 
hearing would prevent the making of the award within 
the specific time agreed upon by the parties in the 
contract out of which the controversy has arisen, the 
matter may not be reopened unless the parties agree 
upon the extension of such time limit. When no 
specific date is fixed in the contract, the arbitra-
tor may reopen the hearings, and the arbitrator shall 
have thirty days from the closing of the reopened 
hearing within which to make an award. 
The District Court ruled that Appellant, C & A Enterprises 
were barred by collateral estoppel from maintaining its cross-claim 
(Record at 307-315) against Otto Buehner & Company for negligence. 
Record at 44. Otto Buehner & Company was not a party to the con-
tract or the arbitration. Record at 711-713. The contract pro-
vides : 
4.3 No contractual relationship shall exist between 
the Owner and any Subcontractor and the Contractor 
shall be responsible for the management of the 
Subcontractors in the performance of their Work. 
Record at 55. 
The confirmation of the arbitration award (Record at 
160-161) and the Order and Judgment signed by the District Court in 
connection therewith (Record at 166-167) did not adjudicate all the 
claims, rights or liabilities of all the parties to the action. 
Retrial Order, Record at 726 et seq. The District Court did not 
make a determination that there was no just reason for delay or 
direct entry of judgment confirm in the award. Record at 166-167. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court found that a portion of the arbi-
tration award was a penalty and refused to enforce that portion of 
the award. The arbitration agreement between the parties did not 
give the arbitrators the authority to award punitive damages. 
Applicable law limits contractual damages to compensatory damages. 
In exacting a penalty which was noncompensatory, the arbitrators 
exceeded their power and the award should have been vacated rather 
than confirmed in part. 
II. The award was not made within the time set by agree-
ment of the parties or by statute, whichever is applicable. The 
arbitrators1 reopening of the hearing which prevented making the 
award in the required time was improper as the parties had not 
agreed to extend the time limit. The powers of the arbitrators to 
make an award terminated when the time limit passed. In making the 
award after their powers terminated, the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers and the award should have been vacated. Appellants did not 
waive their right to rely upon the time limit for making the award 
but objected to reopening of the hearings and additional proceed-
ings . 
III. The cross-claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, 
against Otto Buehner & Company were not barred by collateral estop-
pel. There was no final judgment on the merits with respect to such 
claims nor was there an actual determination of the issues. The 
only judgment was the "Order and Judgment11 confirming the arbitra-
tion award in this case. The "Order and Judgment" was non-final as 
it did not dispose of all the issues or parties in this case and the 
District Court did not direct entry of the "Order and Judgment". 
Confirmation of the arbitration award did not constitute a determi-
nation of the issues. The arbitrators only determined contractual 
issues between the parties to the contract. They did not make any 
determination regarding the common law issues which were the subject 
of the cross-claim. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
The District Court erred in refusing to vacate the arbi-
tration award although it found that the award included an improper 
penalty which the court would not enforce. 
II. 
The District Court erred in failing to vacate the arbitra-
tion award which was not made within the time required and with 
respect to which the arbitrators improperly reopened the hearing. 
III. 
The District Court erred in ruling that the claims of 
Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto Buehner & 
Company are barred by collateral estoppel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The District Court erred in refusing to vacate 
the award although it found that the award included an improper 
penalty which the court would not enforce. 
This court has recognized the public policy in favor of 
arbitration. Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 
1070 (Utah 1981). The Court has noted that arbitration is a practi-
cal and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court 
congestion. Robinson and Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 
1983). However, the legislature has enacted statutes which govern 
the arbitrability of claims, the procedure to be followed and the 
court's powers and responsibilities with respect thereto. Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-1 through 78-31-22. This court has 
recognized that judicial authority with respect to arbitration is 
limited by statute. Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, supra at p. 
846. In fact, the court has stated that judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards "should be strictly limited to statutory grounds and 
procedures for review." Id. Clearly, the function of the court is 
to consider the award and the arbitration in accordance with the 
statutes. 
When the District Court found that the arbitration award 
included an improper penalty, it should have vacated the award 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16 rather than 
confirming the award but refusing to grant a judgment which enforced 
the offend i_ng provision. 
The District Court found that the award on its face 
included a penalty. Record at 1227, lines 8-9. The award which by 
its terms was not yet payable included "interest" as a measure of 
damages for unreasonable withholding of the balance of contract 
price. Punitive damages are not appropriate damages for contract 
claims. Highland Construction Company v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 683 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1984), Jorgensen v. John Clay and 
Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983). 
As indicated in the award, the arbitrators perceived their 
responsibility was to resolve disputes arising out of the perfor-
mance and interpretation of the contract. Except for the "interest" 
found by the District Court to be a penalty, the award clearly 
evaluates the claims and defenses of the parties based upon the 
Contract. The amount of the award is the amount due under the 
Contract as adjusted by change orders and reduced by the contractual 
claims of Appellants. Many of the other claims of Appellants and of 
the Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., were disposed 
of by the arbitrators by reference to the terms of the Contract 
between them. Clearly, the arbitrable claims were those sounding in 
contract. 
Even if the court looked beyond the four corners of the 
arbitration award, it would have properly concluded that only 
contractual damages were to be included in the award. The rules 
agreed upon by the contracting parties provided that the scope of 
award was limited to remedies and relief "within the terms of the 
agreement of the parties". Record at 82, Rule 43. There is no 
provision in the Contract for assessment of any penalty from a 
party. 
There was sufficient evidence beyond the face of the award 
to support the District Court's finding that the "interest" which 
the arbitrators awarded was not intended to compensate the Contrac-
tor but was intended as a penalty. No interest was payable by the 
terms of the Contract until all documentation required for payment 
was furnished to the Owner. Among the documentation required was 
lien waivers from the contractor and subcontractors. Payments were 
not due until these documents had been provided. The final payment 
was not due until satisfactory evidence that all payrolls, material 
bills and other indebtedness connected with the project had been 
paid or otherwise satisfied. The arbitrators recognized the con-
tractual requirement of supplying these documents prior to payment 
and provided in the award that the award was not payable and would 
not be until lien waivers were provided. There is no evidence in 
the record that the required lien waivers were ever obtained or 
provided, nor that other evidence that payrolls, materials bills and 
other indebtedness connected with the project had been paid or 
satisfied was supplied. The arbitrators had indicated to the 
parties that they felt that any award to Appellee, Worthington & 
Kimball Construction Co. should be conditioned upon delivery of lien 
waivers or release of liens. 
Since lien waivers had not been provided, the final 
payment was not due; no interest was accruing thereon under the 
Contract. Thus, the withholding of the final payment was not 
wrongful or malicious and would not have supported a claim grounded 
in tort for which punitive or exemplary damages could be av/arded had 
the claim been brought in a judicial forum rather than in arbitra-
tion. Jorgensen v. John Clay and Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983). 
Since the "interest" awarded was not intended as compensa-
tory damages but was a measure of damages for "unreasonable with-
holding" , it was punitive. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 
675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). However, in a private proceeding 
such as an arbitration, punitive damages do not serve societal 
interests. Arbitrators who are called upon to resolve contractual 
disputes and make awards within the terms of the parties' agreement 
derive their authority from the agreement and statute and, absent 
agreement by the parties or statutory authority, have no power to 
award punitive damages. One court has even held that an arbitration 
award of punitive damages violates public policy and is improper 
even if the parties provided in their arbitration agreement that 
punitive damages may be awarded. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 
N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976). 
Having determined that the "interest" was an improper 
measure of damages and could not be enforced, the District Court 
should have vacated the award. The District Court had found that 
the arbitrators had exceeded their authority. Such a finding 
requires that the award be vacated when a party to the arbitration 
has properly so moved. Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16. 
The District Court could not modify the award pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-17. The District Court is 
empowered to modify an award only upon application of a party. No 
such application had been made. The statute does not grant the 
District Court authority to modify the award on its own motion. 
Without arrogating to itself powers which the legislature did not 
grant, the District Court could not modify the award. 
Even if a party had made application for modification or 
the District Court had authority to modify the award on its own 
motion, a modification excising the improper damages would not have 
been appropriate. The statute provides that "the order must modify 
and correct the award so as to effect the intent thereof." Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-17. The District Court had 
already determined that the intent of the arbitrators in awarding a 
penalty was improper. It could not make an order giving effect to 
that intent. The award could not be modified in accordance with the 
statute which strictly limits the District Court's authority. 
The District Court was required to either confirm or 
vacate the award. Because it found that the award included an 
improper measure of damages which the court could not enforce, the 
arbitration fell within the scope of Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Section 78-31-16. The arbitrators had exceeded their authority. 
The statute required the District Court to vacate the award. Under 
the statute, the Court had no authority to confirm the balance of 
the award. 
POINT II. The District Court erred in failing to vacate 
the arbitration award which was not made within the time required 
and with respect to which the arbitrators improperly reopened the 
hearing. 
The award was made after the time set forth in the letter 
of the American Arbitration Association for making the award had 
lapsed. There was no agreement of the parties to extend that time. 
There was no waiver by Appellants of the requirement that an award 
be made within the time specified. The arbitrators derive their 
authority from the parties1 agreement and statute and have no power 
to make an award after the time provided in the agreement or statute 
for making the award has lapsed. General Metals Corp. v. Precision 
Lodge 1600, 183 Cal. App.2d 586, 6 Cal. Rtpr. 910 (1960). 
Appellee argued below that the time was extended by 
reopening of the hearings. Appellee asserted that no specific date 
for making the award was fixed in the Contract and consequently, the 
third sentence of Rule 36 of the Construction Industry Arbitration 
Rules (Record at 81) extends the time for making the award. The 
language of the third sentence of Rule 36 indicates that it is not 
intended to apply to agreements to arbitrate future disputes. With 
few exceptions, no specific date is set forth in any contract 
relating to the submission to arbitration of potential future 
disputes. The parties to a contract have no way of knowing when a 
dispute will arise, when arbitration would be demanded, or how long 
a proceeding to resolve an unknown dispute could be expected to 
take. In the absence of such foreknowledge, attempting to fix a 
specific date by which an award must be made is meaningless. 
However, the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules are designed to 
cover agreements to submit existing disputes to arbitration as well 
as agreements relating to future disputes. The third sentence of 
Rule 36 is designed to control with respect to agreements to submit 
existing disputes to arbitration. The parties can, if they choose, 
agree on a specific date by which the award must be made with 
respect to a known, existing dispute. 
With respect to agreements to submit future disputes, the 
second sentence of Rule 36 controls. That sentence provides: 
If the reopening of the hearing would prevent 
the making of the award within the specific time 
agreed upon by the parties in the contract out of 
which the controversy has arisen, the matter may not 
be reopened, unless the parties agree upon the 
extension of such time limit. 
It is clear that either a time for the award was agreed 
upon by the parties in the contract or they failed to set a time. 
It is also clear that, there was no agreement to extend the time. 
If the parties did agree upon a time, that time was thirty days from 
the close of the hearings as indicated by Rule 41 of the Construc-
tion Industry Arbitration Rules (Record at 82) which the parties 
agreed would apply (Record at 65-66, paragraph 16.1) and by the 
letter of the American Arbitration Association which stated that an 
ward would be due within thirty days of the close of the hearings 
(Record at 83-84). 
No award was made within that time as a result of the 
reopening the hearing. No extension of the time was agreed upon by 
the parties. Therefore, reopening the hearings was improper. The 
time for making an award having lapsed, the arbitrators had no 
authority to make the award. The District Court should have vacated 
the award. 
If the parties failed in their agreement to set a time 
within which the award must be made, the Utah Statutes set a time 
limit. Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-8 provides: 
Award-Time for Making.- If the time within which the 
award shall be made is not fixed in the arbitration 
agreement, the award must be made within sixty (60) 
days from the time of the appointment of the arbitra-
tors, and an award made after the lapse of sixty (60) 
days shall have no legal effect, unless the parties 
extend the time in which said award may be made, 
which extension, or any ratification, shall be in 
writing. 
The date of appointment of the arbitrators does not appear 
in the record but that appointment certainly occurred before the 
first hearings were held on April 25, 1983, (Record at 44), one 
hundred ninety-six (196) days before the award was made. More than 
sixty (60) days elapsed after the closing of the hearings on 
September 2, 198 3 before the award was made. 
If the parties did not set a time limit for making the 
award, by statute the award, made more than sixty days from appoint-
ment of the arbitrators, has no legal effect. It should have been 
vacated by the District Court. 
Whether (1) the parties agreed upon a time for making the 
award and the rule applied or (2) the statute applied because they 
had failed to so agree, no award was made within the time required. 
No extension of time was agreed upon. The arbitrators had no power 
to make an award after the required time. They exceeded their power 
in making the award. The award has no legal effect and pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16, it must be vacated. 
The doctrine of waiver does not justify confirming an 
untimely award. There is no evidence in the record of any waiver by 
Appellants of their rights. They did not acquiesce to any proceed-
ings after the time set forth in the letter of the American 
Arbitration Association for making the award. They objected to 
reopening the hearings, to submission of additional evidence and 
argument of new theories for recovery by Appellee, Worthington & 
Kimball Construction Co., after the taking of evidence had concluded 
and agreed upon briefs had been submitted, and objected to addition-
al proceedings. 
Both the statute regarding time for making the award and 
the rule regarding reopening of the hearing require an affirmative 
act by both parties to extend the time. Refusal or failure by 
Appellants to make such an affirmative act does not constitute a 
waiver. Nor does it evidence an intent to waive. Rather, it 
evidences the unwillingness of Appellants to agree to extend the 
time. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court, interpreting a statute 
similar to Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-8, held that 
because written agreement is required to extend the time for making 
the award, waiver is precluded by the statute. Marsala v. Valve 
Corporation of America, 157 Conn. 362, 254 A.2d 469 (1969). There 
was in that case no waiver despite participation in and failure to 
object to proceedings after the time fixed by the statute had 
lapsed. 
While public policy favors resolving disputes by arbitra-
tion, the arbitration must conform to the agreement of the parties. 
Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co. 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981). 
The Court cannot ignore the requirement of the statute or of the 
rule which the parties agreed would control, one of which must 
apply. Nor should the Court construe the statute or rule to require 
a party to take some action to avoid waiver of a time limit when 
both the statute and rule specify that the time limit applies unless 
there is an express agreement to the contrary. 
The finding of a waiver would not do justice to the 
parties. Appellants were not responsible for the delay in making 
the award. They argued in their arbitration reply brief that 
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., had not es-
tablished a claim against Appellant, C & A Enterprises and C & A 
Companies, Inc., another respondent in the arbitration. It was not 
Appellants burden at any time during the arbitration proceedings to 
remind Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., that it 
would be necessary to establish a case against each arbitration 
respondent which it desired to be bound by an award. Appellants did 
not raise a new issue by arguing the failure to establish a claim. 
The issue existed from the moment Appellee, Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Co., named those parties as respondents in the arbitra-
tion. Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., in its 
motion to reopen the hearings, argued new theories for recovery and 
facts not then in evidence. All this occurred after it had con-
cluded its case and stated it had no further witnesses and after the 
time agreed upon by the parties and directed by the arbitrators for 
all briefs to be filed had passed. If there was any waiver, 
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., waived its right 
to prove a case against Appellant, C & A Enterprises and C & A 
Companies, Inc. in the arbitration proceeding by waiting until the 
hearings were to close to prove its claims against such parties. 
No award was made within the time established by statute 
or agreed upon rules, whichever applies. There was no agreement to 
extend the time for making the award as required under the statute 
or rules. Rather, Appellants objected to reopening of the hearings, 
and to additional proceedings which were held. There is no basis 
for finding that Appellants waived their rights to insist upon an 
award within the required time. Instead, if there was a waiver, it 
was Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., that waived 
its right to prove claims it omitted until after all evidence and 
briefs had been submitted. Any award made by the arbitrators was 
made after the time for making the award had passed. The arbitra-
tors had no power after the time had lapsed and thus exceeded their 
powers. The District Court should have vacated the award. 
POINT III. The District Court erred in ruling that the 
claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto 
Buehner & Company, are barred by collateral estoppel. 
This Court has discussed the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel in International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 
1979). In that case, the Court stated that in order for collateral 
estoppel to apply, there must be (1) a final judgment on the merits 
and (2) an actual determination of the issues. Neither of the two 
requirements is met in this case. 
The only judgment which existed upon which collateral 
estoppel could be based was the Order and Judgment which confirmed 
the arbitration award. However, that judgment issued in this same 
case was not a final judgment. Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, an order, however denominated, which adjudicates 
fewer than all the issues or the rights and liabilities if fewer 
than all the parties is not final unless the court makes a determi-
nation that there is no just reason for delay and directs entry of 
judgment. More than one claim for relief had been presented in this 
case. Multiple parties were involved. The judgment confirming the 
arbitration award did not adjudicate all the claims presented nor 
did it adjudicate the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
The claims remaining to be decided are described in the pretrial 
order. 
While it might have done so under Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court did not determine that 
there was no just reason for delay or direct entry of judgment. As 
a result, the judgment was "subject to revision at any time before 
the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties", Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
54(b). The order was in fact modified by the District Court as it 
refused to give effect in the Corrected Order, Judgment and Decree 
of Foreclosure to the fifteen percent (15%) "interest" provided in 
the arbitration award. 
Since there was no final judgment, collateral estoppel 
could not bar Appellants' claims against Appellee, Otto Buehner & 
Co. 
There was not an actual determination of the issues raised 
by the cross-claim of C & A Enterprises. The arbitration award is 
binding only to persons who are parties to the arbitration and only 
as to subject matter submitted to the arbitrators. Patrick J. 
Ruane, Inc. v. Parker, 185 Cal.App.2d 488, 8 Cal.Rptr. 379 (1960); 
Geo. V. Nolte & Co. v. Pieler Construction Co., 337 P.2d 710 (Wash. 
1959). Hosek MFG-Overland Foundry Co. v. Teats, 110 P.2d 976 (Colo. 
1941) . 
Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, was not a party to the 
arbitration. It was not a party to the contract which was the 
subject of the arbitration. There was no agreement between 
Appellant, C & A Enterprises, and Appellee, Otto Buehner & Co. to 
arbitrate claims existing between them. While public policy favors 
arbitration, the Court has recognized that a person cannot be 
compelled to arbitrate claims which he has not agreed to arbitrate. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-1; Lindon City v. Engineers 
Construction Co., supra. Similarly, arbitrators cannot make binding 
decisions regarding matters not submitted to them. Even if the 
award purported to resolve claims between Appellant, 
C & A Enterprises, and Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, it would to 
that extent be ineffective. 
The claims of C & A Enterprises against Otto Buehner & 
Company were claims based on negligence. The arbitrators only 
considered the contractual claims of the parties to the Contract. 
They did not consider common law claims for negligence arising out 
of the work performed by Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, or its 
failure to exercise due care in connection therewith. 
There was no final judgment which actually determined the 
claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto 
Buehner & Company. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not 
apply. The District Court erred in refusing to permit C & A 
Enterprises to prove such claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The arbitration award should have been vacated. The 
arbitrators exceeded their powers by including in the award a 
measure of damages which the District Court held to be improper and 
which it refused to enforce. That the "interest" was not compensa-
tory damages was evident from the face of the award and is supported 
by evidence beyond the award itself which indicates that actual 
interest was not payable under the contract and the arbitrators 
intent was to impose a penalty which was not within the parties1 
agreement and was not within the arbitrators1 authority. 
The arbitrators further exceed their power by making an 
award after the time for making an award had lapsed. Whether the 
time for making an award was set by agreement of the parties or by 
statute, the award was not timely made. Arbitrators only have power 
to the extent authority is granted by an agreement of the parties or 
by statute. After the time for making the award had lapsed, the 
arbitrators had no further power to make an award. 
The District Court should have vacated the award. This 
court must reverse the judgment confirming the award and remand this 
case to the District Court with instructions to vacate the arbitra-
tion award. 
Collateral estoppel did not apply to the claims of Appel-
lant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company. 
There was no final judgment which determined the issues with respect 
to such claims. Appellant, C & A Enterprises, was improperly barred 
from submitting evidence to prove such claims. The decision of the 
District Court that collateral estoppel applied must be reversed and 
the case remanded to permit Appellant, C & A Enterprises, to pursue 
its claims. 
Respectfully submitted this ^9-bto day of August, 1985. 
Robert F. Bentley 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, ROBERT F. BENTLEY, certify that I caused to be mailed 
two copies of the foregoing Brief to the following parties, this 
30th day of August, 1985, postage prepaid, deposited in the United 
States Mail: 
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Stewart Title Guaranty 
24 85 Grant Avenue 
Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 8 4 401 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Otto Buehner 
311 South State Street 
Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert F. Bentleyi 
BEHRENS v. RALEIGH HILLS HOSP., INC. Utah H79 
Cite as 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983) 
appeal, GMAC asserts that defendant hospital but, rather, relied upon [9] On 
Draper Bank's appeal was in bad faith, and 
asks for attorney's fees pursuant to 
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-56 (Supp.1983). 
That section allows a court to award attor-
ney's fees to a "prevailing party" if an 
action or defense to the action was "with-
out merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith." Although Draper Bank's 
claims of error are without merit, it did not 
appeal in bad faith. Cady v. Johnson, 
Utah, 671 P.2d 149 (1983). 
Affirmed. Costs to GMAC. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
| K £ Y N U M 6 ( « SYSTE! 5> 
Diana BEHRENS, individually and as 
Guardian ad Litem of Nathan Alan 
Behrens, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
RALEIGH HILLS HOSPITAL, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 1809.3. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 22, 1983. 
Plaintiff brought wrongful death ac-
tion against hospital seeking compensatory 
damages. After defendant's motion for 
new trial was granted, plaintiff moved to 
amend her complaint to include claim for 
punitive damages. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., 
denied motion to amend complaint, and 
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that: (1) plaintiffs 
amendment to include punitive damages 
count was not barred by limitations; (2) 
plaintiffs motion to amend complaint to 
add punitive damages count did not refer to 
new or different acts of misconduct bv 
different legal characterization of the same 
conduct, and thus, was not outside scope of 
notice of intent to sue; and (3) wrongful 
death statute permits recovery of punitive 
damages in appropriate cases. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Pleading <3=>238< 2) 
Trial court may deny motion to amend 
for movant's failure to present written mo-
tion and proposed amended complaint. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 7(b)(1). 
2. Death <s»55 
Plaintiffs written motion to amend 
complaint to add punitive damages count 
filed prior to trial in wrongful death action, 
which included specific language to be add-
ed to complaint, was improperly denied. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7. 
3. Pleading c=»250 
Plaintiffs renewed motion to amend 
complaint to add punitive damages count 
filed after trial court granted defendant's 
motion for new trial was improperly de-
nied, where plaintiff had previously filed 
written motion to add punitive damages 
count before trial which included specific 
language to be added, and where defendant 
did not object to plamriffs failure to file a 
proposed complaint and in fact, knew pre-
cisely what issues were. I' C.A.li)o3. 78-
11-7. 
1. Pleadin* C-~ 127 
If plaintiff in wrongful death action 
were able to adduce necessary foundational 
evidence at trial, she could claim punitive 
damages without formal amendment to 
pleadings. Rules Civ Proc Rule 54(c)(1); 
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7. 
5. Limitation of Actions C=>127(18) 
Amendment of claim to include dam-
ages does not import into case new and 
different cause of action; thus, plaintiffs 
motion to amend complaint to add punitive 
damages count was not barred by statute 
of limitations in wrongful death action. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7. 
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6. Limitation of Actions <3=>127(5) 
Setting forth of an additional ground 
of negligence as cause of same injury is not 
new cause of action. 
7. Physicians and Surgeons <§=> 18.20 
Notice of intent to sue is not intended 
to be equivalent of complaint and need not 
contain every allegation and claim set forth 
in complaint. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8. 
8. Physicians and Surgeons <s=»18.20 
Purpose of an intent to sue notice is to 
give parties an opportunity to discuss, and 
hopefully to resolve, potential claim before 
they become locked into lawsuit. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-14-8. 
9. Physicians and Surgeons <©=>18.20 
Although notice of intent to sue must 
include specific allegations of misconduct 
on part of prospective defendant, that re-
quirement does not need to meet standards 
required to state claim for relief in com-
plaint; parties need to give only general 
notice of intent to sue and of injuries then 
known and not a statement of legal theo-
ries. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8. 
10. Physicians and Surgeons C^IH^O 
Plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 
to add punitive damages count in wrongful 
death action did not refer to new or differ-
ent acts of misconduct but, rather, relied 
upon different legal characterization of 
same conduct; thus, motion to amend com-
plaint wras not outside scope of notice of 
intent to sue, where notice cited specific 
allegations of defendant hospital's miscon-
duct, including failing to diagnose dece-
dent's dangerous mental condition and al-
lowing him to possess razor. U.C.A.1953, 
78-11-7, 78-14-8. 
11. Physicians and Surgeons <$=> 18.20 
Describing defendant's conduct as neg-
ligent conduct in notice of intent to sue did 
not preclude describing conduct as grossly 
negligent or reckless elsewhere in wrong-
ful death action. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8. 
12. Physicians and Surgeons 0=18.20 
Law governing notice of intent to sue 
does not require that claim for punitive 
damages be expressed in notice of intent, 
as long as it includes general statement of 
nature of claim. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8. 
13. Death <s=>9 
Wrongful death statute is not required 
to be strictly construed because it deviates 
from common law. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-2. 
14. Death <&=»93 
Consistency with general tort law sug-
gests that wrongful death statute should 
be construed to permit punitive damages; 
if the Legislature intended to prohibit 
award of punitive damages, it could have 
done so expressly, assuming that such ac-
tion would be constitutional. Const. Art. 
16, § 5; U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7. 
15. Death @=>9 
Primary purpose of wrongful death 
statute is to compensate deceased's heirs. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7. 
16. Death 0=93 
Purpose behind wrongful death statute 
of compensating deceased's heirs is not in-
consistent with general policy of permitting 
punitive damages to punish a wrongdoer 
and to deter particularly culpable, danger-
ous conduct. U.C.A.1953. 78-14-8. 
17. Death <S=>93 
Wrongful death statute permits recov-
ery of punitive damages in appropriate 
cases, in view of broad statutory language 
which permits recovery for nonpecuniary 
losses, libera! constructor: that ha.> bet:a 
placed on that language, and desirability of 
having rule of law in wrongful death cases 
consistent with general tort law. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-11-7. 
18. Damages <s»87(l) 
Although punitive damages may be 
awarded in an appropriate case, general 
rule is that only compensatory damages 
are appropriate and that punitive damages 
may be awarded only in exceptional cases. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7." 
19. Damages <3=>91<1) 
punitive damages should not be award-
ed to increase sorrow that defendants gen-
erally suffer or when an injury has been 
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inflicted by error or inadvertence, or to 
give plaintiff an in terrorem weapon in 
settlement negotiations. U.C.A.1953, 78-
11-7. 
20. Damages <3=»91(1) 
Since punitive damages are not intend-
ed as additional compensation to plaintiff, 
they must, if awarded, serve societal inter-
est of punishing and deterring outrageous 
and malicious conduct which is not likely to 
be deterred by other means. 
21. Damages <3=>91(3) 
Simple negligence will never suffice as 
basis upon which punitive damages may be 
awarded; defendant's conduct must be ma-
licious or in reckless disregard for rights of 
others, although actual intent to cause inju-
ry is not necessary. 
22. Damages c=>91(l) 
To be liable for punitive damages, de-
fendant must either know or should know 
that his conduct would, in high degree of 
probability, result in substantial harm to 
another, and conduct must be highly unrea-
sonable or an extreme departure from ordi-
nary care, in a situation where high degree 
of danger is apparent 
23. Damages c=>87< 1) 
Punitive damages should be awarded 
only when they will clearly accomplish pub-
lic objective not accomplished by award of 
compensatory damages. 
24. Damages e=>87( I) 
Punitive d^vi<n,s ar^ not intended to 
vent vindictiveness or to increase sorrow 
and suffering that persons guilty of error 
normally feel as result of the all too human 
propensity to err, and even to blunder; 
such damages may, however, be appropri-
ate to take profit out of wrongdoing where 
compensatory damages are small in rela-
tion to financial resources of defendant and 
can be subsumed as cost of doing business. 
25. Damages e»87(l) 
Intended deterrent effect of awarding 
punitive damages must be clear and in pro-
portion to nature of wrong and possibility 
of recurrence. 
James E. Hawkes, Bob W. Warnick, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellant 
Robert F. Orton, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The issue on this appeal is whether puni-
tive damages may be awarded in a wrong-
ful death action. The case is here on an 
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's 
refusal to permit the plaintiff to amend its 
complaint to seek punitive damages. 
I. THE FACTS 
Plaintiffs decedent, Robert Alan Beh-
rens, was admitted to the defendant Ra-
leigh Hills Hospital to undergo treatment 
for alcohol abuse. On the third day of his 
stay, a hospital employee allowed decedent 
to use a razor to shave. Instead, decedent 
used the razor to slash his wrists; he died 
four days later. 
Decedent's wife, individually and on be-
half of their infant son. filed this action for 
wrongful death seeking compensatory dam-
ages only. The jury trial resulted in a 
judgment for plaintiff in the amount of 
•S 100.000. However, the trial court granted 
defendant's motion for a new trial because 
of its failure to give a comparative negli-
gence jurv instruction. That ruling is not 
challenged. 
After the motion for a new trial was 
granted, plaintiff moved to amend her com-
plaint lo include a claim for punitive dam-
ages. The matter was heard on oral argu-
ment, and the motion to amend was denied. 
Because the precise basis for that denial is 
not in the record, we examine first the 
possible procedural grounds offered as a 
justification for the ruling. 
II. PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS 
A. Motion to Amend 
[1] Defendant argues that the motion 
to amend was properly denied for procedur-
al reasons because it was not presented in 
writing and was not accompanied by the 
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proposed amended complaint. Although a 
trial court may deny a motion to amend for 
a movant's failure to present a written 
motion and a proposed amended complaint, 
see Utah R.Civ.P. 7(bXD; 3 J. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice 1115.12 (2d ed. 
1983), that rule does not govern this case. 
[2,3] Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a writ-
ten motion to amend the complaint. Plain-
tiffs motion included the language to be 
added to the complaint, i.e., "Plaintiff 
prays for punitive damages in the amount 
of $50,000." That motion was improperly 
denied by the trial court. The motion was 
renewed after the trial court granted a new 
trial. The defendant did not object to plain-
tiffs failure at that time to file a proposed 
complaint. Indeed, the defendant knew 
precisely what the issues were with respect 
to the motion to amend and filed a lengthy 
and well-researched memorandum on the 
issue of punitive damages. Under the cir-
cumstances, plaintiffs first motion to 
amend was sufficient. It wTas again error 
to deny the renewed motion. 
Furthermore, this case must be viewed 
against the backdrop of Utah R.Civ.P. 
54(c)(1), which states that "every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demand-
ed such relief in his pleadings." See also 
Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P.2d 752 (1978); 
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 
297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). Cf Motivated 
Management International v. Finney, 
Utah, 604 P.2d 467 (1979). As Professor 
Moore states: 
Rule 15 provides liberally for amendment 
of pleadings and supplemental pleadings 
to the end that litigation may be disposed 
of on the merits. And Rule 54(c) contin-
ues the story by providing that, except as 
to a judgment by default which shall not 
be different in kind from or exceed the 
amount prayed, every other final judg-
ment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled. 
1. So in original; see 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages 
While under Rule 8(a)(3), supra, every 
pleading setting forth a claim for relief 
should contain a demand for judgment, 
this prayer for relief constitutes no part 
of the pleader's cause of action; a plead-
ing should not be dismissed for legal 
insufficiency unless it appears to a cer-
tainty that the claimant is entitled to no 
relief, legal, equitable or maritime, under 
any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of the claim, irrespective of 
the prayer for relief; and, except as to a 
judgment by default, the prayer does 
not limit the relief, legal, equitable or 
maritime, which the court may grant 
[Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.] 
6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, 
Moore s Federal Practice *! 54.60 at 1212-
14 (2d ed. 1983). 
[4] Thus, if the plaintiff were able to 
adduce the necessary foundational evidence 
at trial, she could claim punitive damages 
under Rule 54(c) without a formal 
amendment to the pleadings. Case author-
ities support this proposition. In Guillen 
v. Kuijkcndall, 470 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 
1972) (per curiam), the court stated: 
It is not necessary to claim exemplary 
[i.e., punitive] damages by specific de-
nomination if the facts show that the 
wrong complained of was "inflicted with 
malice, oppression, or other like circum-
stances of [aggravation]1", 22 Am 
Jur.2d Damages ** 29:>. 
Accord Gilbreath v Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 526 F.Supp 657 (W [) Okl 1()S0) (mt^r 
preting Oklahoma law); Alexander v. 
Jones, 29 F.Supp. 690. 692 (E.D Okla.1939) 
(same). Cf Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F 2d 
738 (5th Cir. 1982). 
B. Statute of Limitations 
[5,6] The defendant also asserts that 
the claim for punitive damages is a new 
claim for relief that is barred by the stat-
ute of limitations. However, an 
amendment to include damages does not 
import into a case a new and different 
cause of action. Hjorth v Whit ten burg, 
121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952). See 
§ 293 at 389 (1965). 
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also Johnson v. Brinkerhqff, 89 Utah 530, 
57 P.2d 1132 (1936). Even the setting forth 
of "an additional ground of negligence as 
the cause of the same injury" is not a new 
cause of action. Peterson v. Union Pacif-
ic Railroad Co., 79 Utah 213, 221, 8 P.2d 
627, 630 (1932). 
Other jurisdictions have also allowed a 
claim for punitive damages to be added on 
the ground that the claim raised no new 
legal issues and therefore its addition did 
not prejudice the other party. Owen v. 
Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 75, 649 P.2d 278 
(1982); Thomas v. Medesco, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 
129 (E.D.Pa.1974); Hodnik v. Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad, 54 F.R.D. 184 (W.D.Pa. 
1972); Walker v. Fleming Motor Co. Inc., 
195 Kan. 328, 404 P.2d 929 (1965). See 
also Hernandez v. Brooks, 95 N.M. 670, 
625 P.2d 1187 (App.1980). Accordingly, the 
statute of limitation is no bar. See Rule 
15(c); Peterson v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co., 79 Utah 213, 8 P.2d 627 (1932); Thom-
as v. Medesco, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 129 (E.D.Pa. 
1974). 
[7-91 Defendant also argues that denial 
of the motion was proper because the pro-
posed amendment set forth additional alle-
gations and claims outside the scope of 
plaintiffs notice of intent to sue, which had 
been filed prior to commencement of this 
action. A notice of intent to sue, as re-
quired by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-14-8, is not 
intended to be the equivalent of a com-
plaint and need not contain every allegation 
and claim set forth in the complaint. The 
purpose of an intent to sue notice is to give 
the parties an opportunity to discuss, and 
hopefully to resolve, the potential claim 
before they become locked into a lawsuit. 
Although the notice must include "specific 
allegations of misconduct on the part of the 
prospective defendant/* that requirement 
does not need to meet the standards re-
quired to state a claim for relief in a com-
plaint. The parties need to give only gen-
eral notice of an intent to sue and of the 
injuries then known and not a statement of 
legal theories. 
[10-12J In the present case, the notice 
cited specific allegations of the Hospital's 
misconduct, including failing to diagnose 
decedent's dangerous mental condition and 
allowing him to possess a razor. The pro-
posed amendment to the complaint does not 
refer to new or different acts of miscon-
duct; rather, the amendment relies upon a 
different legal characterization of the same 
conduct. Describing the defendant's con-
duct as negligent conduct in the notice of 
intent does not preclude describing it as 
"grossly negligent" or reckless. Nor does 
§ 78-14-8 require that a claim for punitive 
damages be expressed in the notice of in-
tent, as long as it includes "a general state-
ment of the nature of the claim." 
HI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN WRONG-
FUL DEATH ACTIONS 
The key substantive issue in this case is 
whether the Utah wrongful death statute 
allows for recovery of punitive damages or 
only permits compensatory damages. The 
relevant portion of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-11-7 
states: "In every action under this [sec-
tion] such damages may be given as 
under all the circumstances of the case 
may be just." Whether this provision al-
lows for recovery of punitive damages in a 
wrongful death action is a question of first 
impression in Utah. 
The common law recognized no action for 
the wrongful death of a human being 
Lord Campbell's Act, which was enacted in 
England in 1846 to override the common 
law, created a statutory action for wrong-
ful death. That act pro\ ided fur the recov -
ery of damages which the jury found re-
sulted from the death. Comment, A Prim-
er on Damages Under the Utah Wrongful 
Death and Survival Statutes, 1974 Utah 
L.Rev. 519. Although English courts have 
restricted recovery under that act to pecu-
niary losses suffered by the sur\ivors, 
American courts have not ruled consistent-
ly one way or the other Id.; 1 S Speiser, 
Recovery For Wrongful Death § 31 at 103 
(2d ed. 1975). 
Most wrongful death statutes in the 
United States, including Utah's, were mod-
eled after Lord Campbell's Act. 1 S. Speis-
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er, supra, § 1:9 at 29; U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 78-11-7 (Compiler's Notes). Some Amer-
ican jurisdictions adopted, expressly either 
in their statutes or by judicial construction, 
the pecuniary damage limitation of the 
English act 1 S. Speiser, supra, § 3:1 at 
106-09; 1974 Utah LRev., supra, at 520. 
A majority of American jurisdictions allow 
recovery of nonpecuniary damages, such as 
mental anguish or loss of companionship, 1 
S. Speiser, supra, § 3:1 at 113-15 and 
§ 3:49 at 313-20. However, only some of 
those jurisdictions limit damages to those 
which are compensatory, whether pecuni-
ary or nonpecuniary damages or both, 
while denying noncompensatory damages 
aimed at punishing the wrongdoer. 1 S. 
Speiser, supra, § 3:4; J. Stein, Damages 
and Recovery, Personal Injury and Death 
Actions § 183 at 361-64 (1972). 
At bottom, the allowance of punitive 
damages in wrongful death actions is a 
function of the governing statute con-
strued in light of legislative intent and 
public policy. J. Stein, supra, § 183 at 360; 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 925 (1979). 
In those jurisdictions where punitive dam-
ages are not allowed in wrongful death 
actions, the rationale is generally that the 
governing statute limits recovery to pecuni-
ary losses. Some states have relied on the 
canon of statutory construction that a stat-
ute in derogation of the common law must 
be construed narrowly and, on that basis, 
have refused to allow punitive damages. 
On the other hand, the statutes in nearly 
half the American jurisdictions, either ex-
pressly or by construction, allow recovery 
of punitive damages in appropriate wrong-
ful death actions, and this position repre-
sents the modern trend.2 
Defendant contends that the Utah stat-
ute, being in derogation of the common 
law, must be strictly construed and that 
the claim for punitive damages must conse-
quently be denied because the statute nei-
2. See generally 1 S. Speiser, Recovery For 
Wrongful Death § 3:4 (2d ed. 1975 & 1982 
Supp.); J. Stein, Damages and Recovery, Per-
sonal Injury and Death Actions § 183 (1972 & 
1982 Supp. § 183.6); Annot., Exemplary or Pu-
ther expressly nor impliedly allows for 
such damages. 
The Utah wrongful death act was origi-
nally passed by the Territorial Legislature 
in 1874 to remedy the harsh effects of the 
common law rule which did not recognize 
wrongful death actions at all. Ch. 11 
[1874] Laws of Territory of Utah 9, II 
Compiled Laws of Utah § 2961 (1888). At 
statehood, a cause of action for wrongful 
death was guaranteed by the Constitution 
which also prohibited any statutory limits 
on the amount recoverable. Article XVI, 
§ 5 states: 
The right of action to recover damages 
for injuries resulting in death, shall nev-
er be abrogated, and the amount recover-
able shall not be subject to any statutory 
limitation 
[13] The Utah wrongful death statute, 
implementing the constitutional provision, 
although in derogation of the common law, 
traditionally has been liberally construed 
by the courts. See Jones v. Carvel/, Utah, 
641 P.2d 105 (1982), and cases cited. In-
deed, a liberal construction is supported by 
one of our earliest statutes, U C.A.. 1953, 
§ 68-3-2: 
The rule of the common law that stat-
utes in derogation thereof are to be 
strictly construed has no application to 
the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respect-
ing the subjects to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings un-
der them are to be liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice. [Em-
phasis added.] 
Thus, unlike those wrongful death statutes 
which disallow punitive damages because 
those statutes are construed strictly, the 
Utah wrongful death statute is not re-
quired to be strictly construed because it 
deviates from the common law. 
nitive Damages As Recoverable In Action For 
Death, 94 A.L.R. 384 (1935), Comment, Punitive 
Damages in Wrongful Death, 20 Clev.St L.Rev 
301 (1971). 
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The traditional, liberal construction of 
the Utah statute has been applied specif-
ically to the damages clause of the act 
which provides for "such damages . . . as 
under all the circumstances of the case 
may be jus t" U.C.A., 1953 § 78-11-7. 
This Court, at an early date, construed the 
statute to allow recovery of damages for 
both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses, 
even though damages for nonpecuniary 
losses are not expressly authorized by the 
statute. E.g., Evans v. Oregon Short line 
Railroad Co., 37 Utah 431, 439, 108 P. 638, 
641 (1910); Corbett v. Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Co., 25 Utah 449, 71 P. 1065 
(1903). In Jones v. Carvell, supra, we 
recently stated: "[T]he statute is broadly 
phrased, and this Court has construed it 
accordingly." Id. at 110. 
Most commentators agree that absent an 
express prohibition against recovery of pu-
nitive damages in wrongful death actions, 
the position most consistent with fairness 
and sound public policy is to allow punitive 
damages where the circumstances warrant. 
For example, in his comprehensive treatire, 
Speiser comments: 
Under existing systems, many jurisdic-
tions do not allow recovery of punitive 
damages in wrongful death actions, un-
less the statutes are fairly explicit in 
sanctioning such recovery. This would 
make sense in states (and there are a 
few) that do not allow punitive damages 
at all; But it makes no sense for a state 
that allows punitive damages for a wil-
ful, wanton, malicious, reckless or gross-
ly negligent tort that results in personal 
injury, emotional anguish or property 
damage, to deny such punitive damages 
where the injury victim happens to die. 
Death is, after all, the final injury—the 
ultimate insult. Such a result defies log-
ic and distorts symmetry in the law. 
2 S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful 
Death, § 15:14 at 487 (2d ed. 1975). Speis-
er also states: 
The nature and quality of the wrongful 
act should dictate whether its perpetra-
tor should be compelled to respond in 
more than compensatory damages—not 
the fortuitous circumstance whether he 
happens to injure or to kill his victim. 
1 S. Speiser, supra, § 3:4 at 135. See also 
K. Redden, Punitive Damages § 4.2(A)(3) 
(1980); Comment, Constitutional Law— 
Wrongful Death, 8 Cumb.L.Rev. 567, 574 
(1977); Comment, Punitive Damages in 
Wrongful Death, 20 Clev.St.L.Rev. 301, 
304, 314 (1971). 
[14] This state has traditionally permit-
ted recovery of punitive damages in person-
al injury cases, e.g., Cruz v. Montoya, 
Utah, 660 P.2d 723 (1983). Consistency 
with general tort law suggests that the 
Utah wrongful death statute should be con-
strued to permit punitive damages. If the 
Legislature intended to prohibit the award 
of punitive damages, it could have done so 
expressly, assuming that such action would 
be constitutional under Article XVI, § 5. 
[13,16] Defendant relies on language 
in Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 168, 
140 P.2d 772, 780 (1943), to support its 
argument against punitive damages. In 
Morrison, the Court stated: "Under our 
wrongful death statute, [citation omitted], 
the law does not seek to punish the wrong-
doer, but simply to compensate the heirs 
for the loss sustained." This language, 
however, was directed to another issue. 
The issue before the Court was recover}-' of 
funeral expenses, not recover}' of punitive 
damages. Certainly the primary purpose 
of the statute is to compensate the de-
ceased's heirs, but that is not its only pur-
pose. Compensation is not inconsistent 
with the general policy of permitting puni-
tive damages to punish a wrongdoer and to 
deter particularly culpable dangerous con-
duct. 
Other jurisdictions with statutory lan-
guage identical or similar to Utah's have 
also construed that language to allow puni-
tive damages. In Gavica v. Hanson, 101 
Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980), the Idaho 
Supreme Court construed an identical 
wrongful death damage provision to allow 
punitive damages: 
Thus, while a wrongdoer may be liable 
for punitive damages if he injures anoth-
er, it is argued that punitive damages 
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should nevertheless be withheld if a 
wrongdoer so injures another as to cause 
death. We find no logic in such a conclu-
sion. If wrongful conduct is to be de-
tarred by the award of punitive damages, 
that policy should not be thwarted be-
cause the wrongdoer succeeds in killing 
his victim. 
Id. at 61, 608 P.2d at 864. 
The West Virginia wrongful death stat-
ute provides that "the jury may award 
such damages as to it may seem fair and 
just." W.Va.Code, § 55-7-6 (1981). In 
Bond v. City of Huntington, W.Va., 276 
S.E.2d 539 (1981), the court construed that 
language to permit recovery of punitive 
damages. The court reasoned that "the 
deterrence principle of punitive damages is 
perfectly compatible with a wrongful death 
claim," and perhaps even more appropriate 
there than in actions for less severe inju-
ries. "The fact that the wrongful death 
statute never spelled out particular items 
of damages has not precluded this Court in 
the past from concluding that certain ele-
ments of damages could be obtained." Id. 
at 545. See also Perry v. Melton, W.Va., 
299 S.E.2d 8 (1982). 
Defendant cites several cases from other 
jurisdictions that deny punitive damages in 
wrongful death cases. We acknowledge 
the division among the authorities on this 
question; however, for the most part, con-
trary conclusions can be traced to material 
differences in either the governing statute 
or its legislative history. 
[17] In sum, because of the broad lan-
guage of the wrongful death statute which 
permits recovery for nonpecuniary losses, 
the liberal construction that has been 
placed on that language, and the desirabili-
ty of having the rule of law in wrongful 
death cases consistent with general tort 
law, we hold that the wrongful death stat-
ute permits the recovery of punitive dam-
ages in appropriate cases. 
IV. LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES 
[18-20] Although punitive damages 
may be awarded in an appropriate case, the 
general rule is that only compensatory 
damages are appropriate and that punitive 
damages may be awarded only in excep-
tional cases. It is not the point to allow 
punitive damages to be awarded to increase 
the sorrow that defendants generally suf-
fer when an injury has been inflicted by 
error or inadvertance, or to give a plaintiff 
an in terrorem weapon in settlement nego-
tiations. Since punitive damages are not 
intended as additional compensation to a 
plaintiff, they must, if awarded, serve a 
societal interest of punishing and deterring 
outrageous and malicious conduct which is 
not likely to be deterred by other means. 
See C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law 
of Damages §§ 77-78 (1935); J. Stein, 
Damages and Recovery, Personal Injury 
and Death Actions § 183 (1972). 
Our cases have generally held that puni-
tive damages may be awarded only on 
proof of "willful and malicious," conduct, 
e.g., Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. 
Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293, 312 (1982); First 
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feed-
yards, Inc., Utah, 653 P.2d 591, 598 (1982); 
Elkington v. Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 37, 41 
(1980); Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 
354, 359 (1975), or on proof of conduct 
which manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and disregard of, the 
rights of others, Branch v. Western Petro-
leum, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 267, 277-78 
(1982); Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mer-
cantile Institution, Utah, 605 P.2d 314, 
327 (1979), especially where compensatory 
damages may be simply absorbed as a cost 
of business. See also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 908 (1979). 
[21,22] Punitive damages should be 
awarded infrequently. Simple negligence 
will never suffice as a basis upon which 
such damages may be awarded. "Punitive 
damages are not awarded for mere inad-
vertence, mistake, errors of judgment and 
the like, which constitute ordinary negli-
gence." Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 908 comment b at 465 (1979). A defend-
ant's conduct must be malicious or in reck-
less disregard for the rights of others, al-
KENNECOTT CORP. v. INDUSTRIAL COftTN OF UTAH 
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though actual intent to cause injury is not 
necessary. Branch v. Western Petroleum, 
Inc., supra. That is, the defendant must 
either know or should know "that such 
conduct would, in a high degree of proba-
bility, result in substantial harm to anoth-
er," Danculovich i?. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 
187, 193 (1979), and the conduct must be 
"highly unreasonable conduct, or an ex-
treme departure from ordinary care, in a 
situation where a high degree of danger is 
apparent" Id. at 191. See also J. Stein, 
supra, §§ 186-187. 
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KENNECOTT CORPORATION, KENNE-
COTT MINERALS COMPANY 
DIVISION, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and Rose K. Georgas, widow of 
Alex Demetrios Georgas, Defendants. 
No. 19036. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 28, 1983. 
[23-25] Furthermore, punitive damages 
should be awarded only when they will 
clearly accomplish a public objective not 
accomplished by the award of compensato-
ry damages. They are not intended to vent 
vindictiveness or to increase the sorrow 
and suffering that persons guilty of an 
error normally feel as a result of the all too 
human propensity to err, and even to blun-
der. Such damages may, however, be ap-
propriate to take the profit out of wrongdo-
ing where compensatory damages are 
small in relation to the financial resources 
of a defendant and can be subsumed as a 
cost of doing business. See generally 
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., su-
pra; First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. 
Feedyards, supra; Terry v. Zions Cooper-
ative Mercantile Institution, supra. The 
intended deterrent effect must be clear and 
in proportion to the nature of the wrong 
and the possibility of recurrence. 
Riverbed and remanded. Coato to appel-
lant. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, OAKS and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Employee's widow brought workmen's 
compensation action against employer to 
recover benefits for death of employee who 
allegedly fell, because of heart attack, into 
tank in which he drowned while he was on 
employer's premises during lunch hour, in 
allowed place apparently getting fresh air 
or drink of water. Administrative law 
judge granted recovery, and Industrial 
Commission denied review. Employer ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that: (1) personal comfort rule was 
adopted; (2) personal comfort rule was ap-
plicable, and thus employee was in course 
of his employment at time of fall; and (3) 
idiopathic fall doctrine applied, and thus 
employee's widow was eligible for benefits. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers' Compensation <£=>615 
For purposes of statute providing for 
workmen's compensation if employee is in-
jured or killed by accident arising out of or 
in course of his employment, course of 
employee's employment is not limited sim-
ply to those places where employee's work 
requires his presence. U.C A. 1953, 35-1-
45. 
2. Workers' Compensation <s=>652 
For purposes of workmen's compensa-
tion eligibility, employee does not leave 
course of employment by engaging in acts 
ministering to his personal comfort, unless 
extent of departure is so great that intent 
to abandon job temporarily may be in-
ferred, or unless method chosen is so un-
40 N.Y.2d 354 
Joan GARRITY, Respondent, 
v. 
LYLE STUART, INC., Appellant. 
Court of Appeals of New York. 
July 6, 1976. 
Author brought action to confirm arbi-
tration award granting her compensatory 
and punitive damages against defendant 
publishing company. The Supreme Court, 
New York County, Thomas C. Chimera, J., 
confirmed award, and publishing company 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, 48 A.D.2d 814, 370 N.Y.S.2d 6, 
affirmed and publishing company appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Breitel, C. J., held 
that arbitrator had no power to award pu-
nitive damages; that such award was vio-
lative of public policy; and that issue of 
punitive damages was not waived. 
Order modified and, as so modified, 
affirmed. 
Gabrielli, J., filed dissenting opinion in 
which Jones and Wachtler, JJ., concurred. 
1. Arbitrat ion <$»29.6 
Arbitrator has no power to award pu-
nitive damages, even if agreed upon by 
parties; punitive damages is a sanction re-
served to state, a public policy of such 
magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion 
to prevent its contravention; and, since 
enforcement of award of punitive damages 
as purely private remedy would violate 
strong public policy, arbitrator's award 
which imposes punitive damages should be 
vacated. 
2. Arbitration <3=>29.4, 29.6, 65.1, 63.2 
Arbitrators generally are not bound by 
principles of substantive law or rules of 
evidence and thus error of law or fact will 
not justify vacatur of award; furthermore, 
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arbitrators generally arc free to fashion 
remedy appropriate to wrong, if they find 
one, but authentic remedy is compensatory 
and measured by harm caused and how it 
may be corrected; these broad principles 
are tolerable so long as arbitrators are 
not thereby empowered to ride roughshod 
over strong policies in law which control 
coercive private conduct and confine to 
state and its courts infliction of punitive 
sanctions on wrongdoers. 
3. Arbitrat ion <§=>56 
Court will vacate arbitration award 
enforcing illegal agreement or one viola-
tive of public policy. 
4. Damages <&=»89(l) 
At law, on civil side, in absence of 
statute, punitive damages are available only 
in limited number of instances. 
5. Damages <®=>87(l) 
Award of punitive damages is social 
exemplary "remedy" not private compensa-
tory remedy. 
6. Arbitrat ion C=>29.6 
Even if so-called "malicious" breach 
of publishing contract would permit impo-
sition of punitive damages by court or 
jury, it was not province of arbitrators to 
award punitive damages to author. 
7. Contracts S=>129(1) 
Law does not and should not permit 
private persons to submit themselves to pu-
nitive sanctions of the order reserved to 
state; freedom of contract does not em-
brace freedom to punish, even by contract. 
8. Contracts G=>I29(I) 
Parties to publishing agreement had no 
power to waive limitations on pmate ly as-
sessed punitive damages and no power to 
agree to such damages by failing to object 
to demand for such damages in arbitration 
award. 
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9. Arbitral Ion <$»56 
That arbitrator's award of punitive 
damages, in violation of public policy, was 
quite modest was immaterial. 
Richard Goldsweig, Yonkers, and Jack 
N. Albert, New York City, for appellant. 
Donald S. Engel, New York City, for re-
spondent. 
BREITEL, Chief Judge. 
Plaintiff author brought this proceeding 
under CPLR 7510 to confirm an arbitra-
tion award granting her $45,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $7,500 in punitive 
damages against defendant publishing com-
pany. Supreme Court confirmed the 
award. The Appellate Division affirmed, 
one Justice dissenting, and defendant ap-
peals. 
The issue is whether an arbitrator has 
the power to award punitive damages. 
[1] The order of the Appellate Divi-
sion should be modified to vacate the 
award of punitive damages and otherwise 
affirmed. An arbitrator has no power to 
award punitive damages, even if agreed 
upon by the parties (Matter of Publishers? 
Assfn of N. Y. City [Newspaper Union], 
280 App.Div. 500, 504-506, 114 N.Y.S.2d 
401, 404-406). Punitive damages is a 
sanction reserved to the State, a public pol-
icy of such magnitude as to call for judi-
cial intrusion to prevent its contravention. 
Since enforcement of an award of punitive 
damages as a purely private remedy would 
violate strong public policy, an arbitrator's 
award which imposes punitive damages 
should be vacated. 
Plaintiff is the author of two books pub-
lished by defendant. While the publishing 
agreements between the parties contained 
broad arbitration clauses, neither of the 
agreements provided for the imposition of 
punitive damages in the event of breach. 
A dispute arose between the parties and 
in December, 1971 plaintiff author brought 
an action for damages alleging fraudulent 
inducement, "gross" underpayment of roy-
alties, and various "malicious" acts de-
signed to harass her. That action is still 
pending. 
In March, 1974, plaintiff brought a new 
action alleging that defendant had wrong-
fully withheld an additional $45,000 in roy-
alties. Defendant moved for a stay pend-
ing arbitration, which was granted, and 
plaintiff demanded arbitration. The de-
mand requested the $45,000 withheld royal-
ties and punitive damages for defendant's 
alleged "malicious" withholding of royal-
ties, which plaintiff contended was done to 
coerce her into withdrawing the 1971 ac-
tion. 
Defendant appeared at the arbitration 
hearing and raised objections concerning 
plaintiff's standing and the conduct of the 
arbitration hearing. Upon rejection of 
these objections by the arbitrators, defend-
ant walked out. 
After hearing testimony, and considering 
an "informal memorandum" on punitive 
damages submitted by plaintiff at their re-
quest, the arbitrators awarded plaintiff 
both compensatory and punitive damages. 
On plaintiffs motion to confirm the 
award, defendant objected upon the ground 
that the award of punitive damages was 
beyond the scope of the arbitrators' au-
thority. 
[2] Arbitrators generally are not bound 
by principles of substantive law or rules of 
evidence, and thus error of law or fact will 
not justify vacatur of an award (see Mat-
ter of Associated Teachers of Huntington 
v. Board of Educ.} 33 N.Y.2d 229, 235, 351 
N.Y.S.2d 670, 674, 306 N.E.2d 791, 795, 
and cases cited). It is also true that arbi-
trators generally are free to fashion the 
remedy appropriate to the wrong, if they 
find one, but an authentic remedy is com-
pensatory and measured by the harm 
caused and how it may be corrected (A/a/-
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itr of Staklinski [Pyramid Elec. Co.], 6 
N.Y.2d 159, 163, 188 N.Y.S2d 541, 542, 160 
N.E.2d 78, 79; see Matter of Paver & 
Wildfoerster [Catholic High School 
Ass'n.], 38 N.Y.2d 669, 677, 382 N.Y.S.2d 
22, 26, 345 N.E2d 565, 569, and cases cit-
ed). These broad principles are tolerable 
so long as arbitrators are not thereby em-
powered to ride roughshod over strong pol-
icies in the law which control coercive pri-
vate conduct and confine to the State and 
its courts the infliction of punitive sanc-
tions on wrongdoers. 
[3] The court will vacate an award en-
forcing an illegal agreement or one viola-
tive of public policy (see Matter of Asso-
ciated Teachers of Huntington v. Board of 
Educ, 33 N.Y.2d 229, 235-236, 351 N.Y.S. 
2d 670, 674-675, 306 N.E.2d 791, 795, su-
pra, and cases cited; Matter of Western 
Union Tel. Co. [Atner. Communications 
Ass'n], 299 N.Y. 177, 187, 86 N.E.2d 162, 
167; Matter of East India Trading Co. 
[Halari], 280 App.Div. 420, 421, 114 N.Y. 
S.2d 93, 94, affd., 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E. 
2d 213). Since enforcement of an award 
of punitive damages as a purely private 
remedy would violate public policy, an ar-
bitrator's award which imposes punitive 
damages, even though agreed upon by the 
parties, should be vacated (Matter of Pub-
lishers' Ass'n of N. Y. City [Newspaper 
Union], 280 App.Div. 500, 504-506, 114 N. 
Y.S.2d 401, 404-406, supra; Domke, Com-
mercial Arbitration, § 33.03; Fuchsberg, 9 
N.Y. Damages Law, § 81, p. 61, n. 9; 14 
N.Y.Jur., Damages, § 184, p. 46; cf. Local 
127, United Shoe Workers of Amcr. v. 
Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 3 Cir., 298 F.2d 277, 
278, 284). 
Matter of Associated Gen. Contrs., N. Y. 
State Chapter (Savin Bros.), 36 N.Y.2d 
957, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555, 335 N.E.2d 859, is 
inapposite. That case did not involve an 
award of punitive damages. Instead, the 
court permitted^rnforcement of an arbitra-
tion award of treble liquidated damages, 
amounting to a penalty, assessed however 
in accordance with the express terms of a 
trade association membership agreement. 
The court held that the public policy 
against permitting the awarding of penal-
ties was not of "such magnitude as to call 
for judicial intrusion" (p. 959). In the in-
stant case, however, there was no provision 
in the agreements permitting arbitrators to 
award liquidated damages or penalties. In-
deed, the subject apparently had never ever 
been considered. 
[4,5] The prohibition against an arbi-
trator awarding punitive damages is based 
on strong public policy indeed. At law, on 
the civil side, in the absence of statute, pu-
nitive damages are available only in a lim-
ited number of instances (see Walker v. 
Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 223 X.Y.S.2d 
488, 490, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498). As was 
stated in Walker v. Sheldon (supra): 
"[p]unitive or exemplary damages have 
been allowed in cases where the wrong 
complained of is morally culpable, or is ac-
tuated by evil and reprehensible motives, 
not only to punish the defendant but to de-
ter him, as well as others who might other-
wise be so prompted, from indulging in 
similar conduct in the future." It is a so-
cial exemplary "remedy", not a private 
compensatory remedy. 
It has always been held that punitive 
damages are not available for mere breach 
of contract, for in such a case only a pri-
vate wrong, and not a public right, is in-
volved (see, e. g., Trans-State Hay & Feed 
Corp. v. Faberge, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 669, 360 
N.Y.S.2d 886, 319 X.E.2d 201, affg. on 
mem. at App.Div., 42 A.D.2d 535, 344 N.Y. 
S.2d 730; Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & 
Neville v. Hayden Pub. Co., 33 A.D.2d 766, 
767, 306 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 [breach of con-
tract by book publisher, which failed delib-
erately and in breach of good faith to use 
"best efforts" to promote plaintiffs books; 
punitive damages denied], affd., 30 N.Y.2d 
34, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329, 281 N.E.2d 142 [dis-
cussing the facts and particularly the 
breach of fair dealing in greater detail], 
7 9 6 N.Y. 353 NORTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
cert den., 409 U.S. 875, 93 S.Ct. 125, 34 
L.Ed.2d 128; Restatement, Contracts, § 
342; 14 N.YJur., Damages, § 183, pp. 45-
46). 
[6] Even if the so-called "malicious" 
breach here involved would permit of the 
imposition of punitive damages by a court 
or jury, it was not the province of arbitra-
tors to do so. Punitive sanctions arc re-
served to the State, surely a public policy 
"of such magnitude as to call for judicial 
intrusion" (Matter of Associated Gen. 
Contrs., N. Y. State Chapter [Savin Bros.], 
36 N.Y2d 957, 959, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555, 
556, 335 N.E.2d 859, 860, supra ). The evil 
of permitting an arbitrator whose selection 
is often restricted or manipuiatable by the 
party in a superior bargaining position, to 
award punitive damages is that it displaces 
the court and the jury, and therefore the 
State, as the engine for imposing a social 
sanction. As was so wisely observed by 
Judge, then Mr. Justice, Bergan in Matter 
of Publisher/ Ass'n of N. V. City (News-
paper Union), 280 App.Div. 500, 503, 114 
N.Y.S.2d 401, 404, supra: 
"The trouble with an arbitration admit-
ting a power to grant unlimited damages 
by way of punishment is that if the court 
treated such an award in the way arbitra-
tion awards are usually treated, and fol-
lowed the award to the letter, it would 
amount to an unlimited draft upon judicial 
power. In the usual case, the court stops 
only to inquire if the award is authorized 
by the contract; is complete and final on 
its face; and if the proceeding was fairly 
conducted. 
"Actual damage is measurable against 
some objective standard—the number of 
pounds, or days, or gallons or yards; but 
punitive damages take their shape from the 
subjective criteria involved in attitudes to-
ward correction and reform, and courts do 
not accept readily the delegation of that 
kind of power. Where punitive damages 
have been allowed for those torts which 
are still regarded somewhat as public penal 
wrongs as well as actionable private 
wrongs, they have had rather close judicial 
supervision. If the usual rules were fol-
lowed there would be no effective judicial 
supervision over punitive awards in arbi-
tration." 
The dissent appears to have recognized 
the danger in permitting an arbitrator in 
his discretion to award unlimited punitive 
damages. Thus, it notes that the award 
made here was neither "irrational" nor 
"unjust" (40 N.Y.2d p. 365, 386 N.Y.S. 
2d p. 838, 353 N\E.2d p. 800). Standards 
such as these are subjective and afford 
no practical guidelines for the arbitrator 
and little protection against abuse, and 
would, on the other hand, contrary to the 
sound development of arbitration law, per-
mit the courts to supervise awards for 
their justness (cf. Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 
N.Y.2d 382, 386, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422, 278 
N.E.2d 633, 635). 
Parties to arbitration agree to the substi-
tution of a private tribunal for purposes of 
deciding their disputes without the ex-
pense, delay and rigidities of traditional 
courts. If arbitrators were allowed to im-
pose punitive damages, the usefulness of 
arbitration would be destroyed. It would 
become a trap for the unwary given the 
eminently desirable freedom from judicial 
overview of law and facts. It would mean 
that the scope of determination by arbitra-
tors, by the license to award punitive dam-
ages, would be both unpredictable and un-
controllable. It would lead to a Shylock 
principle of doing business without a Por-
tia-like escape from the vise of a logic for-
eign to arbitration law. 
In imposing penal sanctions in private 
arrangements, a tradition of the rule of 
law in organized society is violated. One 
purpose of the rule of law is to require 
that the use of coercion be controlled by 
ths State (Kelsen, General Theory of Law 
and State, p. 21). In a highly developed 
commercial and economic society the use 
of private force is not the danger, but the 
uncontrolled use of coercive economic 
sanctions in private arrangements. For 
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centuries the power to punish has been a Accordingly, the order of the Appellate 
monopoly of the State, and not that of any Division should be modified, without costs, 
private individual (Kelsen, loc. cit.% supra), to vacate so much of the award which im-
The day is long past since barbaric man poses punitive damages, and otherwise af-
achieved redress by private punitive mea- finned, 
sures. 
[7,8] The parties never agreed or, for 
that matter, even considered punitive dam-
ages as a possible sanction for breach of 
the agreement (see dissenting opn. below 
by Mr. Justice Capozzoli, 48 A.D2d 814, 
370 N.Y.S.2d 6). Here there is no pre-
tense of agreement, although plaintiff au-
thor argues feebly that the issue of puni-
tive damages was "waived" by failure to 
object originally to the demands for puni-
tive damages, but only later to the award. 
The law does not and should not permit 
private persons to submit themselves to pu-
nitive sanctions of the order reserved to 
the State. The freedom of contract does 
not embrace the freedom to punish, even 
by contract. On this view, there was no 
power to waive the limitations on privately 
assessed punitive damages and, of course, 
no power to agree to them by the failure 
to object to the demand for arbitration (cf. 
Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 
697, 704, 65 S.Ct. 895, 900, 89 L.Ed. 1296, 
affg., 293 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E2d 259 ["waiv-
er" of right "charged or colored with the 
public interest" is ineffective]; see, gener-
ally, 6A Corbin, Contracts, § 1515, pp. 
728-732 [e. g., "waiver" of defenses to an 
usurious agreement is ineffective]). 
[9] Under common-law principles, 
there is eventual supervision of jury 
awards of punitive damages, in the singu-
larly rare cases where it is permitted, by 
the trial court's power to change awards 
and by the Appellate Division's power to 
modify such awards (see Walker v. Shel-
don, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 405, n. 3, 223 N.Y.S.2d 
488, 491, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499, supra). 
That the award of punitive damages in this 
case was quite modest is immaterial. Such 
a happenstance is not one on which to base 
a rule. 
GABRIELLI, Judge (dissenting). 
Although espousing a desire to obviate a 
"trap for the unwary" and a "Shylock 
principle of doing business without a Por-
tia-like escape" (40 N.Y.2d p. 359, 386 
N.Y.S.2d p. 834, 35^ N.E.2d p. 796 the 
majority reaches a result favoring a guile-
ful defendant and voids a just and ra-
tional award of punitive damages to a 
wholly innocent and deserving plaintiff. 
Stripped to its essence the defendant, by 
willful and fraudulent guises, refused to 
pay plaintiff royalties known to be due and 
owing to her; forced her to commence ac-
tions claiming fraudulent acts and to en-
force arbitration to redress the wrongs 
done to her and to collect the sums right-
fully due; and, finally, defendant waived 
any objection to the claim for punitive 
damages, deliberately refused to participate 
in the arbitration hearing and abruptly left 
the hearing without moving against the 
claim for punitive damages or even so 
much as offering any countervailing evi-
dence or argument on the merits of plain-
tiff's claims. I cannot, therefore, join 
with the majority and conclude, as they 
now do, that the ultimate limit of the dam-
ages awardable to plaintiff is that bum 
which was unquestionably due and owing 
to her in any event under the royalty 
agreement. 
The basic issue presented for our deter-
mination is whether, in an arbitration pro-
ceeding brought pursuant to a contract 
containing a broad arbitration clause, an 
award of punitive damages is violative of 
public policy. 
Plaintiff, the author of The Sensuous 
Woman and The Sensuous Man, entered 
into agreements with the defendant to pub-
lish the two books. The agreements con-
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tained identical, broad arbitration clauses 
which provide: 
"Any controversy or claim arising out of 
this agreement or the breach or interpreta-
tion thereof shall be determined by arbitra-
tion in accordance with the rules then ob-
taining of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation, and judgment upon the award may 
be entered in the highest court of the fo-
rum, State or Federal, having jurisdiction." 
A dispute arose between the parties and 
in December, 1971 plaintiff commenced an 
action for damages against defendant 
alleging that defendant and its principal 
officer, Lyle Stuart, committed fraud in 
inducing her to enter into the agreements, 
substantially underpaid her royalties then 
due, and engaged in nefarious business ac-
tivities calculated to harass and annoy her. 
Defendant moved for a stay of the action 
pending arbitration. The decision on the 
motion has been held in abeyance pending 
trial of the fraudulent inducement issue, 
which as yet has not been held due to pro-
tracted pretrial discovery proceedings. 
In March, 1974 plaintiff commenced a 
new and separate action asserting that de-
fendant had wrongfully withheld an addi-
tional $45,000 in royalties during the first 
half of 1973. Defendant obtained a stay 
of that action pending arbitration and 
plaintiff subsequently served a demand for 
arbitration. The demand restated the 
claim made in the March, 1974 complaint 
and also contained an additional claim for 
punitive damages allegedly resulting from 
defendant's maliciously withholding royal-
ties due plaintiff who charged that it was 
done for the unjustifiable and vindictive 
purpose of coercing plaintiff to withdraw 
the pending 1971 action. 
Defendant participated in the selection 
of the arbitrators and appeared at the 
hearing. Represented by counsel and two 
• The agreement provided that where an arbi-
trator found that a member had violated the 
terms of the agreement, damages were to 
be awarded " "in an amount no less than 
three (3) times the daily liquidated damage 
corporate officers, defendant promptly en-
tered objections concerning the standing of 
plaintiff to bring the proceeding and cer-
tain administrative matters. No objection 
was addressed to the demand for punitive 
damages. The objections were overruled, 
and defendant's representatives walked out 
of the hearing and refused to participate 
any fufther in the arbitration proceeding. 
None of the objections raised at the hear-
ing have ever been renewed. 
Following the departure of defendant's 
officers and counsel, the arbitrators heard 
extensive and, of course, unchallenged evi-
dence from plaintiff. As a result, the ar-
bitrators awarded plaintiff $45,000 on her 
claim for royalties and $7,500 in punitive 
damages plus interest and fees. When 
plaintiff moved to confirm tlie award, de-
fendant objected, for the first time, that an 
award of punitive damages is violative of 
public policy and beyond the scope of the 
authority of the arbitrators. Special Term 
confined the award and the Appellate Di-
vision upheld that determination. I would 
affirm. 
In doing so, I would reject the notion 
that this award of punitive damages is vio-
lative of public policy. We have only re-
cently treated with a somewhat similar ar-
gument in Matter of Associated Gen. 
Contrs., N- J7- State Chapter (Savin Bros.), 
36 N.V.2d 957, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555, 335 
N.E.2d 859. There we considered the ef-
fect of a public policy argument against 
penalty awards with respect to an arbitra-
tion commenced by a national trade asso-
ciation in the construction industry against 
one of its employer-members pursuant to 
the provisions of a broad arbitration clause 
contained in the association agreement. 
Specifically at issue was whether an arbi-
tration award of treble liquidated damages, 
assessed in accordance with the express 
terms of the agreement, was enforceable.* 
amount provided for in each * * * heavy 
and highway construction contract to which 
the undersigned firm is a party within the 
geographic area of the applicable labor con-
tract * * * for each * * • day the 
GAMUTS' v. LYLE STUART, INC 
Clt»M35SN.R.2d79» 
N.Y. 799 
We held that since the arbitration was in 
consequence of a broad arbitration clause 
and concerned no third-party interests 
which could be said to transcend the con-
cerns of the parties to the arbitration, 
there was present (p. 959, 373 N.Y.S2d p. 
556, 335 N.E2d p. 860) "no question in-
volving public policy of such magnitude as 
to call for judicial intrusion" (see, also, 
Matter of Riccardi [Modern Silver Linen 
Supply Co.], 36 N.Y2d 945, 373 N.Y.S2d 
551, 335 N.E.2d 856; cf. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 
37 N.Y2d 312, 372 N.Y.S.2d 71, 333 N.E. 
2d 371). The Associated Gen, Contrs. case 
may be contrasted with Matter of Aimcee 
Wholesale Corp. (Tomar Prods.), 21 N.Y. 
2d 621, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 237 N.E.2d 223. 
where the issue to be arbitrated concerned 
the enforcement of State antitrust law, a 
matter which was, as we said in Aetna 
Life & Cos. Co. v. Stekardis, 34 N.Y2d 
182, 186, n., 356 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589, 313 X. 
E2d 53, 54, "of overriding public policy 
significance such as to call for judicial in-
tervention dehors the provisions of CPLR 
7503". Other policies, "especially those 
embodied in statutory form" {Matter of 
Aimcee, supra, 21 N.Y.2d at p. 629, 289 N. 
Y.S.2d at p. 974, 237 N.E.2d at p. 227), 
have also been accorded similar signifi-
cance (see Matter of Knickerbocker Agen-
cy [Holz], 4 N.Y2d 245, 173 N.Y.S.2d 602, 
149 N.E.2d 885 [liquidation of defunct in-
surance companies]; Durst v. A brash, 17 
N.Y.2d 445, 266 N.Y.S.2d 806, 213 N.E2d 
887 [usury law]; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 
427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 [Securities 
Act of 1933 violation]; American Safety 
Equip. Corp. v. Maguire Co., 2 Cir., 391 
F.2d 821 [Federal antitrust law]). 
The case at bar falls within the rationale 
and rule of the Associated Gen. Contrs. 
case. Controlling here, as there, is the 
fact that the arbitration clause is broad in-
deed ; there are no third-party interests in-
volved; and the public policy against puni-
firm complained of is found by the arbitrator 
to have been in violation of its obligation.s'." 
{Matter of Associated Gen. Contrs., supra, 
tive damages is not so commanding that 
the Legislature has found it necessary to 
embody that policy into law, especially one 
that would apply to all cases involving 
such damages irrespective of the amount 
sought, the relative size of the award, or 
the punishable actions of the parties. Or, 
put another way, the public policy which 
"favors the peaceful resolutions of disputes 
through arbitration" (Associated Gen. 
Contrs., supra, at p. 959, 373 N.Y.S2d at p. 
556, 335 N.E.2d at p. 859) outweighs the 
public policy disfavoring the assessment of 
punitive damages in this instance, where 
the unjustifiable conduct complained of is 
found to be with malice. I would con-
clude, therefore, that any public policy lim-
iting punitive damage awards does not rise 
to that level of significance in this case as 
to require judicial intervention. 
The majority would distinguish the As-
sociated Gen. Contrs. case (supra) upon 
the thin ground that the enforcement of a 
treble liquidated damages clause which was 
applicable to numerous nationwide con-
tracts that conceivably could have amount-
ed to astronomical sums is not the equiva-
lent of the enforcement of an award oi 
penalty damages. However, as Mr. Justice 
Greenblott specifically stated for the ma-
jority below in that case, and in an opinion 
expressly approved by this court, the 
amount of damages therein computed in 
the arbitration bore "wo reasonable rela-
tionship to the amount of damages which 
may be sustained" (emphasis added; 45 
A.D.2d 136, 140, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378); 
and a contract clause which is grossly dis-
proportionate to the presumable damage or 
readily ascertainable loss is a penalty 
clause, irrespective of its label (Equitable 
Lbr. Corp. v. IPA Land Development 
Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 521-522, 381 N.Y.S. 
2d 459, 462-463, 344 N.E.2d 391, 395-396; 
Ward v. Hudson Riv. Bldg. Co., 125 N.Y. 
230, 235, 26 N.E. 256, 257; see Wirth & 
36 N.Y.2d p. 958, 373 N.Y.S.2d p. 555, 335 
X.E.2d p. 859.). 
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Hamid Fair Booking v. Wirth, 265 N.Y. 
2\4, \92 N.E. 297; Uniform Commercia\ 
Code, $ 2-718, subd [1]; Restatement, 
Contracts, § 339; 3 Williston, Contracts 
[rev. ed.], | 779). In short. Associated 
Gen. Contrs, is not only apposite but is 
controlling. Conversely, Matter of Pub-
lishers' Assn. of N. Y> City (Newspaper 
Union), 280 App.Div. 500, 504-506, 114 N. 
Y.S2d 401, 404-406, decided in 1951, and a 
predicate for the majority holding, has 
been seriously questioned and said to be of 
"doubtful validity" (8 Weinstein-Kom-
Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac, par. 7510.07) due to 
the subsequent enactment of CPLR 7501 
which intentionally broadened the scope of 
arbitration and made awards therein en-
forceable "without regard to the justiciable 
character of the controversy". Even the 
court which authored Publishers' Asfn 
now agrees that the issue there considered 
was not properly framed (see Associated 
Gen. Contrs., 45 A.D.2d at p. 142, 356 N. 
Y.S.2d at p. 380, supra). 
An affirmance here would do no vio-
lence to precedents in this court. In at 
least two varied circumstances we have 
held that although public policy would bar 
a civil suit for relief, that same public poli-
cy was not of such overriding import as to 
preclude confirmation of an arbitration 
award (Matter of Staklinski [Pyramid 
Blec* Co.], 6 N.Y.2d 159, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541, 
160 N.E.2d 78; Matter of Ruppert [Egel-
hofer], 3 N.Y.2d 576, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785, 
148 N.E2d 129). In Ruppert was permit-
ted the enjoining of a work stoppage in a 
labor dispute by arbitration despite the fact 
that the issuance of such relief by a court 
vi&s prohibited by statute ^thw Civil Prac-
tice Act, § 876-a). Similarly, in Staklin-
ski, citing Ruppert, we upheld an arbitra-
tion award of specific performance of an 
employment contract -in the face of the 
public policy against compelling a corpora-
tion to continue the services of an officer 
whose services were unsatisfactory to the 
board of directors. The rule to be distilled 
from these cases, therefore, is that only 
wheTe the puttie interest ciearty supersedes 
the concerns of the parties should courts 
intervene and assert exclusive dominion 
over disputes in arbitration (see Comment, 
Judicial Review of Arbitration: Role of 
Public Policy, 58 Nw.U.L.Rev. 545, 554-
555 J see, also, McLaughlin, Supplementary 
Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. 
Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR 7501, 
Supp., p. 164; Note, 52 Col.L.Rev. 943, 
945). 
Nor can we hold, as defendant also 
urges, that the arbitrators exceeded their 
authority in awarding punitive damages to 
plaintiff. Arbitrators are entitled to "do 
justice. It has been said that, short of 
'complete irrationality', 'they may fashion 
the law to fit the facts before them'" 
(Lentine v. Fundarot 29 N.Y.2d 382, 386, 
328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422, 278 N.E.2d 633, 636, 
quoting Matter of National Cash Register 
Co. [Wilson], 8 N.Y.2d 177, m, 208 N.Y. 
S.2d 951, 955, 171 N.E.2d 302, 305, and 
Matter of Exercycle Corp. [Maratta], 9 
N.Y.2d 329, 336, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357, 174 
N.E-2d 463, 466; see, also, Matter of Spec-
trum Fabrics Corp. [Main St. Fashions], 
309 N.Y. 709, 128 N.E.2d 416, affg., 285 
App.Div. 710, 139 N.Y.S.2d 612). The 
award made here was neither irrational 
nor unjust. Indeed, defendant has not de-
nied that its actions were designed to ha-
rass and intimidate plaintiff, as she 
claimed and the arbitrators obviously con-
cluded. Hence, the award was within the 
power vested in the arbitrator. 
As viz tawt noted, pUintiii sought £VK\\-
tive damages as listed and set forth in the 
demand for arbitration, presenting of 
course a threshold question to which de-
fendant failed to respond and, in fact, sum-
marily refused to address himself. In ef-
fect, therefore, defendant's failure to act, 
respond or contest the claim is tantamount 
to a waiver of any objection thereto and, 
RILEY T. AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. N.T. 801 
Cite M38SN.lL2d 801 
indeed, it equivalent to an agreement to ar-
bitrate the allegation now complained of. 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate 
Division should be affirmed. 
JASEN, FUCHSBERG and COOKE, 
JJ., concur with BREITEL, C J. 
GABRIELLI, Jn dissents and votes to 
affirm in a separate opinion in which 
JONES and WACHTLER, J J., concur. 
Order modified, without costs, in accord-
ance with the opinion herein and, as so 
modified, affirmed. 
i n MJMMI m i m ) 
presented a claim, advance payments of 
compensation had been made by the em-
ployer within three years of the presenta-
tion of the formal claim, liability could not 
be shifted to the Special Fund; and that 
advance payments of compensation made 
by predecessor corporations were binding 
on the current corporate employer of the 
claimant 
Affirmed. 
I. Workmen's Compensation <8=»l 030.2 
There is no express requirement, in 
order to shift liability for workmen's com-
pensation benefits to the Special Fund for 
reopened cases, that there be a formal 
opening of a claim or a prior formal 
award. Workmen's Compensation Law § 
25-a. 
40 N.Y.2d 366 
In the Matter of George RILEY, Respondent, 
v. 
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS MANUFACTUR-
ING CORPORATION ot aL, Appellants, 
and 
Special Fund for Reopened Cam, 
Respondent, 
Workmen's Compensation Board, Respondent. 
Court of Appeals of New York. 
July 8, 1076. 
Employer and its insurer appealed 
from order of the Supreme Court, Appel-
late Division, which affirmed decision of 
Workmen's Compensation Board that 
award to claimant was not chargeable to 
the Special Fund, for reopened cases. The 
Court of Appeals, Breitel, C J., held that 
although there is no express requirement 
that there have beenji formal opening of a 
claim or a prior award before liability can 
be shifted to the Special Fund, where, al-
though seven years had elapsed between 
time of claimant's accident and time that 
he became totally disabled and formally 
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2. Workmen's Compensation <S=»I030.2 
In the case of "stale" initial claims, i. 
e., claims arising from old injuries without 
there ever having been a formal opening 
or award, it is consistent with objective of 
statute creating the Special Fund for re-
opened cases to shift liability to the Special 
Fund for an old accident and dormant 
compensation matter. Workmen's Com-
pensation Law § 25-a. 
3. Workmen's Compensation <$»I030.2 
Where, although seven years elapsed 
between time of claimant's accident and 
time that claimant became totally disabled 
and filed formal claim for workmen's com-
pensation, employer had made advance 
payments of compensation within three 
years prior to presentation of formal claim, 
liability for the claim could not be shifted 
to the Special Fund for reopened cases. 
Workmen's Compensation Law § 25-a. 
4. Workmen's Compensation <§=>I030.2 
Initial "stale" workmen's compensation 
claims are to be measured, for purposes of 
shifting liability to the Special Fund, for 
reopened cases, from the last payment of 
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efforts to have the stock delivered were 
exerted here. 
Notwithstanding the caution demanded 
of a trial court in ruling on a motion for a 
nonsuit and of an appellate court in re-
viewing the ruling it is apparent that plain-
tiff's evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to him was insufficient and that 
the ruling of the trial court was correct 
Order and judgment affirmed. 
WOOD, P. J.f and FOURT, J., concur. 
STOTBO 
GENERAL METALS CORPORATION, a 
corporation, and Adel Precision Products, 
a Division of General Metals Corporation, 
Petitioners and Respondents, 
v. 
PRECISION LODGE 1600 OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHIN-
ISTS, A.F.L.-C.I.O., an unincorporated 
voluntary association, and Fred J. Good-
man, Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
Daniel F. Fitzpatrlck, as a member, Business 
Representative and on behalf of Precision 
Lodge No. 1600 of the International Asso-
ciation of Machinists, A.F.L.-C.I.O., Cross-
Petitioner and Appellant. 
Civ. 24051. 
District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 3, California. 
Aug. 5, 1960. 
Petition to vacate an award of an 
arbitrator under a collective bargaining 
agreement. From an order of the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County, Bayard 
Rhone, J., vacating the award and denying 
a petition for a confirmation, the union and 
others appealed. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Shinn, P. J., held that where pursuant 
to a collective bargaining agreement, griev-
ance of an employee was referred to an im-
partial arbitrator and agreement required 
the arbitrator to render his decision in writ-
ing not later than 15 days after taking the 
matter under submission, award was prop-
erly vacated where it was not rendered 
within the 15 days as required by the 
agreement. 
Order affirmed. 
1. Arbitration and Award <&=>50 
When the time for making an award 
has been fixed by the agreement of the par-
ties, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to 
make an award after the time has expired 
and it must be vacated upon proper applica-
tion. 
2. Labor Relations <§=460 
Where, pursuant to a collective bar-
gaining agreement, grievance of an em-
ployee was referred to an impartial arbitra-
tor and agreement required the arbitrator to 
render his decision in writing not later than 
15 days after taking the matter under sub-
mission, award was properly vacated where 
it was not rendered within the 15 days as 
required by the agreement. West's Ann. 
Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1287, 1288. 
3. Labor Relations <£=479 
Where an arbitrator under collective 
bargaining agreement was without jurisdic-
tion to act on date specified for failure 
to render his decision within 15 days, it was 
immaterial whether the employer suffered 
prejudice by reason of the delay and the 
award was a nullity and it was properly set 
aside. West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1287, 
1288. 
Rose, Klein & Marias, by Alfred M. 
Klein, Los Angeles, for appellants. 
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 
Los Angeles, for respondents. 
SHINN, Presiding Justice. 
This is an appeal by Precision Lodge 1600 
of the International Association of Ma-
chinists, and Fred J. Goodman from an or-
der vacating the award of an arbitrator 
OOLLISON r. THOMAS 
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and denying a petition for confirmation of 
the award. 
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment between the Union and General Metals 
Corporation, the grievance of an employe 
named Goodman was referred to an impar-
tial arbitrator selected by the parties. Ar-
ticle VII, section 2 of the agreement pro-
vided: "Said arbiter shall render his deci-
sion in writing not later than fifteen (15) 
days after he has taken the matter under 
submission." The arbitrator took the mat-
ter under submission on May 9, 1958 and 
rendered his decision in favor of Goodman 
on July 10th. The company petitioned 
the court to vacate the award and the Union 
petitioned to confirm it Code Civ.Proc. §§ 
1287, 1288. The court ordered the award 
annulled upon the ground that it had not 
been rendered within IS days, as required by 
the arbitration agreement. 
[1,2] The decisive question presented 
on the appeal is whether the court correct-
ly vacated the award because it was not 
rendered within the 15-day period. The 
question must be answered in the affirma-
tive. It has been the law of California 
since 1866 that when the time for making 
an award has been fixed by agreement of 
the parties, the arbitrator has no jurisdic-
tion to make an award after the time has 
expired and the same must be vacated by the 
court upon proper application. Ryan v. 
Dougherty, 30 Cal. 218; In re Abrams 
and Brennan, 2 Cal.App. 237, 84 P. 363; 
Matter of Silhman, 159 Cal. 155, 113 P. 135; 
Willis Finance & Construction Co. v. Por-
ter, 88 Cal.App. 523, 263 P. 842. This view 
is in accord with the weight of authority. 
See cases collected in 154 A.L.R. 1392. Ap-
pellants frankly concede that the provision 
that the arbiter shall render his decision 
within 15 days is both mandatory and juris-
dictional. 
[3] Appellants insist, however, that no 
harm resulted. Since the arbitrator was 
without jurisdiction to act on July 10th it 
is immaterial whether the company suffered 
prejudice by reason of the tfefay. The 
award was a nullity and it was properly set 
aside. 
The order is affirmed. 
VALLfiE and FORD, JJ., concur. 
S> 
Edna M. COLLISON, as Administratrix-
Wlthvrbe-Will-Annexed of the Estate of 
Masi* E. O'Brien, Deceased, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Louis Franklin THOMAS, Successor Admin-
istrator of the Estate of William P. 
O'Brien, Deceased, Defendant. 
Edna M. COLLISON, as Admlnlstratrlx-
With.The-Wlll-Annexed of the Estate of 
Masi* E. O'Brien, Deceased, Plaintiff, 
Crosa-Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
Charles T. Rippy, Cross-Defendant and 
Appellant, 
v. 
Louis Franklin THOMAS, Successor Admin-
istrator of the Estate of William P. O'Brien, 
Deceased, Defendant, Cross-Complainant 
and Respondent. 
Civ. 24567. 
District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 1, California. 
Aug 8, 1060 
Rehearing Denied Aug. 29, 1960. 
Hearing Granted Oct. 5, 1960. 
Action to quiet title and to reform cer-
tain instruments in connection with the ac-
quisition of title and for an accounting and 
damages. The defendant filed a cross-
complaint. The Superior Court of Los An-
geles County, Arnold Praeger, J., entered 
judgment and plaintiff and cross-defendants 
appealed. The District Court of Appeal, 
Lillie, J., held that the evidence was suffi-
cient to support implied finding that home-
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WashJM 32,308 P i d 689, where the parties 
occupied comparable positions, and a judg-
ment for the plaintiff was reversed. 
[3] The plaintiffs' argument, in support 
of the order granting a new trial, seems to 
be that even if half of the Greenwood car 
was on the wrong side of the road, the arc 
of the turn the Bogue car was making was 
such that the next fraction of a second 
would have brought it over onto the plain-
tiffs' side of the road, and a collision would 
have occurred even had the Greenwood car 
been entirely on its own side of the road; 
and it being astraddle of the center line 
would, therefore, not have been a proximate 
cause of the collision. That was likewise 
the contention of the plaintiff in Zahler v. 
Dittmer, supra. 
The answer* given in that case, is likewise 
applicable here. Whether the Bogue car 
would have ultimately gone onto the plain-
tiffs' side of the road is a matter of specula-
tion ; and what the consequences and result 
of an entirely different collision would be, 
if it had occurred, is likewise speculative. 
The jury was, as we have indicated, war-
ranted in finding that the negligence of 
plaintiff Jean Greenwood, in driving on the 
wrong side of the road, was a proximate 
cause of the collision which did occur. No 
cases are cited to support the plaintiffs' 
theory of liability based on prospective neg-
ligence. 
We have accepted the invitation to read 
the record in this case, and have gone into 
the merits only because there was some feel-
ing that we had not heretofore made it clear 
that a statement that "the evidence is not 
suftcravX to s\\bmT\ t\vt \'^id\ct," dots T\O\. 
comply with the requirement of general rule 
of the superior court 16, as amended, that an 
order granting a motion for a new trial give 
"definite reasons of law and facts for so 
doing." 
The order granting a new trial is vacated; 
and the trial court directed to reinstate the 
verdict of the jury, and enter a judgment 
thereon. 
WEAVER, C. J., and MALLERY, 
FINLEY and FOSTER, JJ., concur. 
GEO. V. NOLTE 4 CO, a corporation, 
Respondent, 
v. 
PIELER CONSTRUCTION CO., a corpora-
tton, Appellant, 
Geo. V. Nolte and Fred M. Harris, doing busi-
ness as Geo. V. Nolte * Co., Additional 
Respondents. 
No. 34806. 
Supreme Court of Washington, 
Department 1. 
April 9, 1958. 
Action by subcontractor against con-
struction corporation to recover balance 
due for construction of sidewalks and 
curbs. The Superior Court, Skagit County, 
A. M- Ward, J., entered judgment in favor 
of the subcontractor, and corporation ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Ott, J., held 
that where corporation on September 2, 
1954, notified subcontractor that corpora-
tion would withhold portion of balance due 
for the construction work, subcontractor on 
October 15 filed suit for balance due, corpo-
ration on January 4, 1955, filed answer 
which alleged contract provided for arbitra-
tion before maintenance of civil action and 
filed cross-complaint, subcontractor on Feb-
ruary 6, 1955, made written offer to arbi-
trate, and lapse until subcontractor on 
March 22, 1956, renewed offer to arbitrate 
was attributable to filing of cross-complaint, 
the lapsed time from notification of Sep-
tember 2, 1954, until renewal offer of 
March 22, 1956, was not unreasonable, and 
failure of subcontractor to offer to arli 
trate prior to bringing action did not bar 
subcontractor from maintenance thereof. 
Affirmed. 
I. contracts <3=>322(l) 
When contracting parties have agreed 
that condition of contract must be per-
formed within reasonable time, party who 
asserts time of performance to have been 
unreasonable has burden to prove its un-
reasonableness. 
QEO, V. NOLTB 4 00. v. PIELEB OONSTBUOTION Ca Walk Til 
Citea«337PJ2dT10 
facts $»290 
^Covenant in contract providing for 
tion can be waived 
Infracts <8=>227 
^Waiver of condition of contract can 
^accomplished, expressly or impliedly. 
ontracts <8»I76(I) 
If waiver of condition of contract is 
aplished by implication, it is issue to 
[£ determined by court, based upon facts 
circumstances relied upon. 
eCwitracts <S»284<3) 
%t Where construction corporation on 
September 2, 1954, notified subcontractor 
that the corporation would withhold por-
tion of balance due subcontractor for con-
struction of sidewalks and curbs, subcon-
tractor on October IS filed suit for balance 
doe, corporation on January 4, 1955, filed 
answer which alleged subcontract provided 
Sor arbitration before maintenance of civil 
action and filed cross-complaint, subcon-
tractor on February 6, 1955, made written 
offer to arbitrate, and lapse until subcon-
tractor on March 22, 1956, renewed offer 
was attributable to filing of the cross-
complaint, lapsed time from notification of 
September 2, 1954, until renewal offer of 
March 22, 1956, was not unreasonable, and 
failure of subcontractor to offer to arbi-
trate prior to bringing action for balance 
due did not bar subcontractor from mainte-
nance of such action. 
6. Arbitration and Award <3=82(4) 
Where subcontractor requested arbi-
tration with prime contractor for subcon-
tractors claims for construction of streets, 
curbs, sidewalks, utilities, site improve-
ments, and landscaping, including rehabilita-
tion expense of sidewalks and curbs, which 
had been constructed by sub-subcontractor, 
award of arbitrators adjudicated only 
rights of subcontractor and prime contrac-
tor, and did not bar proceeding by sub-
subcontractor against subcontractor for 
balance due under contract between sub-
subcontractor and subcontractor. 
7. Contracts C=>322(4) 
In action by subcontractor against con-
struction corporation to recover balance 
due for construction of sidewalks and 
curbs, evidence supported finding that sub* 
contractor in every respect performed pro-
visions of contract 
Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester, Lyle L. 
Iversen, Seattle, for appellant 
Sherwood & Forrest, Livesey, Kingsbury 
& Livesey, Bellingham, for respondent 
OTT, Justice. 
Myers, Major & Co., a copartnership 
(hereinafter referred to as Myers), was 
the successful bidder for the construction 
of a Federal housing administration project 
at the Naval Air Station on Whidbey is-
land. April 24, 1952, Myers, the prime 
contractor, entered into a subcontract with 
Pieler Construction Co. (herinafter refer-
red to as Pieler) for the construction of 
certain streets, curbs, sidewalks, utilities, 
site improvements, and landscaping on the 
project, for a total of $246,500. 
On or about May 19, 1952, Geo. V. 
Nolte and Fred M. Harris, doing business 
as Geo. V. Nolte & Co. (subsequently in-
corporated and hereinafter referred to as 
Nolte), entered into a written agreement 
with Pieler to construct, according to the 
plans and specifications, the curbing and 
sidewalks of the Pieler subcontract, for 
the flat sum of $40,152.25. 
The prime contract provided that, if a 
disagreement should arise between the par-
ties thereto, such dispute must first be 
submitted for arbitration as "a condition 
precedent to any right of legal action that 
either party may have against the other." 
This provision was carried, by reference, 
into the other contracts involved. 
Nolte constructed the curbs and side-
walks, in full compliance with the plans 
and specifications, nearly two years before 
the completion of the prime contract, and 
was paid $33,547.90 on account. The FHA 
inspector refused to accept the curbs and 
sidewalks because, in the interim, the side-
walks had become broken and cracked and 
the curbs had sunk below the elevation 
specified. The prime contractor, Myers, 
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notified the subcontractor, Pieler, of the 
FHA rejection. Pieler requested Notte tar 
repair the damages and make the con-
struction acceptable to the FHA inspector, 
or Pieler would do it and charge Nolte for 
i t Nolte insisted it had constructed the 
curbs and sidewalks according to the plans 
and specifications; that the sidewalks, 
through no fault ol Nolte, had become 
broken because of the activity of trucks 
driving over the finished sidewalks without 
proper protection; and that the curbs had 
sunk because the engineers' plans had not 
required adequate ballast before construc-
tion. Nolte refused to do the work again 
unless the additional work and materials 
would be paid for. Pieler notified Nolte 
that it had elected to do the rehabilitation 
work and would recover from the persons 
responsible for the damage. The cost of 
the rehabilitation was $7,082.22. 
Pieler requested arbitration with Myers 
for claims aggregating $34,223.60 as its 
subcontractor, and included its claim for 
rehabilitation expense of the sidewalks 
and curbs. At the arbitration hearing, 
Pieler called Mr. Nolte as its witness, who 
testified that his company had performed 
the contract with reference to the con-
struction of the sidewalks and curbs in 
accordance with the plans and specifica-
tions. No evidence was presented refuting 
the Nolte testimony. The arbitrators de-
nied $5,642.39 of Pieler's claim for these 
items, for the reasons that there was some 
evidence of improper impaction along the 
line of the curbs, and they could not deter-
mine from the evidence what portion of 
the damage to the sidewalks was due to 
trucks driving over them as distinguished 
from other causes and what portion of the 
rehabilitation work was accomplished by 
Meyers and what portion by Pieler. Pieler 
permitted the judgment of award to be-
come final. 
September 2, 1954, Pieler informed Nolte 
of the Myers-Pieler arbitrators' award and 
notified Nolte that it was withholding the 
amount disallowed from the balance due 
Nolte. October 15, 1954, Nolte commenced 
its first action (Island county cause No. 
3364) to recover the balance due it from 
Pieler. Pieter's affirmative answer, filed 
January 4, 1955, alleged that its contract 
with Nolte provided for arbitration as a 
condition precedent to the maintenance of 
a civil action, and that Nolte had not re-
quested arbitration. Pieler also cross-com-
plained against Nolte for sums due it under 
the contract Nolte's written offer to ar-
bitrate during the pendency of this pro-
ceeding, dated February 24, 1955, was re-
fused by Pieler March 7, 1955. May 26, 
1955, Nolte's reply to Pieler's answer al-
leged its offer to arbitrate had been re-
fused. December 2, 1955, Pieler moved 
for summary judgment, alleging that 
Nolte's failure to arbitrate prior to bring-
ing the action barred it from the mainte-
nance thereof. March 5, 1956, the court 
filed its memorandum opinion on the motion 
for summary judgment, in which it held, 
inter alia, that Pieler's cross-complaint did 
not constitute a waiver of the arbitration 
covenant because it had been pleaded af-
firmatively as a bar, and that Nolte's offer 
to arbitrate was not timely because it did 
not in fact precede the commencement of 
the action but was subsequent thereto. 
March 21, 1956, judgment was entered 
dismissing both causes of action without 
prejudice. There was no appeal. 
Nolte renewed its written offer to ar-
bitrate on March 22, 1956. It was refused 
by Pieler March 26f 1956. 
June 20, 1956, Nolte commenced the in-
stant action to recover the balance due 
from Pieler. From a judgment entered 
in favor of Nolte, Pieler appeals. 
Appellant's first contention on appeal \* 
that Nolte's offer to arbitrate was not time 
ly made and constituted a bar to any judg-
ment for Nolte. 
Article 40 of the "General Conditions" 
of the American Institute of Architects 
provided in part as follows: " * * * the 
demand for arbitration shall be made with-
in a reasonable time after the dispute has 
arisen; * * *." 
In Vance v. Mutual Gold Corp., 1940, 6 
Wash.2d 466, 478, 108 P.2d 799, 805, we 
i definition of "reasonable time* 
uch length of time as may fairly, 
y, and reasonably be allowed 
^^quired, having regard to the na-
" ~ of the act or duty, or of the sub-
matter, and to the attending cir-
itances,*,r 
When contracting parties have 
that a condition of the contract 
be performed within a reasonable 
the party who asserts the time of 
formance to have been unreasonable 
the burden to prove its unreasonable-
GEO. V. KOLTEJlOO.T.PrBLEBOON8TEUCTIONCO. Wash. 713 
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Appellant next contends that the request 
for arbitration was not timely made for the 
reason that Ar t 40, supra, provided in 
part: " * * * in no case, however, shall 
the demand [for arbitration] be made later 
than the time of final payment, * * * " 
and that the final payment referred to was 
the final payment between Myers and 
Pieler. 
The A.I.A. articles were a part of the 
Myers-Pieler contract; likewise, they were 
a part of the Pieler-Nolte contract. In 
interpreting the meaning of the A.I.A. 
articles as they apply to the Pieler-Nolte 
contract, the words "final payment" could 
refer only to the final payment between 
Pieler and Nolte. We find no merit in this 
contention. 
[6] Appellant next contends that Nolte 
was a party to the original arbitration pro-
ceeding between Myers and Pieler, and 
that, Nolte having taken no appeal from the 
judgment of award, its claim was barred by 
the application of the doctrine of res judi-
cata. 
With this contention we do not agree. 
Pieler requested arbitration with M>crs. 
The subject matter for arbitration was the 
Myers-Pieler contract. The award of the 
arbitrators adjudicated only the rights of 
the parties to the M>ers-Pieler contract. 
Nolte was not a party to the Mvers-Pieler 
arbitration. The award of arbitration in 
the Myers-Pieler contract was not a bar 
to the instant proceeding because it lacked 
concurrence of at least two of the required 
elements. See Svmington v. Hudson, 1952, 
40 Wash 2d 331, 243 P 2d 484. 
[7] Finally, the court found that Nolte 
in every respect performed the provisions 
of its contract with Pieler. The findings 
of the court are supported by the record. 
We find no merit in appellant's remain-
ing assignments of error. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
WEAVER, C J., and MALLERY, 
DONWORTH, and HUNTER, JJ., concur. 
iiess. 
[2-4] A covenant in a contract pro-
viding for arbitration can be waived. 
fttgtt Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. 
take Washington Shipyards, 1939, 1 Wash. 
id 401, 410, 96 P.2d 257; 3 Am.Jur. 887, 
Arbitration and Award, § 56. A waiver 
of a condition can be accomplished, ex-
pressly or impliedly. Puget Sound Bridge 
& Dredging Co. v. Lake Washington Ship-
yards, supra. If a waiver is accomplished 
by implication, it, likewise, is an issue to be 
determined by the court, based upon the 
facts and circumstances relied upon. 
[5] Of the time that elapsed between 
September 2, 1954 (the date a dispute arose 
between Pieler and Nolte), and March 22, 
1956 (the date Nolte renewed its offer to 
arbitrate), all that is reasonably chargeable 
to Nolte alone is from September 2, 1954, 
to February 6, 1955 (the date of Noite's 
first written offer to arbitrate). The re-
maining fourteen months' time lapse was 
attributable solely to Pieler's filing of its 
cross-complaint, which raised a bona fide 
contention on the part of Nolte that a 
waiver was thereby implied. 
Applying the above rules to these cir-
cumstances, Pieler failed to establish the 
elapsed time to be unreasonable; nor was 
there any evidence that the elapsed time 
chargeable to Nolte or to either of the par-
ties caused Pieler any loss. We find no 
merit in appellant's first assignment of 
error. 
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HIGHLAND CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPA-
NY, a corporation, et al., Defendants 
and Respondents, 
v. 
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY 
OF MARYLAND, Third Party 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 17900. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 3, 1984. 
Subcontractor who was successful bid-
der on concrete substructures and piping 
work to be installed in coal handling facili-
ty filed suit against general contractor, and 
owner of facility alleging breach of con-
tract, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, 
quantum meruit, tortious interference with 
contractual rights, business interference 
and economic duress, as well as punitive 
damage claims. General contractor coun-
terclaimed for breach of contract and re-
sulting damages for costs which it incurred 
in substituting work to be performed by 
subcontractor, and for losses due to winter 
work and business reputation damages. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Christine M. Durham, J., granted a directed 
verdict in favor of all defendants, and en-
tered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of 
general contractor on its counterclaim. 
Subcontractor appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) trial court 
did not err in refusing to permit subcon-
tractor to prove its damages under total 
cost, quantum meruit, or "jury verdict" 
theories; (2) subcontractor was not entitled 
to punitive damages or business losses; (3) 
trial court properly presented issues to jury 
as instructions- covered theories of both 
parties; (4) trial court did not err in exclud-
ing testimony of subcontractor's expert 
witness, since subcontractor offered no 
data upon which expert could base his opin-
ion; (5) trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in awarding to general contractor 
costs of depositions of subcontractor's wit-
nesses; and (6) trial court erred in award-
ing owner of facility its costs since its 
memorandum of costs was not timely. 
Affirmed as modified. 
1. Appeal and Error <s»927(7) 
On review of a directed verdict, Su-
preme Court will view evidence in light 
most favorable to party against whom ver-
dict was directed, in order to determine 
whether it established a prima facie case. 
2. Damages <s=>184 
Some degree of uncertainty in evidence 
of damages will not relieve a defendant 
from recompensing a wronged plaintiff; 
however, plaintiff must show damages by 
evidence of facts and not by mere conclu-
sions, and items of damage must be estab-
lished by substantial evidence and not by 
conjecture. 
3. Damages <s=>15 
Whether general or special, damages 
must be traceable to wrongs complained of. 
4. Damages <®=>124(1) 
Trial court in action by subcontractor 
alleging breach of contract did not err in 
refusing to permit subcontractor to prove 
its damages under theory of total cost, 
where nature of alleged losses did not 
make it impossible or highly impractical to 
determine them with a reasonable degree 
of accuracy, subcontractor's bid or esti-
mate was not realistic, and by its own 
admissions and contradictory statements 
on direct and cross-examination, subcon-
tractor shouldered major portion of blame 
for added expenses due to delays, excessive 
costs and loss of work. 
5. Damages <£=>191 
Where subcontractor failed to prove 
causation between its costs and breach of 
any particular defendant, it was not enti-
tled to present evidence under total cost 
theory of damages. 
HIGHLAND CONST, CO. 
& Contracts <s»303U) 
Performance under bid is not excused 
because difficulties are encountered and 
recovery under such circumstances is re-
stricted to extra work only. 
7. Damages <*=»117 
Damages are controlled by contractual 
remedies fashioned by the parties unless it 
can be shown that work performed was so 
different from work contemplated by the 
contract that additional recovery in quan-
tum meruit is warranted. 
8. Implied and Constructive Contracts 
<*=>65 
Trial court in breach of contract action 
brought by subcontractor did not err in 
refusing to permit subcontractor to prove 
its damages under quantum meruit theory, 
where subcontractor's work was anticipa-
ted and work was performed in pursuance 
of the contract; moreover, although sub-
contractor claimed it had been unjustifiably 
terminated, it failed to prove in what r e 
spects work performed by it differed from 
work contemplated by the contract. 
9. Damages e=»189 
Trial court in breach of contract action 
brought by subcontractor did not err in 
refusing to permit subcontractor to prove 
its damages under "jury verdict" theory of 
recovery, where subcontractor erected in-
surmountable barrier to successful proffer 
of damage evidence by its complete inabili-
ty to make causal connection between its 
losses on project and commissions or omis-
sions of defendants or some of them. 
10. Damages e=>89(2) 
Punitive damages cannot be awarded 
for breach of contract unless the breach 
amounts to an independent tort. 
11. Damages < »^23 
Consequential damages will be award-
ed if losses resulting from a breach were 
reasonably within contemplation of parties 
when they entered into contract. 
12. Damages <3=>189 
Where claim for damages by subcon-
tractor remained unsupported by sufficient 
v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO. Utah 1043 
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documentation to allow jury to reasonably 
ai/er causa/ity between breaches of defend-
ants and losses by subcontractor, claim of 
business losses and consequential damages 
did not rise to level of proof required to 
permit recovery. 
13. Contracts «=>353(1) 
Trial court in breach of contract action 
properly presented issues to jury, where 
theories of both parties were covered by its 
instructions. 
14. Contracts <&=>323(1) 
Dismissal of individual defendants 
from breach of contract action was not 
error, where there was no proffer of evi-
dence of damages attributable to them per-
sonally. 
15. Evidence <s=553(2) 
Trial court in breach of contract action 
brought by subcontractor property exclud-
ed testimony of subcontractor's expert wit-
ness with respect to hypothetical question 
that tardy delivery of plans, unavailability 
of construction sites, incomplete and defec-
tive j)lans and similar negative conditions 
would have adverse effect upon man and 
equipment hours, and that it was not prac-
tical or possible to quantify and assign a 
dollar* value to each of such conditions, 
wher$ subcontractor cited no data upon 
which expert could base his opinion. Rules 
of Evjd., Rule 56(2). 
16. Costs <s=*193 
Supreme Court will allow deposition 
costs as necessary and reasonable where 
development of the case is of such a com-
plex nature that discovery cannot be ac-
complished through less expensive method 
of interrogatories, requests for admissions 
and requests for production of documents; 
award of such costs should be narrowly 
made to guard against abuse by those bet-
ter financially equipped lest costs of seek-
ing justice become prohibitive for the finan-
cially ill equipped. 
17. Costs <s*154, 193 
Trial court in breach of construction 
contract action did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding costs of depositions of subcon-
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tractor's witnesses to general contractor, 
since complexity of case and theories of 
recovery proposed by subcontractor made 
it virtually impossible to obtain sufficient 
information for preparation of case 
through more conservative methods of dis-
covery; moreover, depositions were used at 
trial on cross-examination, both to impeach 
veracity and to refresh memory. 
18. Costs <*»203 
Trial court erred in awarding prevail-
ing defendant its costs when memorandum 
of costs was not timely filed. Rules Civ. 
Proc., Rule 54(dX2). 
Merlin R. Lybbert and Rex E. Madsen, 
Salt Lake City, for Highland. 
Richard H. Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for 
third party defendant and appellant. 
James P. Cowley, Robert A. Peterson, 
David A. Greenwood, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiff, Highland Construction Compa-
ny, appeals from a directed verdict of no 
cause of action for failure to introduce any 
admissible evidence of the quantity of dam-
ages it allegedly had sustained under a 
construction contract. The appeal is taken 
against Dravo Corporation, Carbon County 
Coal Company and its general partners, 
Rocky Mountain Energy Company and 
Dravo Coal Company, hereinafter collec-
tively referred to as Carbon; Lamb Engi-
neering & Construction Company (Lamb); 
and Michael R. Lamb and James R. Lamb, 
as well as Industrial Indemnity Company. 
None of the other parties is before us on 
this appeal for reasons not relevant to our 
review. 
Plaintiff was the successful bidder on 
concrete substructures and piping work to 
be installed in a coal handling facility under 
construction near Hanna, Wyoming. On 
March 26, 1979 Highland entered into a 
written subcontract with Lamb which was 
the general contractor for Carbon, owner 
of the facility. The bid price was $1,097,-
325. Completion of the work under the 
subcontract was scheduled for August 15, 
1979. 
On July 9, 1979 Lamb partially terminat-
ed Highland's work for its failure to com-
ply with working schedules on four of the 
concrete foundations under construction. 
Highland was allowed to continue the re-
maining contract work, but was completely 
terminated on December 27, 1979, after 
three additional partial terminations by 
Lamb in August, September and October of 
that year. 
Highland filed suit against Lamb, Carbon 
and Lamb's surety, Industrial Indemnity 
Company, Richard R. Lamb and James R. 
Lamb, alleging breach of contract, breach 
of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, quantum me-
ruit, tortious interference with contractual 
rights, business interference and economic 
duress, as well as punitive damage claims. 
Lamb counterclaimed for breach of con-
tract and resulting damages for costs 
which it incurred in substituting work to be 
performed by Highland, and for losses due 
to winter work and business reputation 
damages. The case was tried before a 
jury. At the end of the liability phase of 
its case, Highland proffered evidence on a 
"total cost" theory and the opinion of its 
expert that Highland's damages approxi-
mated its total expenditures on the job 
(which included a built-in profit), less the 
amount it had been paid by Lamb. No 
allocation of damages among the various 
defendants was made. Defendants object-
ed to that proffer, the objection was sus-
tained, and Highland rested without fu»* 
ther proof of damages. Defendants then 
moved the court for a directed verdict 
which the court granted. Judgment was 
entered in favor of all defendants, no cause 
of action. The trial proceeded on Lamb's 
counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict 
on special interrogatories against High-
land, awarding damages in the sum of 
$242,660.25 as a result of Highland's 
breach of contract. 
Highland appeals, citing error by the tri-
al court as follows: 
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1. Failure to allow Highland to proceed 
on total costs, quantum meruit, or "jury 
verdict" theories, and ruling that Highland 
was not entitled to loss of business or 
punitive damages. 
2. Refusal to accept some of Highland's 
jury instructions, and the submittal to the 
jury of a special verdict form favoring 
Lamb's theories. 
3. Ruling that there was no evidence of 
improper conduct on the part of Michael R. 
Lamb and James R. Lamb. 
4. Exclusion of Highland's expert wit-
ness testimony. 
5. Award of costs to defendants Lamb 
and Carbon not contemplated by law. 
I. 
[1] The record before us is voluminous 
and covers the entire liability phase of 
Highland's case against Lamb which it 
presented at trial stretching over a period 
of two months. We have diligently re-
viewed the testimony adduced; however, 
space will not allow but the briefest refer-
ence to some of the crucial points. We will 
view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the party against whom the verdict was 
directed, in order to determine whether 
Highland had established a prima facie 
case. Cruz v. Montoya, Utah, 660 P.2d 
723 (1983) and cases cited therein; Lindsay 
v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497 
P.2d 28 (1972). 
II. 
Highland's first assignment of error is 
the trial court's refusal to admit evidence 
of damages based on total costs, quantum 
meruit, and "jury verdict" theories. After 
rejecting Highland's proffer, the court 
made the following finding: 
As to the defendant Lamb Engineering & 
Construction Company, there is no evi-
dence before the court that its conduct, 
misconduct, actions, inactions and/or 
breach of contract caused any damage to 
any other party or parties to the above-
entitled action. 
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Highland contends that the court should 
have allowed evidence that Highland's total 
costs incurred for its partial construction of 
the concrete structures and piping work 
were $2,317,172.66, and that after a credit 
of $413,763.04 paid by Lamb, Highland was 
entitled to $1,903,409.62. Highland's bid to 
Lamb was $1,097,325. 
[2,3] It is true that some degree of 
uncertainty in the evidence of damages will 
not relieve a defendant from recompensing 
a wronged plaintiff. Bastian v. King, 
Utah, 661 P.2d 953 (1983) and cases cited 
therein. However, it is also a general rule 
of long standing that a plaintiff must show 
damages by evidence of facts and not by 
mere conclusions, and that the items of 
damage must be established by substantial 
evidence and not by conjecture. Bunnell 
v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 597 
(1962); Bingham C. & L. Co. v. Board of 
Ed., 61 Utah 149, 159, 211 P. 981 (1922). 
And, whether general or special, damages 
must be traceable to the wrongs com-
plained of. Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater 
Park City Corp., Utah, 592 P.2d 620 
(1979). 
Highland contends that as a result of the 
nature of work to be performed it was 
impossible for it to trace ascertainable and 
quantifiable damages to the misconduct 
and/or breach of the various defendants. 
Therefore, the court below should have let 
the total costs come in under one of the 
three theories set out above, and allowed 
the jury to calculate the amount due as 
well as allocate percentages among the var-
ious defendants. 
[4] 1. In support of its total cost theo-
ry, Highland refers us to several cases 
which allowed recovery to the plaintiff un-
der that method. All of them are distin-
guishable. Two major differences pervade 
all of them: the contractor was either free 
from fault (or his fault was insignificant) 
and suit was brought against a single de-
fendant who was blameworthy in causing 
the contractor's cost overrun. In Thorn 
Const. Co., Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 
Utah, 598 P.2d 365 (1979), the court found 
for the contractor because a specific false 
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representation was made by the defend-
ant's engineer's aide that borrow could be 
used from a certain pit more than 1.7 miles 
closer to the construction area than the pit 
the contractor finally had to use. The 
court allowed the excess cost for hauling 
the borrow. This was determined by com-
paring the cost used by the contractor in 
his bid estimate with his actual cost Con-
versely, here, Highland asks for compensa-
tion not just for extra work but for the 
whole project, including the work done un-
der the bid. It failed to trace its claimed 
damages to breaches of any defendant. 
In J.D. Hedin Construction Company v. 
United States, 347 F.2d 236 (Ct.Cl.1965), 
the primary cause for delay in construction 
of a V.A. hospital was the government's 
faulty piling specifications. This delay 
forced excavations for the foundation to 
stand open during a stormy period of 
weather during which the excavations erod-
ed. The contractor incurred extra costs in 
remedying the effects of the erosion. Re-
sort was had to the contractor's bid esti-
mate which the court found to be reliable 
and the contractor was allowed to recover 
on a "total cost" theory the excess cost 
actually incurred over his bid estimate. 
The court expressed its dislike for the total 
cost method and used it only on that one 
item of damage because there were proper 
safeguards: it was clear that the govern-
ment alone was responsible for the damage 
and the exact amount of damage was diffi-
cult to determine. The court specifically 
rejected total costs on other items of dam-
age that were "susceptible" to precise com-
putation. In the instant case Highland 
could not support its claim that damages 
flowed from acts of or delays caused by 
Lamb and/or Carbon, rather than from its 
own fault. It did not try to tie in its claim 
for damages with its estimate for any par-
ticular cost 
In H. John Homan Co., Inc. v. United 
States, 418 F.2d 522, 189 Ct.Cl. 500 (1969), 
damages were quantified. The contractor 
had incurred extra costs which were attrib-
utable to the government because it had 
furnished an improper survey and faulty 
specifications. The contractor was award-
ed the cost of labor and overhead in excess 
of those items in its bid estimate. Con-
versely here, Highland was unable to show 
what excess cost it had incurred because of 
any particular act or inaction by any de-
fendant Moreover, Highland did not at-
tempt to compare its bid estimate for the 
cost of any item with its actual cost for 
that item. 
The same fatal distinction is noted in 
Moorhead Const. Co. Inc. v. City of 
Grand Forks, 508 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir.1975). 
There an inspection of the site would not 
then have disclosed the difficult site condi-
tions which caused the problems later en-
countered by the contractor. The trial 
court ruled that proper soil conditions un-
der Phase I were to be construed as an 
implied warranty for the contractor to be 
able to work on Phase II as anticipated. 
Moreover, the contract provided for an eq-
uitable adjustment for latent physical con-
ditions. We note that Highland was re-
quired to perform all extra work under 
written change orders. The record is re-
plete with statements that those portions 
of the work performed under change or-
ders were compensated and that despite 
numerous requests by Lamb to submit 
change orders on other occasions, Highland 
repeatedly failed to do so. The record does 
not indicate that Lamb was reluctant to 
issue such change orders, but reveals that 
it urged Highland to cooperate as Lamb 
made two cents profit for every- ten cents 
profit Highland made. All of Moorhead's 
expenses were found to have been fully 
documented and reasonably incurred, Id. at 
101^; none of Highland were document-
ed, despite repeated requests by the court 
to do so when it had to reject as inadmissi-
ble summaries of costs prepared after the 
initiation of the lawsuit. The Moorhead 
court specifically noted that the trial 
court's method of total costs was not the 
preferred method for calculating damages, 
but "that no other method was feasible and 
the supporting evidence was substantial." 
Id. at 1016. Four factors of proof were 
advanced in Moorhead under which that 
method would be acceptable: 
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(1) [TJhe nature of the particular losses 
make it impossible or highly impractical 
to determine them with a reasonable de-
gree of accuracy; 
(2) the plaintiffs bid or estimate was 
realistic; 
(3) its actual costs were reasonable; and 
(4) it was not responsible for the added 
expenses. 
Id. at 1016. 
Compared to those guidelines, High-
land's fact situation is distinguishable on 
all but the third point. The record makes it 
abundantly clear that all extra work per-
formed by Highland was, at the time it was 
incurred, highly susceptible to precise de-
termination, if change orders had been is-
sued, material invoices segregated, and 
man-hours separately recorded. High-
land's own expert witness, Richard White, 
dispelled all notions that the bid had been 
carefully prepared. His testimony con-
firmed that it was not realistic. Highland 
did not inspect the site before submitting 
the bid and the costs of the various compo-
nents of the job were not separately com-
puted. The bid was more of a haphazard 
guess than an estimate based on concrete 
figures. White testified that a realistic bid 
would have made allowances for remote-
ness of area, rocky soil conditions, housing 
and transportation expenses, unfavorable 
weather conditions at an altitude of 7,000 
feet, and sundry other exigencies. None of 
them was projected by Highland. By its 
own admissions and contradictory state-
ments on direct and cross-examination, 
Highland shouldered a major portion of the 
blame for delays, excessive costs and loss 
of work. 
In rejecting Highland's total cost theory 
we look for support to similar cases where 
the plaintiff had failed to quantify damages 
and was not allowed to ignore the terms of 
its bid. In Shocker Const Co. v. State, 
Utah, 619 P.2d 1378 (1980) this Court re-
jected profits above bid as well as total 
costs to the extent that the damages were 
the result of problems plaintiff had with its 
own internal operations and improper 
equipment, or were associated with bad 
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weather. Id. at 1379. Also Thorn, supra, 
was specifically distinguished in Shocker 
as having been affirmed on the basis of 
sufficient evidence in contrast to Shocker, 
where plaintiff had failed specifically to 
associate any portion of its cost with detri-
mental acts of the defendant. IcL at 1380. 
In short, Highland failed to prove its 
increased cost for each alleged problem or 
breach caused by the defendants, failed to 
compare its bid estimate with its actual 
costs for each such problem or breach and 
failed to prove that defendants were solely 
responsible for its additional expense. 
Highland wanted to shorten the process of 
proof by introducing all of its costs for the 
entire job. This it may not do. 
[FJailure to make any satisfactory show-
ing of the amount of damages flowing 
from such breaches would require the 
dismissal of such causes . . . 
Recovery of damages for a breach of 
contract is not allowed unless acceptable 
evidence demonstrates that the damages 
claimed resulted from and were caused 
by the breach. "The costs must be tied 
in to fault on defendant's part." [Cita-
tions omitted.] Boyajian v. United 
States, 423 F.2d 1231, 1235, 191 Ct.Cl. 
233, (1970). 
[5, 61 The paucity of evidence on causal-
ly connected damages cannot be used by 
Highland as a sword to ignore its bid and 
recover its costs plus profit instead. The 
record is barren of the necessary facts 
from which the jury might have reasonably 
found the extent or amount of damages 
flowing from any misconduct of the multi-
ple defendants. In addition, Highland 
failed to prove causation between its costs 
and the breach of any particular defendant. 
See Boyajian v. United States, supra; Ru-
ber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 67 
Cal.App.3d 278, 136 Cal.Rptr. 603 (1977). 
Performance under the bid is not excused 
simply because difficulties are encoun-
tered. Recovery under those circumstanc-
es is restricted to extra work only. L.A. 
Young Sons Const. Co. v. County of 
Tooele, Utah, 575 P.2d 1034 (1978). 
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2. In the alternative, Highland contends 
that the trial court should have allowed its 
total cost under quantum meruit We disa-
gree. 
[7,8] Under Utah law damages are con-
trolled by the contractual remedies fash-
ioned by the parties unless it can be shown 
that the work performed was so different 
from the work contemplated by the con-
tract that additional recovery in quantum 
meruit is warranted. Allen-Howe Special-
ties v. U.S. Const, Inc., Utah, 611 P.2d 705 
(1980); Mann v. American Western Life 
Ins. Co., Utah, 586 P.2d 461 (1978). In this 
case there was a contract clause requiring 
Highland to submit all proposed extra work 
in the form of written change orders so 
that a contractual remedy existed under an 
express contract. Highland's cases cited in 
support of an award of quantum meruit 
damages are all distinguishable. Quantum 
meruit was the proper recovery where the 
work was not anticipated under the con-
tract and the contract could for all intents 
and purposes be considered abandoned. 
Lester N. Johnson Co., Inc. v. City of 
Spokane, 22 Wash.App. 265, 588 P.2d 1214 
(1978); V.C Edwards Contracting Co. 
Inc. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wash.2d 7, 514 
P.2d 1381 (1973); Bignold v. King County, 
65 Wash.2d 817, 399 P.2d 611 (1965); Wun-
derlich Contracting Company v. United 
States, 240 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.1957), cert, 
den. 353 U.S. 950, 77 S.Ct. 861, 1 L.Ed.2d 
859 (1957). Quantum meruit was also up-
held where the subcontractor justifiably 
ceased work or where the general contrac-
tor unjustifiably terminated the subcon-
tractor. United States v. Algernon Blair, 
Inc., 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.1973); Seaboard 
Surety Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 139 
(9th Cir.1966). By contrast, Highland's 
work was anticipated and the work was 
performed in pursuance of the contract. 
Although Highland claimed it had been un-
justifiably terminated, it failed to prove in 
what respects the work performed by it 
differed from the work contemplated by 
the contract. Costs incurred in remedying 
its own faulty work and in repairing its 
own mistakes were not segregated from 
those for which Lamb paid and from those 
for which it did not pay but which actually 
benefitted some or all of the defendants. 
[91 3. We have carefully analyzed the 
cases cited by Highland in support of its 
"jury verdict" theory of recovery. We also 
recognize that the Lamb-Highland contract 
contained an equitable adjustment clause to 
cover changed conditions. We deduce that 
Highland was to give Lamb written notice 
of those changed conditions as a prerequi-
site to such an adjustment, and that writ-
ten estimates of the labor and material 
costs, as well as the impact on the comple-
tion date were to be submitted in support. 
We do not read the cases allowing "jury 
verdict" recovery under similar equitable 
adjustment clauses to stand for the propo-
sition that the contract may be discarded in 
its entirety. Instead, the equitable adjust-
ment is the difference between the amount 
the work would have cost absent unantici-
pated changes and the amount it did cost 
as a result of the altered conditions. Fat-
tore Co., Inc. v. Metropolitan Sewerage 
Com\ 505 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.1974), holding 
the parties to the equitable adjustment 
clause invoked by the plaintiff; Metropoli-
tan Sewerage Com'n v. R.W. Const, 72 
Wis.2d 365, 241 N.W.2d 371 (1976), reject-
ing summary of expenses and remanding 
for an allocation of costs based upon fail-
ures of the respective parties; Dynalec-
tron Corp. (Pacific Div.) v. United States, 
518 F.2d 594, 207 CtCl. 349 (1975) ordering 
both plaintiff and the government to share 
costs where both parties shared responsi-
bility for plaintiffs inability to perform Air 
Force specifications for jamming devices in 
electronic countermeasure systems. 
In distinguishing these cases from High-
land's situation, we are not unaware of 
Highland's proffered admission that ap-
proximately $30,000 damages were the re-
sult of Highland's underbid on hoppers and 
another $50,000 of Highland's own labor 
inefficiencies. However, these conclusory, 
unilaterally established sums were barren 
of any supporting evidence and consequent-
ly could not constitute the basis for "jury 
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verdict" damages of costs plus anticipated 
profits, minus $80,000. 
Highland asks us to find the jury verdict 
approach consistent with this Court's ra-
tionale and holding in Winsness v. MJ. 
Conoco Distributors, Utah, 593 P.2d 1303 
(1979). That case dealt with the issue of 
whether money damages could be deter-
mined from the lessee's failure to keep a 
gasoline service station open 24 hours a 
day. Suffice it to say that the data sub-
mitted to the jury in that case were meticu-
lously compiled to serve as a point of de-
parture for the jury's assessment of dam-
ages. Antipodal to that fact situation is 
the one here under review: Highland could 
express its loss of efficiency in percentage 
terms only. It offered no breakdown on 
breaches of contract, and no breakdown of 
breaches allocated to the several defend-
ants. No evidence was adduced of re-
quests for time extensions apparently al-
lowed under the contract; no evidence was 
adduced on work beyond the scope of the 
contract; no evidence was proffered break-
ing down the cost of Highland's own errors 
and delays. By Highland's own admission 
through counsel it was "absolutely unable 
to come up with something [in the nature 
of quantifiable elements of damages] that 
would be more than just a gut reaction." 
The insurmountable barrier Highland erect-
ed to a successful proffer of damage evi-
dence was its complete inability to make 
the causal connection between its losses on 
the project and the commissions or omis-
sions of acts of the defendants or some of-
them. Although we commend counsel for 
Highland for their valiant effort to harness 
what evidence they had at their disposal, 
Highland simply did not keep the proper 
records necessary to enable a jury to have 
some methodology as a tool to properly 
discharge its function. 
We therefore hold that the trial court did 
not err in refusing to permit Highland to 
prove its damages under any of the three 
theories addressed above. 
[10-12] Highland's related assignment 
of error, that the trial court improperly 
ruled that Highland was not entitled to 
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punitive damages and loss of business 
must also be rejected. It is the general 
rule in this forum that punitive damages 
cannot be awarded for a breach of contract 
unless the breach amounts to an indepen-
dent tort. Jorgensen v. John Clay and 
Co., Utah, 660 P.2d 229 (1983), and cases 
cited therein. There is no evidence to that 
effect in that portion of the record before 
us and we affirm the trial court's ruling on 
punitive damages. Highland's claim for 
business losses must fail for the same rea-
son that its claim for all other damages 
fails. Consequential damages will be 
awarded if the losses resulting from a 
breach were reasonably within the contem-
plation of the parties when they entered 
into the subcontract. Hadley v. Boxen-
dale, 156 Eng.Reptr. 145 (Ex.1854). High-
land proffered a statement to the effect 
that it suffered between $785,000 and 
$1,042,000 in damages. Where the claim 
for damages remains unsupported by suffi-
cient documentation to allow the jury to 
reasonably infer a causality between 
breaches of defendants and losses by High-
land, a claim of business losses and conse-
quential damages cannot rise to the level of 
proof required to permit recovery-
Ill. 
[13] We next consider Highland's con-
tention that the trial court committed error 
in the giving of a special verdict form and 
in its failure to submit proposed jury in-
structions on Highland's theories of defens-
es to Lamb's counterclaim. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides that "[n]o party may assign 
as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto. In 
objecting to the giving of an instruction, a 
party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds for his 
objection." See also Jensen v. Eakins, 
Utah, 575 P.2d 179 (1978). We have before 
us only that portion of the record that 
deals with Highland's case which was dis-
missed by a directed verdict prior to the 
proceeding of the trial on Lamb's counter-
claim. There is thus nothing before us 
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from which we can learn what the nature 
of the objections was with respect to rejec-
tion of some of Highland's proposed in-
structions. All we have before us are the 
instructions themselves with notations 
made by the trial judge. Notwithstanding 
the cited requirement of Rule 51, that same 
rule also gives us the discretion, in the 
interest of justice, to "review the giving or 
failure to give an instruction." We have 
reviewed the instructions cited to us by 
Highland and conclude that the theories of 
both parties were covered by those instruc-
tions submitted to the jury. We have also 
reviewed the special interrogatories sub-
mitted to the jury on damages incurred by 
Lamb for the completion of work left un-
done by Highland. In the absence of any 
record on proper objections to exhibits sup-
porting the cost of completion, we are rele-
gated to assessing the propriety of the 
instructions from their face. We note that 
the jury answered all of the special inter-
rogatories, reduced the cost of claimed cap-
ital to one-fourth and the fee of administer-
ing completion of the work to less than 
one-fifth of the amounts asked for by 
Lamb. Answering the special interrogato-
ry on consequential damages, the-jury de-
nied in its entirety an amount of nearly 
$400,000. It would be difficult to suggest 
that such discriminatory evaluation showed 
prejudice to Highland. All instructions 
considered together show that the trial 
court properly presented the issues to the 
jury. Gilhespie v. DeJong, Utah, 520 P.2d 
878 (1974); Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 
631, 237 P.2d 834 (1951). We conclude that 
Highland's claim of error in instructing the 
jury is unfounded. 
IV. 
[14] The trial court's findings and judg-
ment stated that "as to the defendants 
Michael R. Lamb and James R. Lamb, 
there is no evidence as to any improper 
conduct, misconduct or breach of contract, 
nor is there any other evidence before the 
court upon which they could be found liable 
to any other party or parties to the above 
entitled action." Highland assails this rul-
ing as not being supported by the evidence. 
We have carefully considered the portions 
of the record cited to us by Highland and 
find several inconsistencies. Highland's 
statement that there was a total termina-
tion of Highland's subcontract on July 10, 
1979 by these individual defendants is not 
supported by the record. There was a par-
tial termination only on the fine coal re-
claim tunnel, the loadout structure founda-
tion, the transfer tower foundation and the 
drive building # 1 foundation, on all of 
which Highland was found to be in default 
All other aspects of the work continued 
under the contract. The only other refer-
ence to any misconduct was the taping of a 
conference between Lamb and Highland 
without Highland's knowledge. No evi-
dence was adduced that Highland suffered 
damages at the hands of these individual 
defendants as a result thereof. There was 
no proffer of evidence of damages attribut-
able to them personally. We find no error 
in their dismissal from the action. 
V. 
[15] Highland's next assignment of er-
ror deals with the exclusion of the testimo-
ny of Highland's expert witness, Richard 
White, who was a potential bidder on the 
coal facility project as a prime contractor. 
Highland offered Mr. White's testimony as 
an expert in the construction industry with 
respect to a hypothetical question that late 
delivery of plans, unavailability of con-
struction sites, incomplete and defective 
plans and similar negative conditions would 
have an adverse effect upon man and 
equipment hours, and that it was not prac-
tical or possible to quantify and assign 
dollar value to each of those conditions. 
The court sustained defendants' objections 
on the ground that it would not be helpful 
to the jury to ask the witness hypothetical-
ly "whether if plans were delivered late it 
causes problems, and to have him say yes." 
The court conceded that testimony would 
be allowed if the witness could base his 
opinion on the evidence given by other wit-
nesses with respect to plan delays and oth-
er problems. The court found that those 
witnesses up to that point had been "singu-
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lariy unable" to quantify damages. It sug-
gested that Highland acquaint its expert 
witness with the record for illustrations of 
those elements supporting his testimony. 
Highland declined to analyze the record, 
stating that the proffer made was suffi-
cient for the purposes intended. It cited no 
data upon which the expert could base his 
opinion. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence in force at 
the time of trial of this case1 permitted 
testimony by an expert in the form of an 
opinion if those opinions were "(a) based on 
facts or data perceived by or personally 
known or made known to the witness at 
the hearing, and (b) within the scope of the 
special knowledge, skill, experience or 
training possessed by the witness." Rule 
56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, [Emphasis 
added.] "The expertise of the witness, his 
degree of familiarity with the necessary 
facts, and the logical nexus between his 
opinion and the facts adduced must be es-
tablished." Edwards v. Didencksen, 
Utah, 597 P.2d 1328, 1331 (1979). See also 
Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 
Utah 2d 221, 226, 408 P.2d 186 (1965). 
Rule 56(2) and the case law support the 
trial court's ruling. The testimony was 
properly excluded so long as the witness 
was unable to give his opinion based upon 
data made known to him at trial, as, absent 
personal knowledge of the facts, this was 
the only ground on which the evidence 
could have come in. We therefore affirm 
the trial court's ruling on this issue. 
VI. 
Finally, Highland contends that costs 
were improperly awarded to the defend-
ants. Inasmuch as separate memoranda of 
costs were filed by Lamb and Carbon, our 
approach to the issue will be bifurcated. 
[16] We first deal with the propriety of 
the award to Lamb. Lamb's cost memo-
randum was filed on July 2, 1981, and 
Highland's motion to have Lamb's bill of 
1. The Utah Rules of Evidence were amended 
effective September 1, 1983, to align them with 
v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO. Utah 1051 
1042 (Utah 1984) 
costs taxed was filed on July 9, 1981, with-
in the seven-days' period allowed under 
Rule 54(dX2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The total bill came to 
$2,526.75, of which $2,280.75 was for depo-
sitions of Highland's witnesses. Highland 
contends the cost of the depositions was 
not awardable. Although there has been 
some controversy on this question in our 
forum, the majority of this Court has con-
sistently held that the costs of depositions 
are taxable ''subject to the limitation that 
the trial court is persuaded that they were 
taken in good faith and, in the light of the 
circumstances, appeared to be essential for 
the development and presentation of the 
case." Frampton v. Wilson, Utah, 605 
P.2d 771, 774 (1980) and cases cited therein; 
Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Og~ 
den, 12 Utah 2d 235, 239, 364 P.2d 1029 
(1961). In First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. v. Wright, Utah, 521 P 2d 563, 567 
(1974), where we upheld the trial court's 
denial of deposition costs, we stated that 
"[t]he burden is upon the claiming party to 
establish that they are necessary and rea-
sonable, the determination of whether that 
burden is met is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court; " For the guidance 
of both the trial courts and counsel we 
would allow deposition <"osts as necessary 
and reasonable where the de\elopment of 
the case is of such a complex nature that 
discovery cannot be accomplished through 
the less expensive method of interrogato-
ries, requests for admissions and requests 
for the production of documents The 
award ot costs should be narrowly made to 
guard against abuse by those better finan-
cially equipped lest costs of seeking justice 
become prohibitive for the financially ill 
equipped. 
[17] Even under this restriction, we 
find no abuse of the discretion of the trial 
court in awarding the costs of depositions 
of Highland's witnesses. The complexity 
of a construction case and the theories of 
recovery sought to be used here made it 
the Federal Rules of Evidence 
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virtually impossible to obtain sufficient in-
formation for the preparation of the case 
through more conservative methods of dis-
covery. Moreover, the depositions were 
used at trial on cross-examination, both to 
impeach veracity and to refresh memory. 
We therefore affirm the trial court's award 
of costs to Lamb in its entirety. 
[18] The award of costs to Carbon in 
the amount of $12,712.46 is another story. 
The findings and judgment on the directed 
verdict against Highland were filed on 
April 27, 1981. Carbon's memorandum of 
costs was filed May 5, and Highland's mo-
tion to strike Carbon's costs, though signed 
May 11, was not filed until May 15. Both 
parties were thus outside the limitations 
permitted by Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the 
paramount issue presents itself: Did the 
trial court err in awarding Carbon its costs 
when the memorandum of costs was not 
filed as required by the rules? We hold 
that it did. 
This court has previously held that an 
unverified memorandum of costs filed with-
in the five-day period did not entitle the 
plaintiff to an award of costs, and that it 
was error to permit the filing of a supple-
mental, verified memorandum thereafter. 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. New York 
Terminal W. Co,} 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 P.2d 
626 (1960). The rationale of the Court in 
that decision that "[c]osts were not recov-
erable at common law, and the right to 
recover them is purely statutory" (Id, at 
216, 350 P.2d 626) is equally applicable 
where no memorandum at all was filed 
within the five-day period permitted by the 
rule. Decisions under similar former statu-
tory law support a strict construction of 
this rule. Nelson, et ux. v. Arrowhead 
Freight Lines, Limited, 99 Utah 129, 104 
P.2d 225 (1940); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 
80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932). The memo-
randum of costs should be stricken and 
Carbon required to bear its own costs with 
one exception. As the trial progressed 
through the district court, Carbon ordered 
and paid for a daily transcript of the testi-
mony. When this appeal was filed by 
Highland, it certified as part of the record 
those transcripts and Highland has used 
them extensively in this appeal. It is there-
fore equitable that Highland should reim-
burse Carbon for the transcripts at the rate 
charged if they had been produced at the 
conclusion of the trial in the usual manner 
for appeal purposes and not on the more 
expensive daily rate basis. We remand to 
the district court to determine that cost and 
we award that amount to Carbon as a cost 
on appeal. 
VII. 
In sum, we reject Highland's various to-
tal cost theories to recover damages, as we 
have consistently done in similar cases in 
the past, where the costs were attributable 
to work covered by the contract, either 
under the bid, or through change order 
provisions. Parties to a contract must re 
main free to enforce the terms of their 
agreement and the contractor must be held 
to the terms of his bid, particularly where 
he is unable to connect additional costs 
with any particular breach on the part of 
any particular defendant The issue of 
quantifiable damages pervaded all other 
issues presented by Highland on appeal. 
With the exception of the award of costs 
to Carbon, the judgment, as modified, is 
affirmed in its entirety. Costs on appeal 
are awarded to Lamb; no appeal costs are 
awarded to Carbon except as heretofore 
noted. 
HALL, C.J., and CHRISTOFFERSEN, 
VeNOY and GOULD, CALVIN, District 
Judges, concur. 
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., having dis-
qualified themselves, do not participate 
herein, CHRISTOFFERSEN and GOULD, 
District Judges, sat. 
STEWART, J., does not participate here-
in. 
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HOSEK KFQU-OV«TO^M0 F0UW3RT 
Nevi4«» 
ftoprem* Court & Colorado*. 
reba^lWli 
Stifearftt* Denied frebi 2*, I9«« 
L Mtf#«tto*aa*aw*f****2<4* 
to- contractor's action against: subee»» 
tractor for bneecfe oT contact to supply cast 
atom ift* coflege buildinf, an arbitration 
award waa. properly refused wbe» offered in 
evidence by subcontractor, where arbitration 
proceedings were betwee* subcontractor and 
college and not between subcontractor and 
contractor, and contractor was only a wit-
ness hi the proceedings^ since that did not 
constitute him a- "party" on subject him to 
liability under arbitrator's decisions 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition* for all other definitions of 
"Party"* 
1 Appeal and error <3=M0tl(l) 
In contractor's action against subcon-
tractor for breach of contract to supply cast 
stone for college building, it was for the tri-
al court to draw conclusions from conflicting 
eridence, and those conclusions would not be 
disturbed by the Supreme Court 
En Banc 
Error to District Court, El Paso County; 
J. E. Little, Judge. 
Action by George O. Teats against the 
Hosek Manufacturing-Overland Foundry 
Company, for breach of contract, wherein 
defendant filed a cross-complaint. To re-
view a judgment for plaintiff, defendant 
brings error. 
Affirmed. 
Frank Seydel, of Denver, for plaintiff in 
error. 
Ben S. Wendelken, of Colorado Springs, 
for defendant in error. 
FRANCIS E- BOUCK, Chief Justice. 
Reversal is herein sought of a district 
court judgment for damages based upon a 
subcontractor's alleged violation of its con-
tract to supply cast stone of given specifica-
tions to Teats, the principal contractor, 
plaintiff below and defendant in error here. 
Teats sued the subcontractor, the plaintiff 
in error Hosek Manufacturing-Overland 
Foundry Company. The latter denied the 
violation^ charged against rt, -affirmatively 
alleged its full compliance with the specifi-
cations, and tHen charged negligence of 
Teats himself to be the direct cause of 
defects or injuries found in the materials 
supplied. By cross-complaint the company 
demanded the balance of the purchase 
price. 
?The alleged errors assigned by the com-
pany are (1) rejection of defendant's ex-
hibit 5, purporting to be an arbitration 
award, (2) refusal to give the jury each of 
ten instructions tendered by the defendant, 
(3) giving the jury an instruction not to 
consider defendant's defense of arbitra-
tion, (4) refusing a new trial. 
The subject matter relates to certain re-
pairs and alterations made in a dormitory 
building of Colorado College at Colorado 
Springs. An appropriate contract had been 
entered into by Teats and the college. It 
called for a cast stone porch and arches. 
Teats had received and accepted in due 
course the bid of the defendant company for 
supplying the materials in question. 
[1] The assignments of error all focus 
upon the single proposition that exhibit 5, 
the so-called arbitration award, was a final 
determination of the respective rights and 
liabilities of Teats and the company. 
The specifications underlying the con-
tract between Teats and the college con-
tained the following: "The General Condi-
tions of the contract as prepared by the 
American Institute of Architects shall be-
come a part of these specifications as fully 
as if herein written. A copy of these Gen-
eral Conditions may be examined at the 
office of the Architect." These "general 
conditions" include provisions for arbitra-
tion. The trouble with the alleged arbitra-
tion in the case at bar is that the proceed-
ings were between the company and the 
college, not between the company and 
Teats. The Court cannot find fiom the 
record that Teats was a party to the arbi-
tration proceedings. He was a witness, but 
that does not constitute him a party or sub-
ject him to liability under the decision of 
the arbitrator. Neither the "general condi-
tions" nor the code chapter on arbitration 
could accomplish this result. It follows 
that exhibit 5 was properly refused when 
offered in evidence by the company. 
[2] The arbitration award being prop-
erly rejected, there remains nothing but a 
case of conflicting evidence. It was the 
province of the trial court to draw conclu-
sions from that evidence, and under a 
TuTc-wew a fe»ftwfiy cmtrf db 
' " i l t i ^ i i ;•>•••• windaSi.i* 
emt m 
aubtneu* 
*. • >•%*% » %Z*** 
PHI LUPS %v PEOPLE. 
Mai I4SW. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
reb. 10, 1941. 
Rehearing Denied March S» 1941. 
ft Department. 
t ^rror to District Court, Jefferson Cotn> 
*> Samuel W. Johnson, Judge. 
^Calvin J. Phillips was convicted ota&> 
^ I t , and he brings error. 
Affirmed* 
-Clarence O. Moore, of Denver, for plain-' 
* in error, 
j , ^yron G. Rogers, Arty. Gen., and Gerald' 
f* McAuliffe, AssL Atty. Gen* for defends 
^ t in error. 
&AKKE, Justice. 
* t*laintiff in error, defendant below, was 
t°t*nd guilty of assault for shooting a fif-
-**n year old boy and sentenced to six 
^nths in jail. Reversal is sought on a 
I. Criminal law <£=>365<l) *** o f e r r o n 
Where immediately after accused shot Upon our own motion we dismissed the 
jOrzi&tZ9&sr Mrtzte&&f joterAP AFQSV zr&Jjfa? ^ ^ for failure to prosecute, but subse-
and he with two deputies set out to ar-
rest accused who was found near his truck 
with two guns with him, testimony in pros-
ecution for assault that as accused was 
reaching for a gun, one of the deputies 
overpowered him and brought him down and 
that both of accused's guns were loaded 
was not inadmissible as being testimony of 
a separate and independent crime but was 
admissible as part of the "res gestae". 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
MRes Gestm". 
2. Criminal law ^=M78(!) 
Where X-ray pictures showing bullet 
lodged in one of the witnesses were intro-
duced in connection with the testimony of a 
medical expert in prosecution for assault 
growing out of shooting of prosecuting wit-
nesses by accused, a ballistics expert there-
m\ 
^ntfy, on motion of plaintiff in error, it 
reinstated and we now elect to deter-
the matter as submitted on typewritten 
sJ^fs, without staying the execution of 
^tence. 
vhe parties will be designated as in the 
below. 
facts briefly stated are: On the aft-
p%on of September 16, 1939, three boys, 
a r Hons, Aday and Schwartz, whose homes 
^ in Golden, went up on Table Mountain 
• ^ r Golden on a hunting trip. Each car-
^^i a 22-caliber rifle. As they walked 
ra%g they shot at various targets—birds, 
0£^bits, etc. They entered upon the land 
tk defendant, who apparently had seen 
^ m and was approaching with a gun in 
be^ crook of his arm. The boys stopped 
t l Mind some rocks, but when defendant con-
kj ^ed to advance, they ran and tried to 
nesses oy accused, a oaiusucs expert mere- niN - _ _ _ - - , - - „ - . , 
after called was competent to testify as to tlue l n a w o o d e n **Yen n e a r by- ** u*uaI» 
dieting off a very hard stone wall and at an 
angle of some 45 degrees as compared with 
the bullet shown in the X-ray pictures since 
qualification aa an expert to interpret X-
ray pictures was not necessary. 
3. Homlcltf* «=»34l 
Where accused was charged with "as-
sault to commit murder" and no particular 
degree of murder was involved and court's 
instructions covered the crime of murder, 
refusal to instruct on all degrees of murder 
if error was not prejudicial since error if 
any was favorable to the accused. 
110 P.2d—02 
> ^ 
Ve was a dog along and he started whin-
£en, thus reveahng their whereabouts to cle-j^ dant Parsons was at the end of the 
w a /ert nearest defendant, and behind him j Aday, with Schwartz near the opposite 
c o n . Parsons testified to the following 
.versation with defendant: "So I have 
era y o u a t *ast' e ^ **e s a ^ : 'Gome on, 
outwl out of there/ And I went to crawl 
My gun was lying on the ground and 
ut my hand behind me to get up and he 
£rei, 'So pull a gun on me, will you?' and he 
gcj.d. Before he fired, I said, 'Don't shoot.' * 
„jMwartz testified that defendant said? 
r- pn't pull a gun on me or I, will shoot you 
ht through the heart." 
i p ; 
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Neil JORGENSEN, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
• . 
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a corpora-
tioa, and Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company, a corporation, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 1762L 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 3, 1983. 
Seller of sheep brought breach of con-
tract action against buyer and its surety. 
The Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, 
Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment in favor 
of seller, and appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) buyer 
was not entitled to have venue changed to 
Weber County, its principal place of busi-
ness; (2) award of punitive damages, and 
attorney fees as an element of them, was 
error; and (3) seller was entitled to interest 
on difference between what seller should 
have received under contract with buyer 
and what he actually received. 
Modified and affirmed. 
1. Venue <8=*7.5<2) 
Defendant buyer was not entitled to 
have breach of contract action moved to 
Weber County, Utah, its principal place of 
business, where neither face of contract nor 
implications drawn from it indicated that 
buyer's obligation was to be performed in a 
particular county of Utah. U.C.A.1953, 7&-
ia-4. 
2. Venue «=>7.5(7) 
Venue in breach of contract action was 
properly placed in county where plaintiff 
seller was a resident, where plaintiff seller 
sued on transitory cause of action and cause 
of action arose without state. U.C.A.1953, 
78-13-6. 
3. Damages <s=>89(2) 
Generally, punitive damages cannot be 
awarded for breach of contract. 
While jury did find malice in buyer's 
breach of contract for purchase of lambs 
and returned a verdict of one dollar puni-
tive damages, there was no pleading, argu-
ment or evidentiary suggestion that refusal 
of lambs rose to level of an independent 
tort; and thus award of punitive damages, 
and attorney fees as an element of them, 
was error. 
5. Interest <*=>39(2) 
Prejudgment interest may be awarded 
in a case where the loss is fixed as of a 
particular time and the amount of the loss 
can be calculated with mathematical accu-
racy. 
6. Interest <*»56 
Seller, the plaintiff in breach of con-
tract action, was entitled to interest on 
difference between what seller should have 
received under contract with buyer and 
what he actually received from another as 
of date of last delivery. 
Richard L. Stine and Richard Campbell, 
Ogden, Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Stephen L. Henriod 
and Clark R. Nielsen, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This is a case of breach of contract for 
the purchase of sheep from Neil Jorgensen 
(seller). John Clay and Company (buyer) 
and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company 
(buyer's surety) seek a reversal of the judg-
ment entered against them and retrial on 
the basis of improper venue; or, in the 
alternative, they seek a remittitur in the 
amounts of $21,400 awarded for attorneys* 
fees and $14,822.37 awarded for pre-judg-
ment interest. 
Seller, who raises sheep for market, is a 
resident of Mt Pleasant, Sanpete County, 
Utah. For many years he had dealt with 
the buyer who has its principal place of 
business in Ogden, Weber County, Utah. 
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Seller entered into a contract with buyer in 
November of 1978 for the sale of 5,000 
lambs at 66 cents per pound with a "weight 
stop"l of 120 pounds. In early December, 
seller entered into a second contract in 
which buyer agreed to purchase 10,000 
lambs at 70 cents per pound with no weight 
stop and had the option to take delivery of 
them between January and March 15,1979. 
At this time most of seller's sheep were 
pastured in Blythe, California, although 
some were in Cedar City, Utah and in Mt 
Pleasant, Utah. Shipments from Blythe on 
the first contract began after Christmas 
and continued into January of 1979. Ship-
ping dates were agreed upon in advance of 
each shipment so that seller or his repre-
sentative could be present to supervise the 
sorting, loading, and inspection of the 
lambs. Because bad weather conditions de-
veloped in Blythe that winter, seller had to 
move his lambs in order to save them. 
Buyer, who was already obligated for ship-
ment, agreed to reimburse seller for moving 
the 10,000 lambs sold under the second con-
tract to a feedlot in Ault, Colorado. The 
feedlot is located near Monfort Company of 
Greeley, Colorado, which is a packing house 
to whom buyer had resold the lambs. 
Even though the custom in the industry 
and the parties' practice had been to notify 
the owner prior to the shipment of live-
stock, buyer selected 2,421 of seller's lambs 
and shipped them to Monfort from the 
feedlot on February 5, 6, and 7, 1979 with-
out advising seller. When seller protested, 
buyer assured him that it would not happen 
again. However, later in February buyer 
shipped 1,096 more lambs to Monfort with-
out advising seller. Seller was paid for 
these but received no weight slips and he 
claimed they were improperly weighed. 
Consequently, seller advised the feedlot 
owner not to release any more of his lambs 
without notifying him. 
At the next scheduled shipment, because 
bad weather prevented him from flying into 
Ault, Colorado, seller telephoned to autho-
1. A "weight stop" is a device used m the indus-
try which puts a weight limitation on each 
lamb so that any excess weight is not paid for 
rise the release of his lambs. He was told 
that since he was not present, another own-
er's lambs had been substituted and 
shipped. Later, two days before another 
shipment was scheduled, he was informed 
that buyer would not accept any more of 
his lambs because buyer claimed that seller 
had interfered with Monfort's slaughtering 
schedule. In the interim the market had 
fallen to 60 cents per pound; and, buyer 
offered to take the lambs at that price with 
a weight stop of 120 pounds. Seller gave 
buyer until March 10 to honor the contract 
but when buyer's only response was to raise 
its offer to 63 cents per pound, seller resold 
6,238 lambs to R.H. Rock Co. at a loss to 
him of $166,566.40 which was in addition to 
the unpaid freight charges of $22,000.00 for 
shipping from Blythe. Further loss was 
sustained by seller when buyer eventually 
paid 5 cents per pound less than agreed 
upon for 274 lambs which seller had deliv-
ered in February. 
After filing a claim with buyer's surety, 
seller brought suit in Sanpete County. 
Buyer moved to change venue to Weber 
County but the motion was denied, the trial 
was conducted, and the jury returned its 
verdict awarding plaintiff $191,463.40 
($166,566.40 damages on the contract, $22,-
000.00 for freight from Blythe and 5 cents 
per pound on the 274 lambs shipped in 
February) and $100 punitive damages To 
that verdict the trial court added pre-judg-
ment interest of $14,822.37 and attorneys' 
fees of $21,400.00. 
VENUE 
Buyer moved to change venue to Weber 
County, its principal place of business, rely-
ing upon the following statutory provisions 
of U.C.A., 1953: 
78-13-4. Actions on written con-
tracts.—When the defendant has con-
tracted in writing to perform an obliga-
tion in a particular county of the state 
and resides in another county, an action 
on such contract obligation may be com-
by the buyer It is disapproved by the Packers 
and Stockyards Administration 
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meaced and tried in the county where 
pock obligation is to be performed or in 
which the defendant resides. 
7&-13-7. All other actions.—In all 
other cases the action must be tried in the 
county in which the cause of action arises, 
Of in the county in which any defendant 
resides at the commencement of the ac-
tion; provided, that if any such defend-
ant is a corporation, any county in which 
such corporation has its principal office or 
place of business shall be deemed the 
county in which such corporation resides 
within the meaning of this section 
Since § 78-13-7 applies only where no 
other provision applies, we need not discuss 
it here. Buyer cites several cases to sup-
port the applicability of § 78-13-4 to this 
contract Simmons v. Hoyt, 109 Utah 186, 
167 ?2d 27 (1946); Palfreyman v. True-
man, 105 Utah 463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943); 
Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P.2d 281 
(1935); Atlas Acceptance Corp. v. Pratt, 85 
Utah 352, 39 P.2d 710 (1935); Buckle v. 
Ogden Furniture and Carpet Co., Utah, 61 
Utah 559, 216 P. 684 (1923). In these cases 
where written contracts to allegedly per-
form "an obligation in a particular county 
of this state" had not explicitly or impliedly 
indicated the place of performance, we re-
solved the ambiguity in favor of the de-
fendant and held the venue to be at the 
residence of the defendant, rather than the 
place of performance. But that principle is 
not reached here since this case is distin-
guishable. 
[1] Unlike the cases cited in the above 
paragraph, the contract involved here was 
not one to perform an obligation in a partic-
ular county of this state or necessarily with-
,in this state at all. Most of the sheep were 
pastured in California, had to be moved to 
Colorado and were resold there. Buyer's 
agents conducted transactions and commu-
nications with seller from Colorado and Ari-
2. 7 U.S.C. § 228b, Reg. of Sec. of Agriculture, 
Packers and Stockyards Act, 9 C.F.R., Sec 
201.43(b)(2)(h) states: 
No dealer purchasing livestock for 
slaughter, shall mail a check in payment for 
the livestock unless (a) the check is made 
available for actual delivery and the seller or 
zona. It was Colorado where buyer refused 
to accept further deliveries which it had 
agreed to take under the contract This 
dimension of contract boundaries beyond 
the territorial limits of Utah is not present 
in the cases cited and relied upon by the 
buyer. 
Neither does the face of the contract or 
implications drawn from it indicate that 
buyer's obligation was to be performed in a 
particular county of this state. The omis-
sion from the contract of a statement of the 
place of performance as well as the sur-
rounding factual setting of various out-of-
state locations for the parties' transactions 
are considerations which lead to the conclu-
sion that § 78-13-4 does not obtain in this 
instance. 
Even the fact that the parties contracted 
in light of the Packers and Stockyards Act 
is not helpful. The applicable provision2 
suggests that Sanpete County might have 
been the place of performance only if seller 
had not been present to receive payment at 
the time of delivery in California or Colora-
do. The application of the Packers and 
Stockyards Act provision to the contract as 
a fallback provision does not create an am-
biguity concerning alternative places of 
performance as buyer argues, either Its 
language is quite clear In short, the appli-
cation of this provision would not qualify 
this contract under it. 
[2] The applicable statute in this in-
stance is the following: 
78-13-6. Arising without this state in 
favor of resident.—All transitory causes 
of action arising without this state in 
favor of residents of this state shall, if 
action is brought thereon in this state, be 
brought and tried in the county where 
the plaintiff resides, or in the county 
where the principal defendant resides, or 
if the principal defendant is a corpora-
his duly authorized representative is not 
present to receive payment, at the point of 
transfer of possession of such livestock, on 
or before the close of the next business day 
following purchase of the livestock and 
transfer of possession thereof 
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tkm, then in the county where the plain-
tiff resides or in the county where such 
corporation has an office or place of busi-
ness, subject, however, to a change of 
venue as provided by law. 
There is no dispute that plaintiff sued on a 
transitory cause of action. It is also clear 
that this cause of action arose "without this 
state." Colorado was where buyer took 
possession of some of the lambs without 
notice to seller and then later refused to 
accept further deliveries. Buyer provides 
no persuasive rationale for his argument 
that while Colorado was the place of injury, 
it was not the location where the right of a 
cause of action arose. Because seller had 
an option under § 78-13-6 to choose where 
to bring suit, the district court had no pre-
rogative to change venue to the county of 
buyer's choice. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Walker, Utah, 631 PM 860 (1981). As a 
result, there was no error on this point 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
There was no provision for payment of 
attorney's fees in this contract. The trial 
court awarded them as an element of puni-
tive damages because the jury had found 
malice. 
In tort cases where conduct is willful and 
malicious, we have allowed the award of 
punitive damages. Elkington v. Foust, 
Utah, 618 P.2d 37 (1980); Terry v. Zions 
Co-op Mercantile Inst, Utah, 605 P.2d 314 
(1979), Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354 
(1975); Hofdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 
505 P.2d 295 (1973); Powers v. Taylor, 14 
Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963). In a 
recent repossession case, Clayton v Cross-
roads Equipment Co., Utah, 655 P.2d 1125 
(1982), we affirmed the award of punitive 
damages on similar grounds. 
Heretofore, we have not approved the 
award of punitive damages for breach of 
contract In First Security Bank v. Utah 
Turkey Growers, Inc., Utah, 610 P.2d 329 
(1980), we held that under the Utah Uni-
form Commercial Code remedies are applied 
solely to compensate for actual losses—no 
punitive awards are permitted. In Debry & 
Hilton Travel v. Capitol Intern. Airways, 
Utah, 588 P.2d 1181 (1978), we affirmed the 
denial of attorney's fees in a breach of 
contract action where punitive damages 
were also denied. Palornbi v. D &C Build-
ers, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969), 
involved faulty workmanship in the per-
formance of a contract for the installation 
of aluminum siding where we held that 
punitive damages were not justified but 
awarded attorney's fees on a statutory ba-
sis. In Dahl v. Prince, 119 Utah 556, 230 
P.2d 328 (1951), we held that an award for 
attorney's fees as damages against an at-
taching creditor for depriving plaintiff of 
possession of an automobile was erroneous. 
See also Lyman Grazing Assoc, v. Smith, 24 
Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 905 (1970), a contract 
action where malice was not found and 
attorney's fees were not awarded. 
[3] The general rule is that punitive 
damages cannot be awarded for a breach of 
contract Farris v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar-
anty Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978); 
Purington v. Sound West, 173 Mont. 106, 
566 P.2d 795 (1977); Continental Nat. Bank 
v. Evans, 107 Ariz. 378, 489 P.2d 15 (1971). 
See 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 245 (1965). 
See also: Restatement of Contracts § 342 
(1982); Williston on Contracts § 1340 (Rev. 
Ed., 1968); Sutherland on Damages, Exem-
plary Damages, § 391 (4th Ed., 1916). 
However, we and other jurisdictions have 
allowed punitive damages where the breach 
of contract amounts to an independent tort. 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 293 (1982); Temmen v. 
Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 22TI Kan. 45, 605 
P.2d 95 (1980); Jackson v. Glasgow, Okla. 
App., 622 P 2d 1088 (1980), Z.D Howard 
Co. v. Cartwright, Okla., 537 P.2d 345 
(1975); Gonzalez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 217 
Kan. 262, 535 P.2d 919 (1975); Dold v. Out-
rigger Hotel, 54 Hawaii 18, 501 P.2d 368, 58 
A.L.R3d 360 (1972). 
We recognize the rule in some jurisdic-
tions which, rather than requiring an inde-
pendent tort, allows the award of punitive 
damages if the contract was breached will-
fully and maliciously. Yacht Club Sales & 
Service, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank, 101 Idaho 
852, 623 P.2d 464 (1980); State Farm Gen-
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v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 last delivery. Seller was entitled to interest 
on that difference. We find no error on 
this point 
The judgment below is affirmed except 
as modified herein. No costs awarded. 
*ni Ins. Co. 
JK2d 798 (1974); Boiae Dodge Inc. v. Clark, 
9* Idaho 902, 453 ?2d 551 (1966). Despite 
dicta in some cases, we have not and do not 
adhere to this rule. 
[4] Therefore, while the jury did find 
malice in the buyer's breach of contract and 
returned a verdict of $1.00 punitive dam-
ages, there was no pleading, argument or 
evidentiary suggestion that the refusal of 
the Iambs rose to the level of an indepen-
dent tort Consequently, the award of pu-
nitive damages, and attorney's fees as an 
element of them, was error in this case; 
and, attorney's fees were not recoverable on 
any other ground since there was no con-
tractual or statutory basis for them. De-
vore v. Bostrom, Utah, 632 P.2d 832 (1981); 
BAR Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 
442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Blake v. Blake, 
17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 (1966). 
Accordingly, we order that the award of 
$1.00 punitive damages and the additional 
$21,400 attorney's fees awarded as an ele-
ment of punitive damages be remitted. 
INTEREST 
[5] Prejudgment interest may be 
awarded in a case where the loss is fixed as 
of a particular time and the amount of the 
loss can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy. Anderson v. State Farm Fire 
and Casualty Co., Utah, 583 P.2d 101 (1978); 
Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., Utah, 560 
P.2d 315 (1977); Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. 
White Superior Co., Utah, 546 P.2d 885 
(1976); Jack B. Parson Construction Co. v. 
State, Utah, 552 P.2d 107 (1976). 
[6] Buyer's argument that this is not 
such a case is unpersuasive. This is not an 
instance such as a case involving personal 
injury, false imprisonment, wrongful death, 
defamation, or the like. Regardless of vari-
ability of the weight of the sheep, these 
damages were mathematically calculated. 
The jury awarded seller damages based 
upon the difference between what seller 
should have received under the contract 
with buyer and what he actually received 
from R.H. Rock Company as of the date of 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, OAKS and 
DURHAM, JJ , concur. 
( O §KEYNUMB£RSYSTEM> 
Joseph M KINKELLA, Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
HJL (Jim) BAUGH and Dan Baugh, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 17967. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 7, 1983. 
Homeowner brought suit for damages 
on cost plus 1^0% contract for remodeling of 
home. The First District Court, Cache 
County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., held for 
contractors, and homeowner appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
there was substantial compliance with rule 
of practice requiring that copies of proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law be 
served on opposing counsel before being 
presented to court for signature; (2) evi-
dence adequately supported trial court's 
finding that evidence tended to support 
contractors' cost figures; (3) finding on is-
sue of whether defendants were licensed 
contractors should have been made, but 
court's failure to do so was not reversible 
error; and (4) contractors were entitled to 
contract price for their services. 
Affirmed. 
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void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judg-
ment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment The mo-
tion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), 
not more than three months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was en-
tered or taken. A motion under this sub-
division (b) does not affect the finality of 
a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This Rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment 
for fraud upon the court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
Rules or by an independent action. 
[1] The sequence of events recited ante 
would indicate that the proper procedure 
for setting aside the default in the instant 
case would be under Rule 60(bXl)—mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect 
This is true particularly in view of the late 
filing of defendant's motion to dismiss. 
However, because the time for setting aside 
a judgment for this reason had expired 
("three months after the judgment"), de-
fendant attempts to construe the reason as 
one falling within Rule 60(bX7), i. e., that 
plaintiff is not the real party in interest. A 
ruling of this kind is typically discretionary 
with the trial court,3 its concern being only 
with why a party failed to answer, not with 
the merits of any defense he might offer.4 
[2] The trial court denied defendant's 
motion on two separate bases: (1) the time-
liness of the motion; and (2) the substance 
of defendant's claim. It would appear that 
the reason the trial court even considered 
3. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 
2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962); Ney v. Harrison, 5 
Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956). 
4. Board of Education of Granite School District 
v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 334 P.2d 806 (1963) 
cited with approval in Airken Intermountain, 
Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65. 513 P.2d 429 
the substance of the claim was its concern 
that defendant may have been confused as 
to the effect of the stipulation for an 
amended complaint1 There is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the fact 
that plaintiff was the real party in interest, 
and that defendant had knowledge thereof. 
The trial court's decision is affirmed. 
Costs to plaintiff. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
( O |K£YNUM8£RSYST£M> 
- f"in n r n H J J \f 
INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
C. Robert DUNFIELD and Lynn S. Dun-
field, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 16127. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 21, 1979. 
In an action upon a contract claim, a 
motion to dismiss on ground of res judicata 
or collateral estoppel was granted by the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J., and plaintiff appealed 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held 
that where, in a previous case, court had 
entered order allowing alleged assignor of 
plaintiffs claim to be made party but such 
alleged assignor had never been served nor 
actually brought into action, and where 
court had made no findings and thus it was 
(1973); See also Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
5. It is conceivable that defendant expected yet 
another amended complaint to be filed pursu-
ant to the stipulation. 
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reasonable to infer that there was no show-
ing as to truthfulness of the allegation of 
assignment, such alleged assignor was not 
barred, either by res judicata or collateral 
estoppel, from bringing the instant action 
upon such contract claim. 
Judgment vacated and case remanded. 
1. Judgment *»634, 713(2) 
Distinction between res judicata and 
collateral estoppel is that former applies 
both as to issues which were actually tried 
and those which could have been tried in 
prior action, while latter does not apply to 
issues that could have been tried in prior 
case but were not 
2. Judgment *=»707 
Where, in first case, court entered or-
der allowing alleged assignor of plaintiffs 
claim to be made party but such alleged 
assignor was never served nor actually 
brought into action, and where court made 
no findings and thus it was reasonable to 
infer that there was no showing as to truth-
fulness of allegation of assignment, such 
alleged assignor was not barred, either by 
res judicata or collateral estoppel, from 
bringing subsequent action upon such con-
tract claim. 
Lorin N. Pace, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
Steven C. Vanderlinden, Farmington, for 
defendants and respondents. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice. 
International Resources, a corporation, 
sued the defendants for breach of a lease 
agreement and for return of money it had 
paid in advance thereon. Defendants filed 
an affidavit which alleged: that one Snel-
len N. Johnson had sued the defendants in a 
prior suit on the same claim; that therein 
the said Johnson had alleged that the plain-
tiff, International Resources Corporation, 
had assigned the claim to him; and that 
that suit had terminated in their favor. On 
the basis of those averments, which stood 
undisputed, the defendants moved to dis-
miss the instant action on the ground of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel. From the 
trial court's granting of defendants' motion, 
plaintiff appeals. 
Essential facts appearing from the record 
pertinent to the issue herein confronted are: 
that in the prior action, the defendants 
themselves denied that there had been any 
assignment by plaintiff of its claim against 
the defendants to Snellen Johnson. They 
obtained an order making plaintiff here, 
International Resources, a party to that 
suit, but it was never served nor actually 
brought into that proceeding. It is true 
that at the conclusion of that trial, the 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
on the ground that the plaintiff (Snellen 
Johnson) had failed to prove the allegations 
therein; and that the trial court granted 
that motion and dismissed the complaint 
with prejudice. 
Particularly noteworthy are these facts: 
that the motion to dismiss that suit, which 
the court granted, was as against the plain-
tiff therein, Snellen Johnson; and that the 
court's order recited that "International Re-
sources had never been formally advised 
that it had been joined as a party plaintiff 
in the above entitled action, and no sum-
mons nor service of process ever having 
been served on International Resources, In-
ternational Resources is dismissed from the 
case " 
The principle which underlies both the 
doctrine of res judicata and its close rela-
tive, collateral estoppel, is that when there 
has been a proper adjudication upon a con-
troversy, and the judgment has become fi-
nal, that should settle the matter and there 
should be no further litigation thereon. 
Concerning the doctrine of res judicata, it is 
often said that both the parties and the 
issues must have been the same; ! and also 
that the judgment is conclusive, both as to 
issues which were actually tried and those 
which could have been tried in the prior 
1. See 28 Am.Jur.2d 700. 
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action.2 One of the reasons that it is said 
that the parties must have been the same in 
both actions is that before the rights of a 
party are concluded by a judgment, he is 
entitled to due process of law and an oppor-
tunity to contest the issue if he so desires. 
[1] Though the related doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel is based generally upon rea-
soning similar to that which underlies res 
judicata, there is an important distinction 
to be noted. The rationale of collateral 
estoppel is that, even where the parties may 
not have been the same, where a party has 
had an issue adjudicated against him in a 
prior case, he should be estopped from relit-
igating that issue in a subsequent case.3 
But it is important to keep in mind this 
distinction between the rule of res judicata 
and that of collateral estoppel: while as 
indicated above, the former applies both as 
to issues which were actually tried and 
those which could have been tried in a prior 
action, the latter does not apply to issues 
that merely "could have been tried" in the 
prior case, but operates only to issues which 
were actually asserted and tried in that 
case.4 The primary reason for this is that if 
the party against whom such a defense is 
invoked was not a party to the prior action, 
he would have had no choice as to litigating 
an issue that merely "could have been 
tried" in the prior suit; and if the material 
issue was not actually asserted and deter-
mined, there is no basis upon which it could 
be concluded that he had actually taken any 
position on the issue and should now be 
estopped from asserting a different position 
in the instant suit. 
[2] The position essayed by the defend-
ants, in support of the trial court's ruling, is 
that in the prior suit it was alleged that the 
plaintiff in this suit (International Re-
sources) had assigned its claim to the plain-
tiff in the prior suit, Snellen N. Johnson 
(which allegation, incidentally, the defend-
2. Elliston v. Texaco, Inc.. Utah, 521 P.2d 379. 
3. See Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 
P.2d 1044; Allen v. Allen, Wyo., 489 P.2d 65. 
4. We so state in awareness of a concededly 
overbroad statement in our case of Tracy Loan 
and Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., et ai, 102 
ants disputed); and that because that suit 
terminated favorably to them, the plaintiff 
herein is precluded from maintaining this 
action on the ground of res judicata or of 
collateral estoppel. 
In applying what has been said above to 
those contentions, these observations are 
pertinent: res judicata is not here applica-
ble because, even though the court entered 
an order allowing plaintiff International 
Resources to be made a party, it was never 
served nor actually brought into the action. 
It is significant that the allegation that 
International Resources had assigned its 
claim to the plaintiff in that suit, Snellen 
Johnson, was the allegation of Snellen 
Johnson, and not that of International Re-
sources. Moreover, in its ruling in favor of 
the defendants, dismissing the suit of Snel-
len Johnson, the court made no findings. 
In thus rejecting Snellen Johnson's com-
plaint, it is reasonable to infer that Johnson 
made no showing as to the truthfulness of 
his allegation that International Resources 
had assigned its claim to him. 
From what has been said above, it will be 
seen that, whatever view is taken of the 
two cases, it does not appear that plaintiff 
International Resources has asserted any 
different position in the prior case as to its 
ownership of the claim against the defend-
ants than that which it asserts here. It 
therefore has not had the "full and fair 
opportunity" it is entitled to for an adjudi-
cation on the question of whether it had 
made an assignment of its rights to Snellen 
Johnson, nor as to other issues which may 
exist relating to the controversy between 
itself and the defendants. It is therefore 
necessary that the judgment of dismissal be 
vacated and the case be remanded for such 
further proceedings as may seem advised. 
Costs to plaintiff (appellant). 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS, 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HALL and 
Utah 509, 132 P2d 388, to the effect that one 
would riot be "judicially estopped" unless the 
parties and the issues are the same in the 
instant and the pnor suit. Any misstatement 
of the rule was corrected and superseded by 
our decision in Richards v. Hodson, supra, note 
3. 
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fenae, and any amounts in mitigation must 
be established by the employer. Pratt v. 
Board of Education, supra. Where no sala-
ry agreement has been reached for the 
damage period, the rate of pay for the 
previous salary year should be used as the 
base salary amount Brady v. Board of 
Trustees, 196 Neb. 226, 242 N.W.2d 616 
(1976). 
In sum, we hold that, where the College 
breached its contract with this employee by 
originally discharging him without observ-
ing the formal termination procedures in 
the College Personnel Manual, (1) even 
though the College had good cause to dis-
miss the employee, it was under a contrac-
tual obligation to continue to pay his salary 
until he was properly dismissed; and (2) the 
College finally performed a proper dismissal 
by substantially complying with the proce-
dures in its Personnel Manual and therefore 
is not obliged to reinstate the employee. 
The judgment is affirmed. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL, C. J., and STEWART and HOWE, 
JJ., concur. 
MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments, 
but died before the opinion was filed. 
O I REY NUMBCft SYST€I«> 
LINDON CITY, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION CO., a 
corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent 
No. 17141. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 21, 1981. 
City brought action against contractor 
for declaratory judgment as to rights and 
obligations of litigants. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, 
J., dismissed, and city appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, C. J., held that: (1) 
under provisions of contract, city was re-
quired to arbitrate prior to litigating dis-
putes; (2) questions as to the interest rate 
on delinquent payments and whether there 
had been final payment by check which did 
not include disputed interest were arbitra-
ble; (3) Arbitration Act did not violate pub-
lic policy; (4) Act does not deprive the city 
of due process or its remedy by due course 
of law; and (5) Act as applied to city was 
not an unconstitutional delegation of a mu-
nicipal function to a special commission. 
Affirmed. 
1. Arbitration <s=>7.5 
Question of whether final payment had 
been made under contract when the amount 
paid did not include disputed interest and 
question as to the rate of interest on delin-
quent contract payments were "disputes" 
subject to arbitration under provision of 
contract providing that all claims, disputes 
and other matters in question arising out of 
or relating to the contract documents or 
breach thereof should be arbitrated, except 
claims which had been waived by the mak-
ing and acceptance of final payment 
2. Arbitration <*=>9 
Under contract calling for arbitration 
of all disputes, city was required to seek 
arbitration before bringing suit under the 
Arbitration Act or the Declarator} Judg-
ment Act. U.C.A.1953, 78-31-1 et seq., 78-
33-1 et seq. 
3. Arbitration «=>7.1 
Doubts as to whether the content of a 
contract is arbitrable should be resolved in 
favor of the parties' freedom to contract 
4. Declaratory Judgment <*=»24 
Purpose of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act is to permit examination of legal docu-
ments and statutes to determine questions 
of construction or validity arising under 
such instruments. U.C.A.1953, 78-33-1 et 
seq. 
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tration any claim asserted by or against i t 
U.C.A.1953, 78-31-1 et seq. 
& Arbitration « • * 
There is no public policy or other rea-
Jttr to prevent parties from agreeing to 
arbitration. 
£ Estoppel <fe»52.10(4) 
Under constitutional guarantee that 
every person shall have remedy by due 
course of law for injury to his person or 
property, party may intentionally and delib-
erately waive the ordinary and usual reme-
dy to which he is entitled for the redress of 
a wrong, provided that waiver is expressed 
in the most unequivocal terms. ConstArt 
I, § 11. 
7. Arbitration *»8 
Arbitration removes a controversy 
from the area of litigation but it is not an 
ouster of judicial jurisdiction. 
8. Arbitration <*=>2 
Constitutional Law <*=>321 
Provision of the Arbitration Act per-
mitting valid and enforceable agreements 
for arbitration of future disputes does not 
violate the constitutional guarantee of rem-
edy by due course of law for injury to 
property. U.C.A.1963, 7&-31-1 et seq.; 
ConstArt. 1, § 11. 
9. Constitutional Law *=»251 
Due process of law does not necessarily 
require judicial action; the purposes of the 
law may be effected by executive or admin-
istrative actions and still be valid if they 
meet the requirements of due process. 
ConstArt. 1, § 7. 
10. Arbitration <*=»2 
Constitutional Law <*=> 306(3) 
Arbitration Act meets due process re-
quirements. ConstArt 1, § 7; U.C.A.1963, 
7&-31-1 et seq. 
II. Municipal Corporations <*=»62 
Arbitration Act, as applied to contract 
involving municipality, does not unconstitu-
tionally delegate a municipal function to a 
special commission. ConstArt. 6, § 28; 
U.C.A.1963, 78-51-1 et seq. 
12. Municipal Corporations <*»1011 
Absent statutory prohibition, municipal 
corporation has the power to submit to arbi-
Jackson Howard, John R. Merkling, 
Provo, for plaintiff and appellant 
Robert J. Dahl, Robert F. Babcock, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and respondent 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a 
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment 
as to rights and obligations of the litigants 
under a contract that included provisions 
calling for arbitration of any disputes that 
might arise out of the contract The con-
tract was for construction of a facility for 
the plaintiff, Lindon City, and resulted af-
ter the defendant, Engineers Construction, 
was the low bidder on an advertised invita-
tion for bids. Both parties agreed to the 
arbitration by the designated American Ar-
bitration Association. The entire contract 
was prepared by the City and the arbitra-
tion provision was a condition necessary to 
bind the parties to its terms. 
Two disputes did arise: one as to the rate 
of interest on delinquent contract pay-
ments, and the other as to whether there 
had been a "final payment" by check that 
did not include the disputed interest 
Engineers claimed that payment had not 
been made, and requested and gave notice 
for arbitration according to the contract's 
terms. Before the date of hearing, the City 
refused to arbitrate and filed this suit for 
declaratory judgment 
The contract provisions that ar*> of vital 
concern in resolving this litigation are re-
produced as follows: 
Section 30.1. All claims, disputes and 
other matters in question arising out of, 
or relating to, the CONTRACT DOCU-
MENTS or the breach thereof, except for 
claims which have been waived by the 
making and acceptance of final payment 
as provided by Section 20, shall be decid-
ed by arbitration in accordance with the 
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules 
of the American Arbitration Association. 
1072 Utah 636 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
This agreement to arbitrate shall be spe-
cifically enforceable under the prevailing 
arbitration law. The award rendered by 
the arbitrators shall be final, and judg-
ment may be entered upon it in any court 
having jurisdiction thereof. 
Section 19.6 If the OWNER fails to 
make payment 30 days after approval by 
the ENGINEER, in addition to other 
remedies available to the CONTRAC-
TOR, there shall be added to each such 
payment interest at the maximum legal 
rate commencing on the first day after 
said payment is due and continuing until 
the payment is received by the CON-
TRACTOR 
Section 20.1 The acceptance by the 
CONTRACTOR of final payment shall be 
and shall operate as a release to the 
OWNER of all claims and all liability to 
the CONTRACTOR . . . . 
[1] It would appear that the "disputes" 
mentioned above are particularly suited and 
designed for determination by arbitration 
by the very provisions insisted upon by the 
City for inclusion in the very contract it 
drafted and required as a condition for ac-
ceptance of bids. If not so intended to be 
arbitrable, it is suggested that few, if any, 
situations or "disputes" would survive for 
arbitration under such a superficial conclu-
sion. We are of the opinion that a claim, 
followed by denial of the interest agreed 
upon and whether final payment under the 
contract had been made, are "disputes" un-
der the plain, clear wording of the contract 
provisions set out above, and we so hold. 
[2] The only question, therefore, is 
whether the plaintiff City was premature in 
filing for declaratory judgment—not 
whether such a suit is impermissible under 
any circumstances because of the arbitra-
tion agreement We are convinced that 
before the plaintiff filed this suit, it was 
bound by its promise, first, to seek arbitra-
tion, then to litigate, if it could under its 
contract, or under either the Arbitration 
Act1 or the Declaratory Judgment Act.2 
The plaintiff asserts that the trial court 
held that it had no "standing" in court, 
while defendant contends the trial court 
held the suit to be "premature." The state-
ments of the court indicate that it adjudged 
that the suit was premature. Whatever 
term is or was used, it connotes the conclu-
sion that in any event the parties covenant-
ed to arbitrate first; otherwise, the provi-
sions therefor would make no sense. There 
is no question before this Court as to filing 
suit after arbitration failed, and therefore 
we need not discuss it except to say that, in 
fact, the Arbitration Act itself provides for 
such litigation in U.C.A., 1953, 78-31-13: 
The arbitrators may on their own mo-
tion, and shall by request of a party to 
the arbitration: 
(1) At any stage of the proceedings 
submit any question of law arising in the 
course of the hearing for the opinion of 
the court, stating the facts upon which 
the question arises, and such opinion 
when given shall bind the arbitrators in 
the making of their award. 
(2) State their final award, in the form 
of findings of fact, for the opinion of the 
court on the questions of law arising on 
the hearing. 
The trial court decided the suit was pre-
mature, as do we. Resort to the arbitration 
process has not been had, as agreed, and the 
arguments as to what the declaratory judg-
ment says or does, are not germane here 
Neither are those touching the jurisdiction 
of the arbitrator or issues determinable by 
the arbitrator in the first instance, such as 
"future" versus "present" disputes, whether 
the contract complies with the Arbitration 
Act, and whether the 1977 amendment to 
the Act or its predecessor prevailed. The 
decision of the trial court cannot be inter-
preted other than to say that none of the 
above matters can properly be heard by the 
court prior to arbitration. 
[3] As to whether the content of a con-
tract is arbitrable, doubts should be re-
solved in favor of the parties* freedom to 
1. U.C.A., 1953, 78-31-1, et seq. 2. U.C.A.. 1953, 78-33-1, et seq 
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contract1 As was stated in King County v. 
Boeing Company:4 
Arbitration is a contractual remedy for 
the settlement of disputes by extrajudi-
cial means. It is a remedy freely bar-
gained for by the parties, and "provides a 
means of giving effect to the intention of 
the parties, easing court congestion, and 
providing a method more expeditious and 
less expensive for the resolution of dis-
putes." There is a strong public policy in 
favor of such a remedy, but it should not 
be invoked to resolve disputes that the 
parties have not agreed to arbitrate. 
* * * * * * 
Arbitration clauses should be liberally 
interpreted when the issue contested is 
the scope of the clause. If the scope of 
an arbitration clause is debatable or rea-
sonably in doubt, the clause should be 
construed in favor of arbitration unless it 
can be said that it is not susceptible to an 
interpretation that covers the asserted 
dispute . . . . If an arbitrable issue exists, 
the parties should not be deprived of the 
benefits of the agreement for which they 
bargained. [Citations omitted.]5 
There is nothing in the contract here that 
is unclear, ambiguous or vague, and even if 
there were, the parties have agreed to arbi-
trate such things first There is nothing in 
the contract that an average, literate per-
son would not be able to read and interpret 
such as to demand a judge's decision rather 
than a competent arbitrator. 
[4] The purpose of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act f is to permit examination of 
legal documents and statutes to determine 
questions of "construction or validity" aris-
ing under such instruments. There is no 
reason, however, why an arbiter appointed 
and authorized consensually by the parties 
cannot examine such instruments for the 
3. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). 
4. 18 Wash.App. 595, 570 P.2d 713 (1977). 
5. 570 P.2d at pp. 717-718. 
6. Supra, note 2. 
same reasons, as a condition precedent to a 
formal lawsuit7 
[5] There appears to be no "public poli-
cy" or other good reason why persons effec-
tively and by contract, should not be able to 
agree to an out-of-court settlement It is 
accomplished frequently by stipulation, 
binding concessions, accord and satisfaction, 
covenant not to sue, by indemnity contract, 
and by other honorable and legal means. 
The trend toward such inter se agree-
ments without resort to litigation, reflects a 
good, practical way to resolve disputes. 
This very case appears to be a typical exam-
ple of such attempted avoidance of the cost 
and protraction this case itself already has 
engendered. It would appear that in this 
case the City may have sought lower con-
struction costs and Engineers, a more remu-
nerative margin of profit, by entertaining 
the arbitration process. 
Plaintiffs remaining point on appeal 
challenges the constitutionality of the Arbi-
tration Act, which permits the parties to 
"[a]gree to submit to arbitration any con-
troversy which may arise in the future." 
We note at the outset that 1) plaintiff does 
not support the point by any substantial 
meritorious argument, and 2) that many of 
our sister state courts have held similar acts 
to be constitutional. 
Without satisfactory proof otherwise, 
constitutionality is generally presumed.8 In 
Branch v. Salt Lake County,9 the Court held 
as follows: 
The first legal principle to be observed 
is that there is a presumption that a 
statute is valid and constitutional; and 
one who questions it has the burden of 
convincing this court of its unconstitu-
tionality. 
7. Gary Excavating v. Town of North Haven, 
164 Conn. 119, 318 A.2d 84 (1972); Ozdeger v. 
AJtay, 66 Ill.App.3d 629, 23 HLDec. 446, 384 
N.E.2d 82 (1978). 
8. Washington County v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 103 Utah 73, 133 P.2d 564 (1943). 
9. 23 Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 814 (1969). 
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Plaintiff contends the amendment vio-
lates Article I, Section 1 1 l f and Article I, 
Section 71 1 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Plaintiff further argues that the application 
of the amendment to a party that is a 
municipal corporation violates Article VI, 
Section 28 of the Constitution of Utah.12 
[6,7] Under Article I, Section 11, a par-
ty may intentionally and deliberately waive 
the ordinary and usual remedy to which a 
party is entitled for the redress of a wrong, 
but such waiver should be expressed in the 
most unequivocal terms.13 Although Barn-
hart v. Civil Service Employees Insurance 
Company M alludes to this constitutional re-
vision, this Court has consistently ruled that 
an agreement to arbitrate future disputes 
was enforceable for reasons of public policy. 
In Johnson v. Brinkerhoff** this Court stat-
ed that the Utah statute (R.S. Utah 1933, 
104-36-1) did not apply to agreements to 
arbitrate future disputes, and that such 
agreements were held to oust the courts of 
jurisdiction.1* 
[8] In Latter v. Holsum Bread Co.,11 this 
Court ruled that in the absence of a statute 
to the contrary, an agreement to arbitrate 
future disputes was unenforceable on the 
ground that it denied to the parties judicial 
remedies and was, therefore, contrary to 
public policy. In a concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Wolfe stated that public policy was 
10. "All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, proper-
ty or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or de-
fending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he 
is a party." 
11. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law." 
12. 'The Legislature shall not delegate to any 
special commission, private corporation or as-
sociation, any power to make, supervise or 
interfere with any municipal improvement, 
money, property or effects, whether held in 
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, . or to 
perform any municipal functions." 
13. Bracken v. DahJe, 68 Utah 4S6, 499, 251 P. 
16 (1926). 
what the legislature declared it to be; and 
although the rule that commercial arbitra-
tion contracts were against public policy 
had long been criticized, it was too firmly 
imbedded to be overturned without legisla-
tion. In the Barnhart case,18 this Court 
held that inasmuch as the legislature had 
not amended the arbitration statute, we 
would adhere to the law as previously es-
tablished and would decline to enforce an 
agreement for arbitration of controversies 
which might arise in the future. In two 
concurring opinions, Justices Henriod and 
McDonough expressed the view that there 
was no reason parties should not be able to 
enter freely and voluntarily into a binding 
arbitration agreement, but it was the pre-
rogative of the legislature to amend the 
statute to so provide. The legislature re-
sponded to the clarion opinions expressed by 
members of this Court and amended the 
statute to permit valid and enforceable 
agreements for arbitration of future dis-
putes. This amendment does not violate 
Article I, Section 11, Constitution of Utah. 
[9] Plaintiff contends the amendment 
violates the due process clause of Article I, 
Section 7, Constitution of Utah. Such an 
argument is not persuasive. In Christian-
sen v. Harris,19 this Court observed that due 
process of law does not necessarily require 
judicial action. The purposes of the law, 
especially as to property, may be effected 
14. 16 Utah, 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965). 
15. 89 Utah 530, 544, 57 P.2d 1132 (1936). 
16. Such a phrase and the ensuing rule of !a* 
have been subject to some ridicule, 6A Corbin 
on Contracts, Sec. 1431, p. 381. An agreement 
to arbitrate future disputes has no effect upon 
the jurisdiction of the court, although it may 
affect the court's action. Arbitration removes 
the controversy from the area of litigation. It 
is no more an ouster of judicial jurisdiction 
than a compromise and settlement or a cove-
nant not to sue, each of which disposes of 
issues without litigation. Id., Sec. 1432, p. 383. 
17. 108 Utah 364, 368, 160 P.2d 421 (1945). 
18. Supra, note 14. 
19. 109 Utah 1, 7, 163 P.2d 314 (1945). 
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by executive or administrative action, and 
still be valid if they meet the requirements 
of due process. The requirements are "that 
no party can be affected by such action, 
until his legal rights have been the subject 
of an inquiry by a person or body authoriz-
ed by law to determine such rights, of 
which inquiry the party has due notice, and 
at which he had an opportunity to be heard 
and to give evidence as to his rights or 
defenses." 
[10] A survey of Chapter 31, Title 78 
reveals that the Arbitration Act more than 
fulfills all these requirements. In addition, 
there are provisions for action by the courts 
to affirm, modify, correct or vacate an 
award. 
[11] Finally, plaintiff claims that the 
1977 amendment violated the proscription 
of Article VI, Section 28 as a delegation to 
a special commission of a municipal func-
tion. Specifically, plaintiff argues that to 
enforce the binding arbitration clause it 
included in the contract would be tanta-
mount to subjecting a municipal corpora-
tion to the interest of a group antagonistic 
to the public with no responsibility to the 
public 
[12] Absent a statutory prohibition, a 
municipal corporation has the power to sub-
mit to arbitration any claim asserted by or 
against it This power is based on the right 
to contract and the right to maintain and 
defend suits.* The arbitration clause in 
the instant case did not involve a delegation 
of unlimited discretion to an ad hoc panel of 
private persons to make basic governmental 
policy.21 The contract specified the rights 
and duties of both parties, and the arbitra-
tion clause applied only to disputes about 
compliance with terms fixed by the con-
tract. Such a clause was not an abdication 
of the municipality's duties towards new 
matters which might arise in the future, 
20. 20 A.L.R.3d 569, Anno.: Power of municipal 
corporation to submit to arbitration, Sec. 2(a)v 
pp. 572-574; Sec. 4(a), pp. 579-582. 
21. Compare Salt Lake City v. International A&. 
sociation of Firefighters, Utah, 563 P.2d 786 
(1977). 
but only constituted a present agreement 
that disputes which might arise under the 
contract would be arbitrated.2* We there-
fore conclude and hold that the Arbitration 
Act is constitutional.9 
The judgment is affirmed with costs to 
respondent 
STEWART, HOWE and OAKS, JJ., con-
cur. 
MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments, 
but died before the opinion was filed. 
STATE of Utah in the Interest of: OR-
GILL, Evan Leonard (04-08-67) Orgill, 
Bart Wells (01-04-71) Persons under 18 
years of age. 
Appeal of Joyce THOMASON. 
No. 17456. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 22, 1981. 
Mother appealed from order of the 
Second District Court, Weber County, Cal-
vin Gould, J., which terminated parental 
rights. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held 
that: (1) evidence sustained determination 
that mother had abandoned children, and 
(2) evidence sustained determination that 
mother was unfit by reason of conduct and 
emotional condition to retain parental 
rights. 
Affirmed. 
22. City of Madison v. Frank Lloyd Wright 
Foundation, 20 Wis.2d 361, 122 N.W.2d 409, 
416-418, 20 A.L.R.3d 545 (1963). 
23. See annotation in 55 A.L.R.2d 432 in support 
of this conclusion. See also, Berkowitz v. Ar-
bib, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921). 
MARSALA r. VALVB CORPORATION OP AMERICA 
Clt» M 254 AM4M 
Conn. 469 
15T Conn.'382 
Ctartac* T. MARSALA 
v. 
VALVE CORPORATION OF AMERICA. 
Supreme Court of Connecticut 
Jan. 8,1960. 
Application to vacate arbitration 
award in favor of employer in dispute as 
to propriety of employer's discharge of em-
ployee. The Superior Court, Fairfield 
County, Tedesco, J., vacated award and 
employer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
King, C. J., Ldd that where parties had not 
in writing expressly waived requirement 
that award be made within 60 days after 
arbitrators were empowered to act, arbitra-
tion award which was made more than 60 
days after start of arbitration hearing was 
of no legal effect, though award was made 
within 60 days after parties' summation 
briefs for hearing were mailed to arbitra-
tors. 
No error. 
1. Contracts <8=>284<l) 
Arbitration agreements are to be fa-
vorably construed. 
2. Arbitration and Award <$=>! 
Person can be compelled to arbitrate 
dispute only if, to extent that, and in man-
ner in which, he has agreed to do so. 
3. Arbitration and Award <3=>3I 
Agreement for arbitration of dispute 
may contain special provisions covering 
conduct of arbitration proceedings. 
4. Arbitration and Award &=>3I 
In absence of special provisions gov-
erning conduct of arbitration proceedings, 
proceedings are governed by applicable 
provisions of general arbitration statutes. 
C.G.S.A. §§ 52-408 to 52-424. 
& Arbitration and Award 4=>50 
Where parties to arbitration proceed-
ing had not in writing expressly waived re-
quirement that award be made within 60 
days after arbitrators were empowered to 
act, arbitration award which was made 
more than 60 days after start of arbitra-
tion hearing was of no legal effect, though 
award was made within 60 days after par-
ties' summation briefs for hearing were 
mailed to arbitrators. C.G.S.A. §§ 31-98, 
52-408 et seq., 52-413, 52-414, 52-416, 52-
41& 
6. Arbitration and Award €=>50 
Statutory provision that arbitration 
award made more than 60 days after arbi-
trators have been empowered to act shall 
have no legal effect unless parties express-
ly extend time in writing is mandatory and 
not merely directory and it is beyond pow-
ers of parties to arbitration proceeding to 
modify except in manner provided for in 
statute. CG.S.A. § 52-416. 
Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., Stamford, with 
whom, on the brief, was John A. Sabanosh, 
Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant). 
Lawrence J. Merly, Bridgeport, for ap-
pellee (plaintiff). 
Before KING, C. J., and ALCORN, 
HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ 
KING, Chief Justice. 
This was a proceed^g brought b> t^e 
plaintiff, under § 52-418 of the General 
Statutes, which provides in material part, 
that the Superior Court "shall make an or-
der vacating * * * [an arbitration] 
award upon the application of any party to 
the arbitration: * * * (d) if the arbi-
trators have exceeded their powers or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, 
final and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made". 
The plaintiff was employed by the de-
fendant as its personnel manager under a 
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contract dated May 17, 1965, which pro-
vided, inter alia, that the contract of em-
ployment could not be terminated by either 
party except for "just cause"; that, if a 
dispute arose as to what constituted "just 
cause", it should be determined by a three-
member board of arbitration; that one 
member of such board should be chosen by 
each party; and that the two thus chosen 
should themselves choose the third arbitra-
tor. 
On December 9, 1966, the plaintiff was 
discharged on the ground that he had been 
disloyal. On December 12, he requested 
arbitration of the dispute as to the proprie-
ty of his discharge. The plaintiff chose 
John V. Turk, Jr., as his arbitrator, the de-
fendant chose Philip H. Smith, an attor-
ney, and the two chose, as the third arbi-
trator, Peter Seitz. The selection of the 
three arbitrators was completed on January 
30, 1967. 
None of the arbitrators was ever sworn, 
as required by General Statutes § 52-414, 
although at some point in the proceedings 
the parties attempted orally to waive that 
statutory requirement. 
On February 22, the arbitrators sched-
uled the arbitration hearing for May 10. 
The plaintiff, on February 21, had made 
application to the Superior Court, appar-
ently pursuant to General Statutes § 52-
412, for the taking of a deposition of Phil-
ip Sagarin, an officer of the defendant, 
and on March 20, the plaintiff filed in the 
Superior Court a notice that Sagarin's dep-
osition would be taken on April 10. On" 
March 22, the defendant asked the plaintiff 
for alternate dates for the taking of the 
Sagarin deposition, and it was rescheduled 
for April 20, at which time it was taken. 
The arbitration hearing was held on the 
scheduled date, May 10, both parties partic-
ipating and represented by counsel, and the 
hearing was completed on that day. At 
the close of the hearing, in response to an 
inquiry of arbitrator Seitz as to the meth-
od of summation, the plaintiffs attorney 
stated that he would like to have briefs ex-
changed, and it was agreed that briefs 
should be exchanged not later than June 
13, which was done, and copies were 
mailed to the arbitrators on that day. 
On August 8, the plaintiff's attorney re-
ceived by mail the award, which consisted 
of a majority award in favor of the de-
fendant and signed by arbitrators Seitz 
and Smith and a minority award, in favor 
of the plaintiff, signed by arbitrator Turk. 
On August 29, the plaintiff filed the 
aforesaid application to vacate the award. 
The relevant specific grounds were (a) 
that the award was not rendered within the 
statutory period of "sixty days from the 
date on which * * * [the] arbitrators 
* * * were empowered to act", as re-
quired by General Statutes § 52-416, and 
(b) that the arbitrators, prior to hearing 
testimony and taking evidence, were not 
sworn as required by General Statutes, § 
52-414 and there was no written waiver of 
this requirement. The court, after hear-
ing, entered judgment vacating the award 
on the ground that it had not been ren-
dered within the statutory time limit, and, 
in effect, it held that the date on which the 
arbitrators "were empowered to act" with-
in the meaning of § 52-416 was not later 
than May 10, 1967, which was the date on 
which the arbitration hearing was held and 
the evidence concluded. From the judg-
ment vacating the award the defendant ap-
pealed. 
[1-4] Arbitration agreements are to be 
favorably construed by the courts. Gaer 
Bros., Inc. v. Mott, 144 Conn. 303, 307, 130 
A.2d 804, 65 A.L.R.2d 749, and cases cited. 
But a person can be compelled to arbitrate 
a dispute only if, to the extent that, and in 
the manner in which, he has agreed so to 
do. Visselli v. American Fidelity Co., 155 
Conn. 622, 624, 237 A.2d 561; Frager v. 
Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 155 Conn. 
270, 274, 231 A.2d 531, and cases cited. 
While the agreement for the arbitration of 
a dispute may contain special provisions 
governing the conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings, in the absence of such special 
MARSALA T. VALVE CORPORATION OF AMERICA Conn. 4 f t 
Cite as 2W A.2d 400 
provisions the arbitration proceedings are 
governed by the applicable provisions of 
oor general arbitration statutes.1 Mc-
Caffrey v. United Aircraft Corporation, 
147 Conn. 139, 141, 157 A2d 920. These 
statutes consist of §§ 52-408 through 52-
42* and are contained in what is now 
chapter 909 of the General Statutes. Nei-
ther party makes any claim that the provi-
sions of chapter 909 are not applicable or 
that the agreement to arbitrate contained 
any special provisions relevant or material 
to the present controversy. Chapter 909 
was first enacted as chapter 65 of the Pub-
lic Acts of 1929 and, with some changes, 
was taken from the Uniform Arbitration 
Act first promulgated in 1925. Since that 
time a new Uniform Arbitration Act has 
been promulgated, differing considerably 
from the original act and reflecting 
changes and improvements suggested by 
experience in arbitration proceedings under 
the original Uniform Act. 9 Uniform Laws 
Annotated (1957) 76. 
It is provided in General Statutes § 52-
414 that, "[b]efore hearing any testimony 
or examining other evidence in the cause", 
the arbitrators "shall be sworn to hear and 
examine the matter in controversy faith-
fully and fairly and to make a just award 
according to the best of their understand-
ing, unless the oath is waived in writing by 
the parties to the arbitration agreement". 
Here, the arbitrators were not sworn, and 
there was an oral, but not a written, waiv-
er of that requirement. The statute ex-
pressly requires that the waiver be in writ-
ing. Since for the reasons hereinafter 
pointed out that the court was not in error 
vacating the award because it had not been 
rendered within the sixty-day time limit, it 
is unnecessary to determine the efficacy of 
I. In chapter 560 of the General Statutes, 
which is not applicable to this proceed-
ing, there are certain special statutory 
provisions regarding the arbitration of 
labor disputes before the board of media-
tion and arbitration. See cases such as 
Banbury Robber Co. v. Local 402, etc., 
145 Conn. 53, 55, 138 A.2d 783; Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. 
Shapiro, 138 Conn. 57, 68, 82 A.2d 345. 
the parties' attempted oral waiver of the 
requirement of the oath. 
[5] We turn now to the phrase "em-
powered to act" since it is clear that the 
sixty-day period ran from that time, what-
ever that time was.2 In the first place, it 
is important to note that, although what is 
now General Statutes § 52-4,16 was taken 
from § 8 of the original Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, the Uniform Act provided that 
the sixty-day period should run from the 
time the arbitrators were appointed, while 
in the Connecticut statute the phrase "em-
powered to act" was deliberately substitut-
ed. This makes it clear that "empowered 
to act" does not refer to the time when the 
arbitrators are appointed as seems to be 
suggested at one point in the defendant's 
brief. 
Although the arbitrators may, prior to 
taking the oath, perform some ministerial 
acts such as assigning a time for a hearing 
or granting a postponement, under General 
Statutes § 52-414, as hereinbefore noted, 
"[bjefore hearing any testimony or examin-
ing other evidence in the cause, the arbi-
trators * * * shall be sworn". 
Under the quoted provisions of § 52-414, 
it is clear that chapter 909, construed as a 
whole, contemplates that the arbitrators 
shall not be empowered to take testimony 
or evidence until they have been sworn or 
until the oath has been waived in writing. 
Since the taking of testimony or evidence 
is indispensable to the performance by the 
arbitrators of their duties, it is clear that 
they must be "empowered to act" within 
the contemplation of the statute not later 
than the time when the taking of testimony 
and evidence begins. Here, the hearing 
2. The ambiguity in the phrase "empower-
ed to act", the differing interpretations 
which have been put upon it, and the 
nc?d for a clarifying amendment are all 
pointed out in Siegel, "Time Limits for 
an Arbitration Award in Connecticut," 
30 Conn.B.J. 3G0. 
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began, and indeed was completed, on May 
10. We conclude that May 10 was the lat-
est date on which it could be said that the 
arbitrators became "empowered to act'* as 
envisioned in the statute. This, in effect, 
was what the court held. Of course the 
parties could not, by their failure to com-
ply with the terms of the statute as to the 
oath, change the procedure which chapter 
909 contemplated would be followed, and it 
is this contemplated procedure as set forth 
in the chapter which must be considered in 
construing the phrase "empowered to act". 
The defendant makes the claim that, un-
til arbitrators had heard the testimony and 
evidence and received the briefs, they were 
not "empowered to act" since they could 
not render a valid award at any prior date. 
We find little merit in this claim. It 
amounts to one that "empowered to act" 
means "empowered to decide". Had the 
General Assembly meant any such thing, it 
would have used language apt to express 
such a concept. Indeed, in proceedings un-
der chapter 560 of the General Statutes be-
fore the board of meditation and arbitra-
tion involving a labor dispute, the General 
Assembly made clear in the applicable stat-
ute that the time in which a decision must 
be rendered runs from the time "a matter 
has been fully heard". General Statutes § 
31-98; Danbury Rubber Co. v. Local 402, 
etc., 145 Conn. 53, 58, 138 A.2d 783. 
The award was not rendered until Au-
gust 8, 1967, which was well over sixty 
days, and, indeed, almost three months, aft-
er the latest date on which the arbitrators 
could have become "empowered to act" un-
der the construction which we have given 
that phrase. It follows that the award, un-
der the express wording of the statute, had 
"no legal effect". General Statutes § 52-
416. 
[6] The defendant claims that in any 
event the plaintiffs conduct must be held 
to have constituted a waiver of any delay 
in the rendition of the award. Section 
52-416 expressly provides that "[a]n 
award made * * * [more than sixty 
days after the arbitrators have been em-
powered to act] shall have no legal effect 
unless the parties expressly extend the time 
in which such award may be made, which 
extension or ratification shall be in writ-
ing". This clearly makes the provision 
mandatory and not merely directory and, 
as such, beyond the powers of the parties 
to modify except in the manner provided 
in the statute itself. All this is brought 
out in International Brotherhood of Team-
sters etc. v. Shapiro, 138 Conn. 57, 68, 82 
A.2d 345. 
The mandatory character of § 52-416 is 
further reinforced by § 52-413, which, aft-
er authorizing the arbitrators to postpone 
the hearing or to adjourn it from time to 
time, provides that "no postponement or 
adjournment shall extend the time as pre-
scribed in section 52-416, or the time, if 
any, fixed in the arbitration agreement, for 
rendering the award". 
Sections 52-413 and 52-416, taken to-
gether, permit the parties to exercise their 
common-law right to fix, in the agreement 
for arbitration, the time in which the arbi-
trators must render their award. Section 
52-416 also permits the parties, in writing, 
to extend the time in which the award may 
be made or to ratify a late award. Here, 
however, there was no express extension 
or ratification in writing. Indeed, there 
was not even an oral express extension or 
an oral ratification of the late award. 
There was, it is true, conduct of both par-
ties which was irreconcilably inconsistent 
with a compliance with the provisions of 
the statute as to the time of the rendition 
of the award. Except for the drastic, 
mandatory provisions of the applicable 
statutes, as previously pointed out, it is 
quite probable that we could, and would, 
find that each party, by his conduct, had 
waived the sixty-day time limit. See note, 
154 A.L.R. 1392, 1403. Certainly, we find 
nothing to commend in this plaintiff's con-
duct in seeking to have the award vacated 
under § 52-416. But the express provi-
sions of the applicable statutes, and espe-
cially the provision in § 52-416 that the 
WILLAMETZ r. GTODA-SZIBEfiT DAIRY COMPANY 
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award, under the circumstances of this i» Trial $»296(7) 
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case, "shall have no legal effect", preclude 
our finding any waiver or estoppel. The 
conclusion of the trial court that the award 
must be vacated was not only not erro-
neous but was the only conclusion which it 
could reach under the provisions of our ap-
plicable general arbitration statutes. 
There is no error. 
In this opinion the other judges con-
curred. 
(o 5 £ 
157 Conn. 295 
Josephine WILLAMETZ 
v. 
GUIDA-SEIBERT DAIRY COMPANY 
et al. 
Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
Dec. 17, 1968. 
Action for property damage and inju-
ries sustained when plaintiff's automobile 
was struck in rear by defendant's truck al-
legedly as a result of negligence of defend-
ant's driver-agent. The Superior Court, 
Hartford County, Pastore, J., rendered 
judgment pursuant to jury verdict in favor 
of defendants and plaintiff appealc!. The 
Supreme Court, House, J., held that where, 
if plaintiff's son and not plaintiff was op-
erator of automobile, there was not only 
variance in factual aspect of case as plead-
ed by plaintiff but also complete failure of 
proof of material allegation to prejudice of 
defendants giving of supplemental charge 
that if plaintiff was not operator of auto-
mobile or if jury was unable to determine 
from evidence if she was operator, they 
should return verdict for defendants was 
not error. 
No error. 
254 A 2d—30V* 
In automobile accident case wherein 
plaintiff claimed that she was driving her 
automobile and defendants claimed that 
plaintiff's son, whose license had been sus-
pended, was driving, instruction to disre-
gard that portion of charge which related 
to principle of falsus in uno, falsus in om-
nibus, and which was withdrawn from jury 
cured any possible error. 
2. Trial e=349(2) 
Submitting interrogatories to jury for 
a purpose of ascertaining their decision on 
contested issue as to identity of operator of 
plaintiff's automobile after recalling jury 
to revoke prior instruction and to instruct 
that if they should find that plaintiff was 
not driver of automobile or if they were 
unable to determine whether plaintiff or 
her son was the driver their verdict should 
be for defendants was within discretion of 
court and did not unduly pinpoint the issue. 
3. Trial <3=>348 
Primary purpose of interrogatory to 
jury is to elicit determination of material 
facts and to furnish means of testing cor-
rectness of verdict rendered. 
4. Judgment <S=?248 
Right of plaintiff to recover is limited 
to allegations of his complaint. 
5. Judgment <3=>249 
Plaintiff may not allege one cause of 
action and recover on another. 
6. Trial <S»3I2<2) 
Where, if plaintiff's son and not plain-
tiff was operator of automobile, there was 
not only variance in factual aspect of ac-
tion for injuries sustained when plaintiff's 
automobile was struck in rear by defend-
ant's truck as pleaded by plaintiff but also 
complete failure of proof of material alle-
gation to prejudice of defendants, giving 
of supplemental charge that if plaintiff 
was not operator of automobile or if jury 
was unable to determine from evidence if 
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!£5V the order denying appellant's motion 
for new trial herein is affirmed. 
KAUFMAN, P . J., and SHOEMAKER, 
| „ concur. 
(o \uiwmm*vmm> 
PATRICK J. RUANE, INC., a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
K. E. PARKER, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 19083. 
District Court of Appeal, First District, 
Division 1, California. 
Oct. 20, 1960. 
Action for breach of contract was 
brought by subcontractor against general 
contractor to recover amount allegedly due 
subcontractor for performance of the con-
tract. The Superior Court, County of 
San Francisco, Herman A. van der Zee, 
J., rendered judgment in favor of the sub-
contractor, and the general contractor ap-
pealed. The District Court of Appeal, 
Dunivvay, J., held that provisions of sub-
contract that subcontractor agreed to be 
bound by general conditions of specifica-
tions and all conditions of prime contract 
insofar as they were applicable to subcon-
tractor's work did not obligate subcon-
tractor to repair plaster, which was al-
legedly defective, at subcontractor's own 
expense, if damage to plaster was caused 
either by inadequate plans and specifica-
tions, or by general contractor, or by an-
other subcontractor. 
Judgment affirmed. 
I. Arbitrat ion and Award <S=>86 
Contracts C=>332(l) 
In action for breach of contract by 
subcontractor against general contractor 
to recover amount allegedly due subcon-
tractor under subcontract, complaint al-
leging the making of the subcontract and 
full performance by subcontractor, and an-
swer admitting contract, but denying alle-
gation of performance, and pleading as a 
separate defense that dispute arose as to 
whether work had been completed by sub-
contractor in accordance with plans and 
specifications and that matter was sub-
mitted to arbitration and was decided 
against subcontractor by arbitrators were, 
on their face, sufficient pleadings. West's 
Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 457. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>654 
Where parties referred to a pretrial 
order at trial, but no pretrial order was 
included in either transcript, and appel-
lant's contentions on appeal were based 
in part on claimed insufficiency of com-
plaint in relation to proof, District Court 
of Appeal on its own motion would order 
a copy of the pretrial order made a part 
of the record on appeal. West's Ann.Supe-
rior Court Rules, rule 8.4(a). 
3. Trial C=>54(l) 
In action for breach of contract by sub-
contractor against general contractor to 
recover amount allegedly due subcontrac-
tor under subcontract, letters, which hid 
been written by subcontractor to general 
contractor, and which were offered in evi-
dence by general contractor without limit-
ing the purpose of the offer, were evi-
dence of truth of subcontractor's state-
ments therein that exterior stucco job had 
been done by subcontractor in accord-
ance with specifications in color and tex-
ture as selected by architect and that ma-
terials used were those specified with no 
deviation from specifications, and that 
stucco was applied under inspection of 
owner's representative and was inspected 
and passed, and that job was acceptable 
to owners and architect on completion. 
4. Contracts C=>322(4) 
In action for breach of contract by 
subcontractor against general contractor to 
recover amount allegedly due subcontractor 
under subcontract, evidence was insufficient 
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to establish that defects in exterior stucco 
work done by subcontractor were caused by 
improper scheduling of work by general 
contractor during improper weather con-
ditions, 
& Appoal an* Error <S=93I(I) 
On appeal by defendant, District Court 
of Appeal would accept evidence favorable 
to plaintiff. 
6. Contracts €=>33 
Provisions of subcontract between sub-
contractor and general contractor that sub-
contractor agreed to be bound by general 
conditions of specifications and all condi-
tions of prime contract insofar as they 
were applicable to work of subcontractor 
were valid and binding on subcontractor. 
7. Contracts <3=I98<2), 199(1) 
Provisions of subcontract between gen-
eral contractor and subcontractor that sub-
contractor agreed to be bound by general 
conditions of specifications and all condi-
tions of prime contract insofar as they 
were applicable to subcontractor's work did 
not obligate subcontractor to repair plaster, 
which was allegedly defective, at subcon-
tractor's own expense, if damage to plaster 
was caused either by inadequate plans and 
specifications, or by general contractor, or 
by another subcontractor. West's Ann.Civ. 
Code, §§ 1643, 1650, 1654, 1655. 
8. Arbitration and Award 0=82(4) 
Where issue between subcontractor 
and general contractor as to alleged de-
fects in plaster work done by subcontrac-
tor \va* not submitted to arbitrator^, though 
subcontractor agreed to submit such issue, 
and general contractor deliberately with-
held that submission, and arbitration was 
as to the responsibility as between general 
contractor and county for defects deter-
mined by the architect to exist in plaster, 
award of arbitrators was not binding on 
subcontractor. 
9. Arbitration and Award <£=>82(4, 5) 
An arbitration award is not res judi-
cata as to a person who is not a party to 
the arbitration, or as to subject matter 
not submitted to the arbitrators. 
10. Arbitration and Award 0=29 
An arbitrator has no legal right to 
decide issues not submitted to him. 
11. Contracts 0=322(3) 
In action for breach of contract by 
subcontractor against general contractor 
to recover amount allegedly due subcon-
tractor under subcontract, evidence estab-
lished performance of subcontract by sub-
contractor. 
12. Contracts ^=287(1), 289 
Generally, where construction con-
tract requires that work be done to satis-
faction of architect and that satisfaction 
of architect be evidenced by his certifi-
cate to that effect, giving of such a certifi-
cate is a condition precedent to right of 
general contractor to recover from owner, 
but if architect is satisfied with the work 
and arbitrarily refuses to issue the certifi-
cate, necessity for production of certificate 
is dispensed with. 
13. Contracts C=>320, 346(2) 
Contractor, who pleads performance 
of contract in action against owner, need 
prove only substantial performance, and 
owner is allowed an offset for deficiencies 
in the work. 
14. Contracts 0=284(2) 
Condition of contract that third party, 
such as an architect, shall take some action 
is to be construed against party relying: on 
it, and will be held to be a covenant, 
rather than a condition when term* of 
contract can be so construed. 
15. Contracts 0=303(4) 
If defendant by his own act has pre-
vented performance by plaintiff of condi-
tion of contract, defendant may not rely on 
plaintiff's failure to perform such condi-
tion. 
16. Contracts 0=335(2) 
In action for breach of contract by 
subcontractor against general contractor 
to recover amount allegedly due subcon-
tractor under subcontract, rule that excuse 
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p r &3ure of performance of contract must 
l^.pleaded did not apply, where subcontrac-
j | £ pleaded performance and proved sub-
giatial performance and that defects in 
iraontractor's work were caused by gen-
ft^I contractor. 
|R Contract! <3»289 
In action for breach of contract by 
iubcontractor against general contractor 
to recover amount allegedly due subcon-
tractor under subcontract, evidence that 
Refects appeared in exterior stucco work 
M subcontractor and that architect reject-
ed the exterior stucco work was evidence 
t>f nonperformance on part of subcon-
tractor but was not under the subcontract 
conclusive as between subcontractor and 
general contractor. 
Johnson & Stanton, Gardiner Johnson, 
Hiram S. Dillin, San Francisco, for appel-
lant. 
Lloyd J. Cosgrove, John G. Evans, San 
Francisco, for respondent. 
DUNIWAY, Justice. 
Action for breach of contract. Plain-
tiff had judgment and defendant appeals. 
Appellant Parker had the general contract 
for the construction of the new Hall of 
Justice and Records Building at Redwood 
City; respondent ("Ruane") had the sub-
contract with Parker for the plastering. 
Although the judgment is for $8,272.01, 
with interest, no claim of error is made 
as to $1,204.66 thereof. Error is claimed 
as to $5,400, representing the cost to 
Parker of painting exterior stucco, and as 
to $1,667.35, representing the cost to 
Parker of patching cracked interior plas-
ter. Parker claims that an arbitration 
award is determinative in his favor, as to 
the exterior stucco, and that, as to both 
items, Ruane pleaded performance, but 
proved only nonperformance plus an ex-
cuse for nonperformance. We have con-
cluded that the judgment must be affirmed. 
The Contracts 
In his subcontract, Ruane agrees to do 
«+ * * j n a workmanlike manner, as 
required by and in strict accord with 
said plans and specifications and details 
illustrative thereof as approved by the 
Contractor, and to the satisfaction, of the 
Contractor, all Lathing and Plastering, i. e., 
all work outlined in Part 1, Sections 16 and 
17 of the Specifications." Ruane also 
agrees "to prosecute [the work] * * * 
in full accord with the requirements of the 
general construction as determined by the 
Contractor * * * " Parker has the right, 
if Ruane fails to perform, to do the work 
at Ruane's expense. It is further pro-
vided that "The Sub-Contractor acknowl-
edges familiarity with the general condi-
tions of the aforesaid specifications and all 
conditions of the original contract between 
the Owner and Contractor and agrees to 
be bound thereby insofar as they are ap-
plicable to this particular work; * * * " 
The subcontract relieves Parker of liability 
to Ruane for delay, but not from other 
liabilities. 
The material portions of the general 
conditions of the prime contract are, as to 
duties of Parker to the owner, to: deter-
mine when and where materials and labor 
will next be needed (9c), coordinate the 
various types of work and inform subcon-
tractors (9d), notify subcontractors to 
furnish and set their work in place (9f), 
safeguard the work against weather, etc. 
(9/), provide needed heat "as necessary 
to protect all materials against injury from 
dampn^s and cold," and specified1!}', 
"[f]rom the beginning of the application 
of plaster and during the setting and 
curing period, provide sufficient heat to-
produce a temperature in the spaces in-
volved not less than 50° Fahrenheit" 
(9n, 2), furnish, for the architect's ap-
proval, samples of materials, including 
"plaster and lathing materials." Such ma-
terials are not to be used without the archi-
tect's approval (9r, 2 and special condi-
tions, 13a). Subcontracts are to be ap-
proved by the architect (10a). 'The Con-
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tractor shall bind every Sub-contractor, and 
every Sub-contractor agrees to be bound 
by the terms of the Contract Documents 
to carry out their provisions insofar as ap-
plicable to their work" (10c), but there 
is no contractual relation between the sub-
contractor and the county (lOd). The con-
tractor is required to " [d ]o all necessary 
patching of damaged, cracked or defective 
plaster, leaving all plaster work in per-
fect condition." (Specifications, § 17-09.) 
As to the architect, the entire work is 
under his jurisdiction. One of his func-
tions is to "pass upon merits of materials 
and workmanship." He is "to make writ-
ten decisions in regard to all claims of the 
Owner or Contractor and to interpret the 
Contract Documents on all questions aris-
ing in connection with the execution of 
the work." His decisions or interpreta-
tions are subject to arbitration (14, 14b). 
All material and workmanship are subject 
to the architect's inspection, and he has 
"the right to reject defective material and 
workmanship" or require their correction. 
Rejected workmanship shall be satisfactori-
ly replaced with proper material without 
charge (15a). Final payment to the con-
tractor is to be made upon a certification of 
completion by the architect (17f, g) . 
The Pleadings 
[1] The complaint alleges the making 
of the contract in general terms only, and 
full performance on Ruane's part. The 
answer admits the contract and denies the 
allegation of performance. It also pleads 
in substance, as a separate defense that 
a dispute arose as to whether the work 
had been completed in accordance with 
"the plans and specifications" and that 
this matter was submitted to arbitration 
and decided against Ruane by the arbi-
trators. These are, on their face, suffi-
cient pleadings (Code Civ.Proc. § 457). 
It is also true, however, that they suc-
cessfully conceal the real issues to be 
tried. 
The Pre-Trial Order 
[2] No pre-trial order is included in 
either transcript, but the parties referred 
to a pre-trial order at the trial. Because 
the pre-trial order, "where inconsistent 
with the pleadings, controls the subsequent 
course of the case" (Rule 8.8, Rules for 
the Superior Courts), and because Parker's 
contentions on appeal are based in part 
on claimed insufficiency of the complaint 
in relation to the proof, we have on our 
own motion ordered a copy of the pre-trial 
order made a part of the record on ap-
peal. Cf. the remarks of Ashburn, J., as 
to our status as parens patriae in Burn-
stein v. Zelman, 182 Cal.App.2d , 5 
Cal.Rptr. 829. Unfortunately, the pre-
trial order contributes nothing to the clari-
fication of the issues or to the solution 
of the problem relating to the pleadings 
presented by appellant Parker. It appears 
to us to be a totally useless document. 
Cf. Arch Rib-Summerbell Steel Fabricators 
v. Lubhner, 183 CaI.App.2d , 7 Cal. 
Rptr. 94; C^llison v. Thomas, Cal.App., 
6 Cal.Rptr. 911. It quotes verbatim the 
pre-trial statements of the parties, which 
are no more specific than the pleadings, 
but does not at any point attempt to state, 
with any particularity or at all, the actual 
issues to be tried. Had the pre-trial judge 
delved into the matter at all, he could 
have discovered the true nature of the 
controversy, settled the issues to be tried, 
required such amendments to the pleadings 
as might be required (Rule 8.4(a)) and 
eliminated the contention as to the plead-
ings nuw p ieced upon us. He did none 
of these things. 
The Real Issues 
The issues developed at the trial are 
these: It is conceded that Ruane did all 
of the work required by the contract, the 
controversy being only, in the instance of 
the exterior plaster, as to (a) whether he 
was bound to repair the defects that ad-
mittedly appeared, regardless of their 
cause, or (b), if not, whether the defects 
were the result of defects in his work, or 
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jft*) whether the arbitration award was 
conclusive against him; and, in the in-
ataace of the interior plaster, (a) whether 
hfe. was bound to repair cracks that ad-
Ulittedly developed, regardlesss of their 
cause, or (b), if not, whether they were 
caused by Ruane's faulty workmanship or 
j y Parker 's improperly heating the build-
ing. 
The Findings 
The court found that Ruane performed 
all the conditions stated in his contract, 
that the arbitration did not decide the 
question before the court although Parker 
tofd Ruane that the arbitrators would de-
cide it, and that the award does not bind 
or estop Ruane. 
The Trial 
The conduct of the trial was in many re-
spects as informal as the pre-trial con-
ference must ha \e been. Ruane's case in 
chief was very brief. Counsel put in evi-
dence his subcontract with Parker and the 
specifications of the prime contract. He 
obtained a stipulation that the building had 
been accepted by the county and notice of 
completion filed. He proved that the con-
tract price, under the subcontract, except 
for the amount sued for, had been paid. 
Mr. Ruane then testified: 
"Q. Has all of the work under this sub-
contract, that is the lathing and plaster 
work, been performed by \our company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And the job to your knowledge has 
been completed? A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And a notice of completion has 
been filed? A. Yes, sir." On cross-
examination, Parker elicited the informa-
tion that the exterior was repainted be-
fore acceptance and that this was not 
done by Ruane. Counsel then agreed that 
the arbitration related solely to the exteri-
or plaster, and Ruane rested. 
The Facts as to the Exterior Plaster 
Counsel for Parker showed that the 
architect rejected the exterior plaster or 
stucco "because of stains, leaching and 
splotches." He showed that, after the 
arbitration (to be described in more de-> 
tail hereafter), Ruane refused to remedy 
the defects. 
[3] In showing the negotiations lead-
ing up to the arbitration, Parker offered 
in evidence, without limiting his offer, a 
letter from Ruane dated December 14, 
1955, in which the latter asserted that the 
exterior job was done "in accordance with 
specifications in color and texture as 
selected by the architect. The materials 
used were those specified with no devia-
tion from the specifications. The stucco 
was applied under the inspection of the 
owner's representative and as each area 
was completed, was inspected and passed 
before removal of the scaffold." The let-
ter also asserts that the job was "accept-
able to the owners and architect upon 
completion." A like assertion appears in 
another letter, dated July 19, 1956, simi-
larly offered by Parker. Having been 
offered by Parker, without any limitation 
as to the purpose of the offer, these let-
ters are evidence of the truth of Ruane's 
statements therein, and may be considered 
in support of the findings of the court. 
Nelson v. Fernando Xelson & Sons, 5 
Cal.2d 511, 518, 55 P.2d 859; Merchant 
Shippers Ass'n v. Kellogg Express & Dray-
ing Co., 28 Cal.2d 594, 170 P.2d 923. To 
that extent, Parker has supplied what 
might otherwise be a deficiency in Ruane's 
proof. 
When Parker's counsel finished his proof 
relating to the exterior stucco, it was 
agreed that Riume should pioceed in rebut-
tal on that issue. He offered in evidence 
another letter, dated April 25, 1956, mak-
ing a similar but briefer assertion. No 
objection was made. 
[4] Ruane points to a statement in one 
of the architect's letters, offered by Parker 
and received without limitation or objec-
tion, that " [ i ] t [the leaching, etc.] is all 
due probably to application of stucco in 
improper weather conditions," and to testi-
mony of Parker on cross-examination that 
Parker scheduled the work that Ruane was 
to do. Counsel apparently thinks this evi-
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dence is a sufficient showing' that the de-
fects were caused by improper schedul-
ing by Parker. We disagree. To so 
hold would stretch the doctrine that a 
finding must be sustained, if there is any 
substantial evidence to support it, too far. 
The evidence as to scheduling is at most 
equivocal, and in our judgment proves 
nothing. However, as we shall see, this 
point is immaterial. 
The Arbitration 
The arbitration was handled through the 
American Arbitration Association, no 
method being prescribed by the contract. 
Two of its forms of "submission/' almost 
identical in form, were signed. One, 
signed by Ruane alone, dated May 19, 1956, 
reads in material part, as follows: 
"Michael Goodman, architect for the 
Hall of Justice and Records Building, Red-
wood City, California has rejected the 
exterior stucco because of stains, leeching 
[sic] and splotches and has demanded that 
we remedy the features objectionable to 
him. 
"K. E. Parker maintains that the instal-
lation of the exterior stucco was per-
formed in accordance with plans and spec-
ifications in first class and workmanlike 
manner and that the leeching [sic] is 
something beyond his control, and for 
which he is not responsible. 
"Since a difference of opinion exists re-
garding the responsibility for this alleged 
condition, the parties hereto wish to sub-
mit the matter of responsibility to arbitra-
tion." 
The other, signed by Parker and the 
county, but not by Ruane, dated May 22, 
1956, is identical except that, in the first 
paragraph, the words "we remedy" have 
been rubbed out and the words "K. E. 
Parker remedy" have been inserted, and 
in the third paragraph, the word "al-
leged" does not appear. Parker did not 
present to the arbitrators the "submission," 
dated May 19, signed by Ruane, although 
he told Ruane that he would. The court 
found that this was done secretly, and in 
violation of Parker's representations to 
Ruane. Thus there was submitted to the 
arbitrators only the question of "responsi-
bility" as between the county and Parker. 
Their award reads: "The responsibility 
* * * rests with the contractor, K. E. 
Parker." Following the award, Parker, 
claiming that the arbitrators had decided 
against Ruane, demanded that Ruane rem-
edy the defects. He refused to do so, 
stating, in a letter to Parker: " * • * 
nowhere do we find that the responsibility 
for the deficiency or for remedying the 
deficiency has been placed specifically 
against our firm or the work or materials 
installed by our firm." Parker's position 
as stated in his testimony is: "No, there 
was no arbitration with me. I had no 
arbitration. He had a contract with me 
to satisfy the architect. There was no 
arbitration between Mr. Ruane and I." 
The Facts as to the Interior Plaster 
[5] On this issue, the parties are in 
agreement that both "normal" and "abnor-
mal" cracking developed. It is also agreed 
that Ruane did considerable patching of 
cracks. The evidence as to when the 
"abnormal" cracking developed, and what 
caused it, is in sharp conflict. The evi-
dence favorable to Ruane, which we must 
accept on this appeal, indicates that the 
lathing and plastering were properly in-
stalled, in a good and workmanlike man-
ner, and in accordance with the plans 
and specifications. It further indicates 
that the "abnormal" cracking developed 
over a week-end, when the central heating 
was first turned on, and during which 
temperatures inside the building rose to 
over 80°, and that such improper heating 
caused the cracks. It further indicates that 
the heating was done under the direction 
and control of Parker. These are the 
cracks that Ruane refused to repair, and 
that Parker had repaired by another sub-
contractor. The architect, or his repre-
sentative, refused to accept the job until 
the cracks were repaired. Some of the 
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foregoing evidence came in as part of 
ftrker's case; some came in as rebuttal 
$gf Ruane. No objection was made to this 
procedure except that, in connection with 
iffac heating, on cross-examination of Park* 
tt, his counsel did object to one question on 
tiie ground that the matter was "beyond 
the issues in this case." 
So far as appears from the transcript, 
counsel for Parker did not, either when 
Raane rested or at any time thereafter 
during the trial, raise the contention on 
which he now relies, that Ruane pleaded 
performance but proved nonperformance 
plus an excuse therefor, and that a judg-
ment supported by such pleading and 
proof cannot stand. Cf. Wyman v. Hook-
er, 2 CaLApp. 36, 41, 83 P. 79. He elected 
to stand upon two propositions: that the 
architect's demand that the leaching and 
splotches, and the cracks, be repaired, re-
quires, as between Ruane and Parker, that 
Ruane do the repairs at his expense, re-
gardless of the cause of the defects, and 
that the arbitration placed responsibility 
upon Ruane. 
The Contractual Relation of the Parties 
[6] The case before us requires a de-
termination of the effect of the language 
of the subcontract whereby Ruane agrees 
to be bound by "the general conditions of 
the aforesaid specifications and all con-
ditions" of the prime contract "insofar as 
they are applicable to this particular work." 
Of course these provisions are valid and 
binding on Ruane. Enochs v Christie, 
137 CaI.App.2d Supp. 887, 291 P2d 200; 
Gray v. Cotton, 166 Cal. 130, 134 P. 1145; 
Trottier v. M. H. Golden Construction Co., 
105 Cal.App.2d 511, 515-516, 233 PJ2d 675. 
The question is, what are the effects of 
these provisions? 
Essentially, Parker takes the position that 
they mean that, as to the plastering, Ruane 
stands in Parker's shoes, for all purposes, 
vis-a-vis the county. This would mean 
that Ruane cannot recover if the archi-
tect's final certificate is withheld because of 
objection to the plastering work, regard-
8 Cal.Rptr.—25 
less of who or what caused the defects 
therein. It also would mean that Ruane 
is bound by any arbitration between the 
county and Parker relating to the plaster-
ing even though the question of responsi-
bility, as between Parker and Ruane, was 
not submitted to the arbitrators. We do 
not agree. We think that Parker's argu-
ment goes too far, and disregards the lim-
iting language in the subcontract, that 
Ruane is bound by the prime contract 
"insofar as * * * applicable." Park-
er's position would put Ruane completely 
at the mercy of Parker and the county and 
its architect, any of whom could, under 
such an interpretation, cause or require him 
to re-do what is in fact proper work, or 
pay for the doing of it by Parker, even 
if Ruane's work, after its proper comple-
tion, were to be damaged by Parker or by 
another of his subcontractors, or by agents 
of the county, or if the specifications them-
selves were defective. 
[7] Basically, what Ruane undertook 
to do was the lathing and plastering work 
called for by the prime contract, in accord-
ance with the plans and specifications, 
which he did not prepare. In doing the 
work, he had to install the lathing and 
plastering in a building which he neither 
designed nor built; that work was to be 
done by Parker or by other subcontractors 
of Parker. Specifically Parker, not Ruane, 
was to heat the building in such a way as 
to protect rather than to damage Ruane's 
plaster. Parker scheduled the work of 
his subcontractors, including Ruane. 
Ruane did not warrant the adequacy or 
sufficiency of the specifications. Even an 
architect does not do that. Pancoast v. 
Russell, 148 Cal.App.2d 909, 913, 307 P.2d 
719, and see Atowich v. Zimmer, 218 Cal. 
763, 25 P.2d 6; Mannix v. Tryon, 152 Cal. 
31, 91 P. 983; Wyman v. Hooker, supra, 
2 Cal.App. 36, 39, 83 P. 79; Simmons v. 
Firth, 33 Cal.App. 187, 189-190, 164 P. 
807; Roebling Const. Co. v. Doe Estate 
Co., 33 Cal.App. 397, 408, 165 P. 547. 
Ruane would have breached his contract 
if he had concluded that they were inade-
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quate and had undertaken, on his own re-
sponsibility, to disregard them for that 
reason. The subcontract provides that 
Ruane "shall not deviate from the said 
plans, specifications and details except on 
written order of the Contractor." I t would 
be unreasonable to construe his obliga-
tion, which was also Parker 's under the 
specifications of the prime contract, to re-
pair the plaster, as including an obliga-
tion to do that work at his own expense 
where the damage was caused either by in-
adequate plans and specifications (Wyman 
v. Hooker, supra, 2 Cal-App. 36, 39, 83 
P. 79) or by Parker or one of his other 
subcontractors. On that question, the 
contract documents are silent. 
It may be that a party can, by contract, 
place himself in such a position as Parker 
asserts, a question that we need not now 
consider. But we would be reluctant so 
to hold in any case where the language 
does not compel such a result. "A con-
tract must receive such an interpretation 
as will make it * * * reasonable 
* * * " Civil Code, § 1643. "Particular 
clauses of a contract are subordinate to 
its general intent." Civil Code, § 1650. 
"Stipulations which are necessary to make 
a contract reasonable * * * are im-
plied * * *." Civil Code § 1655. It is 
significant, we think, that Ruane relieved 
Parker from liability to him for delay, but 
not from any other liability, especially 
since the subcontract is on Parker's printed 
form. Cf. Civil Code, § 1654. 
The relationship of the architect to the 
prime contractor is different from his re-
lationship to the subcontractor. As the 
representative of the owner, his responsi-
bility is to see that the building is com-
pleted properly, in accordance with his 
plans and specifications. He can, there-
fore, reject any part of the work as not 
in accord therewith, but subject to arbi-
tration. However, it is immaterial to him 
whether the defect was caused by the 
prime contractor or one or more sub-
contractors. He looks solely to the prime 
contractor for performance, since the con-
tract documents make it clear that there 
is no contractual relationship between the 
owner and any subcontractor. I t is not 
surprising, then, that nowhere in the con-
tract documents is he given any authority 
or responsibility for deciding disputes be-
tween a subcontractor and the prime con-
tractor. That is not his function. It fol-
lows, we think, that arbitration between 
the prime contractor and the owner, as to 
a decision of the architect, does not deter-
mine such a question, absent an express 
agreement that it shall do so. Nothing in 
the contract documents provides for the 
arbitration of such a question. 
Many cases in this state, none of which 
has been cited by counsel for either party, 
recognize that under contracts similar 
to those before us, a subcontractor can re-
cover from the prime contractor for work 
properly done by the subcontractor, even 
though the prime contractor may not be 
able to recover from the owner because 
the latter or his architect has rejected the 
same work. The cases also recognize the 
differences that we have stated between 
the relationship of the owner's architect to 
the prime contractor and his relationship 
to the subcontractor. Manmx v. Tryon, 
supra, 152 Cal. 31, 39-41, 91 P. 083 [plas-
tering subcontract, plaster discolored, judg-
ment for subcontractor affirmed] ; Libber 
v. Fairbanks, 70 Cal.App 326, 233 P. 74: 
Frank T. Hickey, Inc. v. Los Angeles 
Jewish Community Council, 12S Cal.App. 
2d 676, 683, 276 P.2d 52; Fielding £ 
Shepley, Inc. v. Dow, 72 Cal.App.2d 18, 20, 
163 P.2d 908; C. F. Bolster Company v. 
J. C. Bocspflug, etc., Co., 167 Cal.App 2d 
143, 334 P.2d 247. 
In the Mannix case, the court said, as 
to the subcontractor: "Pie did not agree 
generally to plaster the dwelling, which 
would leave to him the selection of the 
materials and the method of doing the 
work. His agreement was to do it in a 
way that the owner and the original con-
tractor had designed, according to the 
specifications which they had agreed on. 
He had no discretion in the matter. When 
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tef followed strictly those specifications, 
«»ed exactly the materials they called for 
% the composition of the mortar and hard 
ferish, and applied them in a workmanlike 
banner , he did all his contract called for. 
H e did not contract for results, but only to 
do the work in a specified way. If the 
jusual result of white walls and ceilings 
did not follow, he was not responsible for 
it, unless there was some default on his 
part in furnishing the materials called 
for in the specifications or in doing the 
work with them. The court found, and 
the evidence fully sustained the finding, 
that the plaintiff had not been remiss in 
either particular. Under these circum-
stances, as he made no express warranty 
as to results, and plastered and hard 
finished the rooms with the materials 
specified in the contract, and did the work 
skillfully, he did all that he had con-
tracted to do." 152 Cal. at Pages 40-41, 
91 P. at page 987. 
The Arbitrator's Award Did Not 
Bind Ruane 
[8] The issue between Ruane and Park-
er was not submitted to the arbitrators 
although Ruane agreed to submit it. 
Parker deliberately withheld that submis-
sion. The arbitration was as to the re-
sponsibility as between Parker and the 
county for defects determined to exist by 
the architect. His determination would not 
fix responsibility as between Ruane and 
Parker. Certification by a third person, 
such as the architect, as to performance 
or nonperformance by a party, as a binding 
determination, is limited to those matters, 
which, by the contract, are to be certified 
to. Brandenstein v. Jackling, 99 Cal.App. 
438, 444, 278 P. 880; American-Hawaiian 
Engineering & Const. Co. v. Butler, 165 
Cal. 497, 517-518, 133 P. 280. Such cer-
tification is not binding where the contract 
does not make it so. C. F. Bolster Com-
pany v. J. C. Boespflug, etc., Co., supra, 
167 CaI.App.2d 143, 153, 334 P.2d 247; 
Gray v. Cotton, supra, 166 Cal. 130, 135— 
136, 138, 134 P. 1145; Kinkle v. Fruit 
Growers Supply Co., 63 Cal.App.2d 102, 
108, 146 P.2d 8 ; Vaughan v. County of 
Tulare, 56 Cal.App. 261, 266, 205 P. 21. 
Referring to an architect's certificate 
^ to certain delinquencies in a contractor's 
performance, the court said: "But, spring-
ing from the nature of such certificates, 
their power for weal or woe, and the fact 
that they contemplate forfeitures and the 
right of rescission, the terms of the cer-
tificates themselves are strictly construed." 
American-Hawaiian Engineering & Const. 
Co. v. Butler, supra, 165 Cal. 497, 512, 133 
P . 280, 286. 
[9,10] The arbitration being as to a 
decision of the architect, which did not de-
cide the question here involved, it follows 
that the arbitration decided nothing as be-
tween Ruane and Parker. An arbitration 
award is not res judicata as to a person 
who is not a party to the arbitration, or as 
to a subject matter not submitted to the 
arbitrators. Pancoast v. Russell, supra, 148 
Cal.App.2d 909, 914, 307 P.2d 719. An 
arbitrator "has no legal ri^ht to decide 
issues not submitted to him." Crofoot v. 
Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App 2d 156, 
184, 260 P.2d 156, 171; and see William 
B, Logan & Associates v. Monogram Pre-
cision Industries, 184 Cal.App 2d , 7 
Cal.Rptr. 212. 
Of course, Ruane and Parker could have 
submitted the question between them to 
arbitration, and Ruane thought that they 
did, but Parker saw to it that Ruane's in-
tention so to do was frustrated. Under 
these circumstances he is in no position 
to ask us, as he does, to hold that the 
axvard binds Ruane. 
The Rule of Pleading on Which 
Parker Relies Does Not Apply 
[11] Parker asserts that Ruane proved 
nonperformance, plus an excuse therefor, 
when he pleaded only performance. He 
does not claim that performance in ac-
cord with the plans and specifications was 
not shown, and in any event we think that 
such performance was shown. It seems 
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that Roane's statement that "the work 
* * * [has] been performed" is suffi-
cient to make a prima facie case. Thomas 
Havcrty Co. v0 Jones, 185 Cal. 285, 296-
297, 197 P. 105, 110. If it was not, fur-
ther evidence was produced to the same 
effect, by both parties, without objection 
as to the order of proof or as to who was 
doing the proving. What was proved, 
then, was performance, not nonperform-
ance. 
Parker relies on the rule that "a recovery 
on proof of excuse for nonperformance 
cannot be had on an allegation of full per-
formance." Kirk v, Culley, 202 Cal. 501, 
506, 261 P. 994, 996. The cases in which 
the rule has been applied do not involve 
the question here presented, namely, a 
contention by a subcontractor that he has 
performed in full compliance with the 
plans and specifications, and a rejection of 
his work by the architect for defects that 
appeared in the subcontractor's work 
thereafter.1 Parker asserts that his own 
satisfaction with Ruane's work, and the 
architect's approval of it, are conditions 
precedent to Ruane's right to recover, that 
Ruane's own proof showed that Parker was 
not satisfied and that the architect re-
jected Ruane's work, requiring Parker to 
repair it before he would accept the job. 
I. Downs v. Atkinson, 207 Cal. 259, 277 P. 
723 (Highway contractor took employee 
off highway job because state engineer 
objected to him. Employee was ready to 
perform at all times. The court did not 
apply the rule, but sustained recovery by 
the employee on a complaint alleging per-
formance. Followed in Pavno v. Pnt^e 
Studioe, Inc., 6 CahApp.2d 136, 141, 44 
P.2d 598, and Overton v. Vita-Food 
Corp., 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 372, 210 P. 
2d 757); Kirk v. Culley, 202 Cal. 501, 
261 P. 994 (action for attorney's fees); 
Kroteer v. Clark, 178 Cal. 736, 174 P. 
657 (contract to sell real property); 
Herdal r. Sheeny, 173 Cal. 163, 159 P. 
422 (action by prime contractor against 
the owner); Peek v. Steinberg, 163 Cal. 
127, 124 P. 834 (contract for employ-
ment) ; Estate of Warner, 158 Cal. 441, 
111 P. 352 (ante-nuptial agreement); 
Bocke v. Baldwin, 135 Cal. 522, 65 P. 
Actually, it was Parker, not Ruane, who 
proved some of these facts, but they are 
not disputed by Ruane. Ruane's position, 
essentially, is that if he showed that he 
performed according to the specifications, 
he has proved his case. 
[12] Parker relies on the generalvrule 
that, where a contract requires that work 
be done to the satisfaction of the archi-
tect, to be evidenced by his certificate to 
that effect, the giving of such a certificate 
is a condition precedent to the contractor's 
right to recover. Coplew v. Durand, 153 
Cal. 278, 279, 95 P. 38, 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 
791; Ahlgren v. Walsh, 173 Cal. 27, 31, 
158 P. 748; Tally v. Parsons, 131 Cal. 516, 
63 P. 833. But even in an action by the 
prime contractor against the owner, if the 
architect is satisfied with the work, and 
arbitrarily refuses to issue the certificates, 
"the necessity for the production of the 
certificate is dispensed with." Coplew v. 
Durand, supra, 153 Cal. 27$, 281, 95 P. 38, 
39, 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 791; and cf. Philbrook 
v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Cal.App. 187, 
197, 257 P. 882; American-Hawaiian En-
gineering & Const. Co. v. Butler, supra, 
165 Cal. 497, 515-516, 133 P. 280; Sim-
mons v. Firth, supra, 33 CaLApp. 187, 164 
P. 807. 
459, 67 P. 903 (attorney's fees) : Owen v. 
MpAflo. 104 Cal 179, 37 P. 923 (attor-
ney's fees); Daley v. Ross, 86 Cal. 114, 
*24 P. 867 (brokerage); Rylee v. De Fini, 
134 Cal.App.2d Supp. 877, 285 I\2d 115 
(brokerage); Swanson v. Thnrber, 132 
Cal.App.2d 171. 281 P.2d 642 (broker-
age) : Martin v. Chtrnaba r^T, 124 CaLApp. 
2d 648, 269 P.2d 25 (brokerage); Item-
inger v. Edlon Mfg. Co., 114 CaI.App.2d 
240. 250 P.2d 4 (sale); Ayoob v. Ayoob, 
74 Cal.App.2d 236, 237, 168 P.2d 462 (an-
tenuptial agreement); Atkinson v. Dis-
trict Bond Co., 5 Cal.App.2d 738, 43 P. 
2d 867 (contract to buy street bonds— 
dictum); Barnhart v. Blackburn, 137 Cal. 
App. 240, 30 P.2d 424 (exchange of prop-
erties) ; Stehli Silks Corp. v. Director, 
86 Cal.App. 591, 261 P. 313 (sale); Mc-
Nulty v. New Richmond Land Co., 44 Cal. 
App. 744, 187 P. 97 (purchase of real 
property). 
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pff* think that the rule invoked does not 
Hgbrfre a reversal here, for a number of 
Nstaims: 
tflKrff; It has been held that, where a 
jfantiff fails to plead a condition and the 
gi&ion for its nonfulfillment, but this de-
lict is supplied by the answer, there was 
IT mere variance, which did not mislead 
&* defendant, so that Code of Civil Pro-
iti&tre, § 469 applies. Antonelle v. Ken-
nedy 4 Shaw Lumber Co., 140 Cal. 309, 
32&-321, 73 P. 966, and see the annota-
tions to section 469, in Deering's and West's 
Annotated Codes. Here, the defect was not 
supplied by the answer, except as to the 
arbitration, but it was supplied by the 
proof, part of which came from Parker 
himself. 
This is an application of the broader 
rule that when a case is tried on the 
assumption that a cause of action is stated, 
that certain issues are raised by the plead-
ings, that a particular issue is controlling, 
neither party can change this theory for 
purposes of review on appeal. Reid v. 
Overland Machined Products, 183 Cal.App. 
2d , 7 Cal.Rptr. 34, and cases there 
cited. 
Second: It has been held that, where the 
plaintiff consistently claims that he has 
performed, and at no time admits nonper-
formance or claims an excuse therefor, 
the rule does not apply, even though the 
defendant attempts to show the latter. 
Mills v. Geo. A. Moore & Co., 39 Cal.App. 
94, 96, 178 P. 304. So, too, error in over-
ruling a demurrer on the ground that the 
complaint of a contractor did not show 
either that the required certificate of an 
engineer was given, or that there was an 
excuse for its not being given, is not 
prejudicial when at the trial the facts are 
shown without objection. Simmons v. 
Firth, supra, 33 Cal.App. 187, 189, 164 P. 
807; Const., Art. VI, § 4i/£; Code Civ. 
Proc. § 475. 
Third: The rule has not been applied to 
the satisfaction of the owner or architect 
in the case of building contracts or sub-
contracts. There is good reason for this. 
So far as the satisfaction of Parker is 
concerned, it has been repeatedly held that 
performance of a building contract which 
is satisfactory to a reasonable person is 
performance of the contract, even if the 
owner is in fact, not satisfied. Thomas 
Haverty Co. v. Jones, supra, 185 Cal. 285, 
296, 197 P. 105; Scott Co., Inc. v. Rolkin, 
133 Calj\pp. 209, 23 P2d 1065; cf. Collins 
v. Vickter Manor, Inc., 47 Cal2d 875, 882, 
306 P2d 783; Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal2d 
119, 123, 330 P2d 625; Leboire v. Royce, 
53 Cal2d 659, 672, 2 Cal.Rptr. 745; Tiffany 
v. Pacific Sewer Pipe Co., 180 Cal. 700, 
702-704, 182 P. 428, 6 A.L.R. 1493. Under 
such circumstances, pleading of perform-
ance is sufficient. The subcontractor need 
not plead that the prime contractor was or 
was not satisfied. Fielding & Shepley, Inc. 
v. Dow, supra, 72 Cal.App.2d 18, 21, 163 
P.2d 908. 
[13] This is in part because of the 
special nature of building contracts, under 
which the contractor's work becomes a part 
of the owner's real property, and is of such 
a character that it cannot be restored in 
case the owner rescinds, so that the owner 
retains the benefit of it. It is long estab-
lished law in this state that the contractor 
who pleads performance, need prove only 
substantial performance, defendant being 
allowed an offset for deficiencies in the 
work. Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones, 
supra, 185 Cal. 285, 289, 197 P. 105, and 
cases cited; Atowich v. Zimmer, supra, 218 
Cal 763, 76&-76Q, 25 P 2d 6 As the court 
said in Joseph Musto Sons-Keenan Co. v. 
Pacific States Corp., 48 Cal.App. 452, 458, 
192 P. 138, 140: "a substantial perform-
ance is performance." See Shell v. 
Schmidt, 164 Cal.App.2d 350, 356, 330 P.2d 
817; Shumway v. Woolwine, 84 Cal.App. 
220, 223-224, 257 P. 898; Brown v. Aguilar, 
202 Cal. 143, 147, 259 P. 735. 
[14,15] It is also the rule that a condi-
tion that a third party shall take some ac-
tion (such as action by the architect here) 
is to be construed against the party relying 
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npon it, and will be held to be a covenant, 
rather than a condition, when the terms of 
the agreement can be so construed. An-
tonelle v. Kennedy & Shaw Lumber Co., 
supra, 140 Cal. 309, 315-316, 318, 73 P. 966. 
In the case before us, an architect's cer-
tificate is not unequivocally made a condi-
tion precedent to Ruane's right to recover, 
nor is it provided, as it often is in building 
contracts, that the architect's decision is 
final or conclusive. Moreover, if the de-
fendant, by his own act, has prevented per-
formance of a condition, he may not rely 
upon it. Ibid, 140 Cal. at page 316, 73 P. 
at page 968; cf. Lucy v. Davis, 163 Cal. 611, 
614-615, 126 P. 490; Victoria S. S. Co. v. 
Western Assur. Co., 167 Cal. 348, 353, 139 
P. 807; San Diego Construction Co. v. 
Mannix, 175 Cal. 548, 556, 166 P. 325; 
Alpha Beta Food Markets v. Retail Clerks, 
45 Cal.2d 764, 771-772, 291 P.2d 433; 
Wyman v. Hooker, supra, 2 Cal.App. 36, 40, 
83 P. 79; Pacific Allied v. Century Steel 
Products, Inc., 162 Cal.App.2d 70, 79-80, 
327 P.2d 547. 
[16] Where the plaintiff pleads per-
formance, and proves substantial perform-
ance, including proof that the defects in 
his work were caused by the defendant, the 
rule that excuse for failure of perform-
ance must be pleaded does not apply. It 
was directly so held in the case of a plaster-
ing contract, in Smith v. Mathews Construc-
tion Co, 179 Cal. 797, 800-801, 179 P. 205. 
See also Conrad v. Foerst, 54 Cal.App. 277, 
201 P. 795; Shumway v. Woolwine, supra, 
84 Cal.App. 220, 225, 257 P. 898. 
It has been held that in the case of a 
building contract, even the prime contrac-
tor may plead performance, although the 
architect's certificate was withheld, and may 
prove that the certificate was wrongfully 
withheld. See Needham v. Sisters of 
Mercy, 59 Cal.App. 341, 344-345, 210 P. 
830, 831, where the court said: 'The rule 
is that an unreasonable, arbitrary or ca-
pricious refusal of the architect to give the 
certificate required by the contract excuses 
the contractor from producing such a cer-
tificate as a condition precedent to the re-
covery of the payment due, and the allega-
tion of due performance of all conditions 
on the part of the contractor is a sufficient 
allegation to put this matter in issue and to 
permit the contractor to offer evidence 
showing the reason the certificate had not 
been produced. The better practice, of 
course, is to allege the excuse for the fail-
ure to present the certificate, as in other 
cases of nonperformance. But the neglect 
to do so is not a sufficient ground for re-
versal when the trial of the issue has been 
had and a good and sufficient excuse has 
been proved." In so holding, the court re-
lied upon Antonelle, supra, and upon Wy-
man v. Hooker, supra, 2 Cal.App. 36, 40, 83 
P. 79. Cf. Philbrook v. Mercantile Trust 
Co., supra, 84 Cal.App. 187, 197, 257 P. 882; 
Simmons v. Firth, supra, 33 Cal.App. 187, 
164 P. 807. 
Roebling Const. Co. v. Doe Estate Co., 
supra, 33 Cal.App. 397, 165 P. 547, was an 
action by a contractor for the contract price 
of certain concrete work. The contract re-
quired a certificate of acceptance by the 
architect or a writing by the architect stat-
ing a just and true reason for not issuing 
a certificate, and stating the defects to be 
remedied. The complaint alleged full per-
formance, and a refusal by the architect to 
certify. The court found that the contrac-
tor had fully performed, according to speci-
fications. It also found that the materials 
used were inspected and approved by the 
architect, and that the work was done under 
his inspection and with his approval. (The 
letters put in evidence by Parker show the 
same things here, as to the stucco.) The 
concrete afterward checked and cracked. 
The court also found, in substance, that the 
defects were not the fault of the contractor, 
but were caused by improper specifications. 
There was no claim that the architect's cer-
tificate was withheld fraudulently, or in 
bad faith. In affirming a judgment for the 
contractor, the court said: "It seems to us 
that, when the plaintiff agreed 'to furnish 
the necessary labor and materials, includ-
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gftools, implements and appliances, re* 
and perform and complete in a 
like manner * * * all floors 
roof slabs * * * and other works 
4&Ctwn and described,' etc., its engagement 
1p«M to do this, as the contract specifically 
.provides, 'in conformity with the plans, 
^drawings and specifications for the same 
by Havens and Toepke, the author-
architects employed by the owner, 
* *' and 'under the direction and su-
pervision and subject to the approval of 
said architects.' This interpretation, we 
iirink, is, as the contract provides, 'within a 
fair and equitable construction of the true 
intent and meaning of said plans and speci-
fications/ Where, in the erection of a 
tmilding, the owner agrees to pay a certain 
Sum for doing a certain part of the work 
and specifically provides the kind of ma-
terials to be used and the manner in which 
they are to be used and stands by and di-
rects and afterward approves the work, 
the risk of its serving the purpose intended 
by the owner is clearly upon him/' 33 Cal. 
App. at pages 407-408, 165 P. at page 552. 
The court further held that, the trial judge 
having found that the plaintiff performed 
according to plans and specifications, a fur-
ther finding as to the cause of the defects 
that appeared was immaterial and unneces-
sary: "We cannot see that it was essential 
to the finding of the court that plaintiff had 
fully performed its contract, to make a find-
ing as to the improper proportions of sand 
and cement in the mixture required by the 
specifications, as the cause of the defects 
in the floor* If, a* WP hold, plaintiff con-
tracted only to furnish the materials and 
do the work in compliance with the plans 
and specifications and in good and work-
manlike manner, the cause of the defects 
would be immaterial." 33 Cal.App. at page 
409, 165 P. at page 551. In reaching its 
conclusions, the court followed City Street 
Imp. Co. v. City of Marysville, 155 Cal. 
419, 101 P. 308, 23 L.Rj\.,N.S., 317, and 
Coplew v. Durand, supra, 153 Cal. 278, 95 
P. 38, 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 791. 
The foregoing case, we think, is directly 
in point, as to the exterior stucco. As to 
the interior plaster, Ruane proved that he 
did the work according to the plans and 
specifications, i. e., that he performed, and 
that the damage and rejection by the archi-
tect were caused by Parker. Thus, again, 
Ruane proved performance, not nonper-
formance plus an excuse. 
[17] There is no contention that Parker 
was misled; no claim that he did not have 
ample opportunity to meet the issues as 
they actually developed at the trial; no 
suggestion that he might have been able to 
produce other evidence if Ruane's pleading 
had alleged what Parker says it should 
have. As to the exterior stucco, Parker 
elected to stand on the arbitration. As to 
both items he also stood upon the admitted 
fact that defects did appear after the work 
was done and upon rejection of the work 
by the architect. The appearance of the 
defects and the rejection by the architect 
were evidence of nonperformance, but were 
not, under the contract, conclusive as be-
tween these parties. For all of these rea-
sons, and under the cited cases, we hold that 
the pleading and the proof were sufficient. 
Affirm od 
BRAY, P. J., and TOBRINER, J., con-
cur. 
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Professional legal corporation filed a 
petition and motion to confirm an arbitra-
tor's award in a controversy with a client 
over legal fees. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, James S, Sawaya, J., 
granted the petition and motion, and denied 
client's motion to vacate its judgment 
Client appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, 
J., held that: (1) client's motion to vacate 
the arbitrator's award, filed after the 
award was confirmed, was out of time, and 
(2) rule governing motions for new trial or 
amendment of judgment applied where the 
district court proceeding was only a hearing 
on a motion to confirm an arbitration 
award, and thus, by appearing generally in 
the arbitration proceeding and in the hear-
ing on legal corporation's motion to confirm 
the award, client submitted to the jurisdic-
tion of the district court and could not 
contest that jurisdiction as a basis for a new 
trial. 
Affirmed. 
1. Arbitration <$=»!£.& 
Time for appeal of order confirming an 
arbitrator's award ran from order denying 
timely motion to alter or amend that judg-
ment under rule governing new trials and 
amendments of judgment Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rules 59, 73(a). 
2. Attorney and Client *=>143 
Lawyers are forbidden from entering 
into fee agreements that are clearly exces-
sive of what is reasonable for the service 
performed. ABA Code of Jud.Conduct, 
DR2-106(A, B). 
3. Arbitration <*=»7X6 
The Supreme Court would ignore all 
assertions of fact in brief as to what went 
on in arbitrator's hearing for which there 
was no reference to the record and no sup-
port in the record, and would base its deci-
sion solely upon the facts shown in the 
record. 
4 Arbitration «=>89 
The testimony or affidavit of an arbi-
trator is appropriate evidence to show what 
matters were or were not presented to and 
considered in arbitration. 
5. Arbitration *=>L2 
The policy of Utah law favors arbitra-
tion as a speedy and inexpensive method of 
adjudicating disputes. 
6. Arbitration <s=» 73.7(1) 
Judicial review of arbitration awards 
should not be pervasive in scope or suscepti-
ble to repetitive adjudications; it should be 
strictly limited to the statutory grounds and 
procedures for review. U.C.A. 1953, 78-31-
1. 
7. Arbitration <s=>77(2) 
Provision of Arbitration Act that mo-
tions to vacate, modify, or correct shall be 
served within three months is a statutory 
maximum, not a guaranteed minimum that 
permits the filing of such motions after the 
granting of a motion to confirm. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-31-18. 
8. Arbitration <s=>77(2) 
Motion to vacate arbitrator's award 
once the court had entered a judgment con-
firming the award was out of time. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rules 59, 73(a); U.C.A. 1953, 78-
31-15 to 78-31-17, 78-31-19. 
9. Arbitration <s=»77(l) 
Rule governing motions for new trial 
or amendment of judgment applied where 
district court proceeding was only a hearing 
on a motion to confirm an arbitration 
award. U.C.A.1953, 78-31-15 to 78-31-17; 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 59, 59(aX7). 
10. Arbitration «=>72J 
Motion for new trial or to amend 
judgment could not be used in proceeding 
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to confirm arbitrator's award to review 
matters addressed to the hearing before the 
arbitrator. U.CJL1953, TO-31-15 to 7&-
31-17; Rules Civ.Proa, Rule 59. 
1L Appearance <*»19(1) 
By appearing generally in an arbitra-
tion proceeding and in a hearing on plain-
tiffs motion to confirm the award, defend-
ant submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
district court and could not contest that 
jurisdiction as a basis for a new triaL 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 59, 73(a); U.C.A. 
1953, 78-31-15 to 78-31-17, 78-31-19. 
Paul H. Proctor, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant 
David Ko Robinson, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
OAKS, Justice: 
The district court confirmed the award of 
an arbitrator in a controversy between a 
professional corporation and a client over 
legal fees. The client's appeal seeks a re-
mand to determine whether the fees met 
the standard of "reasonableness" specified 
in the Code of Professional Responsibility, a 
question not considered by the arbitrator. 
At issue are the meaning of provisions of 
the Arbitration Act, U.C.A., 1953, §§ 78-
31-1 to -22, and the procedures to be fol-
lowed in confirming awards under it 
So far as pertinent to this controversy, 
the written retainer agreement provided 
that the client would pay specified hourly 
rates for legal services and that any dis-
putes arising from the relationship would 
be settled by arbitration pursuant to the 
ru)es of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. When a dispute arose, the plaintiff 
corporation first filed a civil action against 
the defendant for $7,145.25 in legal fees, 
but almost immediately thereafter aban-
doned the action and referred the matter 
for arbitration." Both parties were repre-
sented by counsel in the arbitration pro-
ceeding, which concluded with a $5,306.41 
1. Pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 73(a), the time for 
appeal of the October 17, 1981, order confirm-
ing the award of the arbitrator runs from the 
awa*d in favor of the plaintiff, plus a di-
rection that the defendant also reimburse 
the plaintiff for the $150 administrative fee 
paid to the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. The arbitrator, John P. O'Keefe, 
signed the award on May 21, 198L 
On June 2, 1981, the plaintiff filed in the 
district court a petition and motion to con-
firm the award of the arbitrator. The peti-
tion and motion was accompanied by a 
signed and notarized copy of the arbitra-
tor's award and an accompanying affidavit 
authenticating that document and relating 
it to plaintiffs controversy with defendant 
Defendant's counsel was duly notified. Af-
ter several continuances, the petition and 
motion was heard and granted on October 
1» 1981. The written order confirming the 
award and granting judgment against de-
fendant in the amount assigned therein was 
signed on October 17, 1981. 
[1) On October 20, 1981, defendant filed 
a motion whose meaning and effect provide 
the principal issue on this appeal. The mo-
tion was explicitly "[pjursuant to Rule 59 
• • and . . . Section 78-31-16/* In perti-
nent part, it asked the court to vacate its 
judgment on two grounds: (1) the arbitra-
tor ''improperly refused to hear evidence 
pertjnent and material to the controversy" 
and (2) the court "is without jurisdiction 
over the defendant in this action" because 
the plaintiff "failed to comply with the 
jurisdictional provisions of [the Arbitration 
Act]/' This motion was heard and denied 
by n written order dated March 25, 1982, 
and the defendant took this timely appeal.1 
[2J 1. Motion to Vacate. Defendant's 
first argument concerns the relationship be-
twe$n the fee provisions in the retainer 
agreement and the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. Defendant cites ample au-
thority to demonstrate that lawyers' fee 
agreements are subject to the corrective 
authority of the court and to the constraints 
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
In te Hansen, Utah, 586 P.2d 413, 416 
orqer denying appellant's timely moUon to alter 
or amend that judgment under Rule 59 
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(1978); Herro, McAndrews A Porter r. Ger* 
lmrdt, 62 WisJM 1TO, 214 N.W^d 401 (1974); 
Horton v. Butler, La.CtApp.f 387 So.2d 
1315 (1960); Stanton v. Saks, S.D., 311 
N.WJM 584 (1981); Kiser y. Miller, 364 
F.Supp. 1311 (D.D.C1973), modified on oth-
er grounds, 517 F2A 1237 (D.CCir.1974). 
Lawyers are forbidden from entering into 
fee agreements that are "clearly excessive" 
of what is "reasonable" for the service per* 
formed. Utah Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility DR 2-106(A) & (B) (1970). 
[3] Plaintiff does not contest these 
propositions, but maintains that the reason-
ableness of its fees is not before us on this 
appeal. In arguing this point, both parties 
encumber their briefs with assertions of 
fact about what went on in the hearing 
before the arbitrator for which there is no 
reference to the record and no support in 
the record. We ignore all such matters and 
base our decision solely upon the facts 
shown in the record. 
[4] The parties waived recording of the 
arbitration hearing. The only information 
in the record about that hearing is con-
tained in the arbitrator's affidavit, filed 
with plaintiffs opposition to the postjudg-
ment motion to vacate. The testimony or 
affidavit of an arbitrator is appropriate evi-
dence to show what matters were or were 
not presented to and considered in arbitra-
tion. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 
453-54, 15 P.2d 353, 357 (1932). Here, the 
affidavit shows that both parties were rep-
resented by counsel at the arbitration hear-
ing and that instead of challenging the ac-
curacy of plaintiffs time and cost records, 
defendant challenged the reasonableness of 
the total charge on the basis that the repre-
sentation was not as successful as she had 
expected.2 When defendant's counsel "at-
tempted to cite the Utah Bar Association's 
Code of Professional Responsibility," the ar-
bitrator excluded the provisions of the Code 
from consideration as "not germane to the 
dispute." Defendant's counsel took no ex-
ception to that ruling. The arbitrator stat-
ed that his award was based on the evi-
dence submitted to him on the agreed fees 
2. See Wamn v. Warren, Utah, 655 P2d 684 
(fixed1 by the agreement at $50 per hour for 
office work, $6ft per hour for court work, 
and $20 per hour for paralegals) and the 
amount of time expended on the represen-
tation. 
Defendant argues that the arbitrator's 
award should have been vacated on the 
statutory ground that the arbitrator was 
aguilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy." § 78-31-16(3); Giannopuhs 
v. Pappas, 80 Utah at 449-50, 15 P.2d at 
356. Plaintiff maintains that defendant 
lost the opportunity to raise this objection 
in the district court or in this Court because 
the record shows (as it does) that defendant 
did not raise this objection until after the 
court had confirmed and entered judgment 
on the arbitrator's award. This issue turns 
on a matter of statutory interpretation of 
the respective functions of the motion to 
confirm and the motion to vacate. 
[5,6] The Territory and State of Utah 
have had statutory provisions for arbitra-
tion of disputes since 1884. Bivans v. Utah 
Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 53 Utah 
601, 607, 174 P. 1126, 1128 (1918). The 
policy of our law favors arbitration as a 
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudi-
cating disputes. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 
Utah at 449, 15 P.2d at 356. To that end, 
the Legislature amended the Arbitration 
Act to permit valid and enforceable agree-
ments for arbitration of future as well as 
present disputes. § 78-31-1. We held that 
amendment constitutional in an opinion 
that reaffirms the strong public policy in 
favor of arbitration as an approved, practi-
cal, and inexpensive means of settling dis-
putes and easing court congestion. Lindon 
City v. Engineers Construction Co., Utah, 
636 P.2d 1070 (1981). To serve that policy 
and achieve those objectives, judicial review 
of arbitration awards should not be perva-
sive in scope or susceptible to repetitive 
adjudications; it should be strictly limited 
to the statutory grounds and procedures for 
review. 
(1982). 
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This spirit permeates our decisions on ju-
dicial review of arbitration awards. Thus, 
fa BSVBDS v. Utah Lake Land, Water & 
Bower Co., supra, we declared that as a 
general rule "awards will not be disturbed 
» account of irregularities or informalities, 
or because the court does not agree with 
the award, so long as the proceeding has 
been fair and honest and the substantial 
rights of the parties have been respected." 
li 53 Utah at 612-13,174 P. at 1130. Ac-
cord, Richards v. Smith, 33 Utah 8,14,91 P. 
683, 684 (1907). In the Bivans case, we also 
held that the court should not consider any 
objection to the appropriateness of evidence 
offered in the arbitration proceeding where 
there had been no objection that would 
allow the alleged defect to be cured in that 
proceeding. 53 Utah at 614-15, 174 P. at 
1131o Similarly, in Giannopuloa v. Pappas, 
80 Utah at 449,15 P 2d at 356, we declared: 
Ordinarily a court has no authority to 
review the action of arbitrators to correct 
errors or to substitute its conclusion for 
that of the arbitrators acting honestly 
and within the scope of their authority. 
The statute has provided a method by 
which an award thus made may be given 
legal sanction and reduced to judgment 
& [§1 78-31-15. Confirmation or modification 
by court on motion.—At any time within 
three months after the award is made, unless 
the parties shall extend the time in writing, 
any party to the arbitration may apply to the 
court for an order confirming the award, and 
the court shall grant such an order, unless 
the award is vacated, modified or corrected 
as provided in the next two succeeding sec-
tions [78-31-16, 78-31-17]. Notice in writ-
ing of the motion must be served upon the 
adverse party, or his attorney, five days be-
fore the hearing thereof. 
4 [§] 78-31-16. Vacating by court—Grounds. 
—In any of the following cases the court 
shall, after notice and hearing, make an order 
vacating the award, upon the application of 
any party to the arbitration: 
(1) Where the award was procured by cor-
ruption, fraud or other undue means. 
(2) Where there was evident partiality or 
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them. 
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing upon sufficient cause shown, or in re-
fusing to hear evidence pertinent and materi-
al to the controversy, or of any other misbe-
by summary proceedings in the nature of 
a motion filed in court The statute also 
has designated the grounds by which the 
award may be vacated or set aside, and it 
is generally held that no other grounds 
than those specified can be taken advan-
tage of in such proceeding. [Citations 
omitted; emphasis added] 
See Richards v. Smith, 33 Utah at 16, 91 P. 
at 685. These general principles guide us in 
interpreting the intent of the various statu-
tory provisions for judicial review. 
In successive provisions whose entire text 
is set out in the footnotes, our Arbitration 
Act permits a motion to confirm an arbitra-
tor's award within three months3 and a 
motion to vacate4 and a motion to modify 
or correct5 within the same period of time. 
§ 78-31-18. The relationship among these 
remedies when more than one is pursued is 
crucial in this case, which turns on whether 
a motion to vacate can be brought forward 
after the court has already granted a mo-
tion to confirm the award. We conclude 
that it cannot. 
Section 15 directs that the court "shall 
grant" the order confirming the award "un-
less the award is vacated, modified or cor-
havior by which the rights of any party have 
been prejudiced. 
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that 
a mutual, final and definite award upon the 
subject matter submitted was not made. 
Where an award is vacated, and the time 
within which the agreement required the 
award to be made has not expired, the court 
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by 
the arbitrators. 
5. [§] 78-31-17 Modification by court-
Grounds.—In any of the following cases the 
court shall, after notice and hearing, make an 
order modifying or correcting the award 
upon the application of any party to the arbi-
tration: 
(1) Where there was an evident miscalcu-
lation of figures, or an evident mistake in the 
description of any person, thing or property, 
referred to in the award. 
(2) Where the arbitrators have awarded 
upon a matter not submitted to them. 
(3) Where the award is imperfect in a mat-
ter of form not affecting the merits of the 
controversy 
The order must modify and correct the 
award so as to effect the intent thereof 
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rected" as provided in sections 16 and 17. 
In context, including the specific require-
ment of written notice to the adverse party, 
this section apparently contemplates that 
any motions to vacate, modify, or correct 
will be before the court when it rules on the 
motion to confirm. This is the procedure 
exemplified in the leading case of Gianno-
puloe v. Pappaa, supra, where the motion to 
vacate was filed along with a verified an-
swer to the motion to confirm. 80 Utah at 
446, 15 P.2d at 354-65. This same proce-
dure was followed under our earlier arbitra-
tion statute in Richards v. Smith, 33 Utah 
at 13, 91 P. at 684, and is specified under 
the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration 
Act (an improved, modern version of the 
Act adopted in Utah in 1925). Audette & 
Sons, Inc. v. LaRochelle, Me., 373 K3A 1226, 
1227 (1977). 
[7] This construction is further con-
firmed by the provision directing entry of a 
conforming judgment or decree upon grant-
ing of an order "confirming, modifying, cor-
recting or vacating an award/' § 78-31-19, 
since that direction apparently contem-
plates that the court would consider such 
motions together rather than in succession. 
Otherwise, the procedures, hearings, and ac-
tion of the court in the motion to confirm 
could be held for naught and the whole 
process repeated. We do not readily infer a 
legislative intent to squander scarce judicial 
time in this manner. Although there is no 
express provision to this effect, we hold 
that the fair intendment of the Arbitration 
Act bars the filing of motions under sec-
tions 16 and 17 once the court has entered a 
judgment confirming the award under sec-
tion 15.* This construction facilitates the 
limited scope of review and the considera-
tions of finality sought to be served by our 
policies on judicial review of arbitration 
awards. 
6. Section 78-31-18, which provides that mo-
tions to vacate, modify, or correct shall be 
served within three months, is not to the con-
trary. For the reasons discussed in the text, 
we interpret that provision as a statutory maxi-
mum, not as a guaranteed minimum that per-
mits the filing of such motions after the grant-
ing of a motion to confirm. 
Section 78-31-18 is inapplicable or the facts 
of this case in any event, since defendant's 
[8] For the reasons explained above, de-
fendant's motion to vacate the arbitrator's 
award was out of time. The order denying 
that motion will be affirmed. 
[9] 2. Motion for New Trial. Plaintiff 
contends that the motion for new trial or to 
amend the judgment under Rule 59 does 
not apply where the district court proceed-
ing was only a hearing on a motion to 
confirm an arbitration award We disa-
gree. As is evident from the content of 
sections 15 to 17 of the Arbitration Act, 
§§ 78-31-15 to -17, the proceedings lead-
ing to confirming, vacating, or modifying 
an arbitrator's award can involve evidentia-
ry hearings as well as legal questions. As it 
relates to the issues of fact and law in the 
district court proceedings, the content of 
Rule 59 is fully applicable. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by Giannopulos v. Pappas, 
supra, where the relief given by our deci-
sion was to grant a new trial of the district 
court proceeding to confirm or vacate the 
arbitrator's award. 
[10] At the same time, however, Rule 59 
should not be applied to alter the nature of 
the district court proceeding, which is sim-
ply a proceeding to confirm or vacate or 
modify the arbitrator's award. That is the 
only "trial" to which the motion for new 
trial is addressed. It is not addressed to the 
hearing before the arbitrator. Viewed in 
that light, some of the grounds for relief 
under Rule 59 are inapplicable to a district 
court proceeding to confirm, vacate, or 
modify an arbitrator's award, but others 
are fully applicable. 
[11] In this case, we find no circum-
stances in the proceedings of the district 
court that apply to any of the grounds for 
new trial under Rule 59. Defendant's claim 
that the district court was without jurisdic-
tion because plaintiff failed to comply with 
motion to vacate was filed more than three 
months after the arbitration award was filed or 
delivered. Such a delay has also been held to 
constitute a waiver of the right to challenge the 
award under the comparable provision of the 
Uniform Arbitration Act. Schroud v. Van C. 
Argiris & Co., 78 IU.App.3d 1092, 1095, 34 III. 
Dec. 428, 430, 398 N.E2d 103, 105 (1979). 
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the jurisdictional provisions of the Arbitra-
tion Act would, if correct, constitute an 
"error in law" under Rule 59(aX7), but this 
claim is without merit By appearing gen-
erally in the arbitration proceeding and in 
the hearing on plaintiffs motion to confirm 
the award, defendant submitted to the jur-
isdiction of the district court and cannot 
contest that jurisdiction as a basis for a new 
trial. Barber v. Calder, Utah, 522 ?2d 700, 
702 n. 4 (1974); Johnson v. Clark, 131 Mont 
454,311 P.2d 772 (1957). The application of 
this general rule on civil actions to a district 
court proceeding to confirm, vacate, or 
modify an arbitrator's award is consistent 
with the general rule that such proceedings 
are summary proceedings that can be com-
menced by motion or petition, without ser-
vice of summons or formal pleadings. Cut-
ler Associates, Inc. v. Merrill Trust Co., Me., 
395 A.2d 453, 455 (1978). 
The other contentions of the parties are 
all subsumed in the foregoing rulings. 
The judgment confirming the arbitrator's 
award and the order denying the posttrial 
motions are affirmed. Costs to respon-
dents. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Richard A. ISAACSON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
v. 
Clair DORIUS, Defendant and Appellant 
Lawrence W. LYNN, Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
• . 
Clair DORIUS, Defendant and Appellant 
Ho. 18166. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 17, 1983. 
Suits were instituted for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile collision. The 
Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, Don 
V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment for plain-
tiffs, and defendant appealed. On motion 
of plaintiffs to dismiss appeal, the Supreme 
Court, Hall, C J., held that although 30-<lay 
period for filing a notice of appeal from 
denial of motion for new trial on November 
13, 1981, was extended to December 14, 
1981, because December 13, 1981, fell on a 
Sunday, where notice of appeal was not 
filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court 
until December 16, 1981, which was two 
days beyond the one-month period of limita-
tion for filing, and mailing of a copy of the 
notice of appeal on December 10, 1981, did 
not constitute a filing, appeal was untimely 
and the Supreme Court was thus deprived 
of its appellate jurisdiction. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Stewart and Howe, JJ., dissented and 
filed opinions. 
1. Appeal and Error s=>428(2) 
Although 30-day period for filing a 
notice of appeal from denial of motion for 
new trial on November 13, 1981, was ex-
tended to December 14, 1981, because De-
cember 13, 1981, fell on a Sunday, where 
notice of appeal was not filed with the clerk 
of the Supreme Court until December 16, 
1981, which was two days beyond the one-
month period of limitation for filing, and 
mailing of a copy of the notice of appeal on 
December 10, 1981, did not constitute a 
filing, appeal was untimely and the Su-
preme Court was thus deprived of its appel-
late jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953, 63-37-1, 78-
2-4; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 73(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>428(l) 
Statute that any report, claim, tax re-
turn, statement or other document or any 
payment required or authorized to be filed 
or made to the state of Utah or to any 
political subdivision thereof which is trans-
mitted through the United States mail shall 
be deemed filed or made and received by 
the state or political subdivisions on the 
ARBITRATION 78-31-1 
78-31-5. Application to be in wii t ing. 
78-31-1). Hearings—Time—Notice—Postponement. 
78-31-7. Fai lure of par ty to appear. 
78-31-8. Award—Time for making. 
78-31-9. Representation of part ies—By at torney. 
78-31-10. Witnesses—Subpoena—Fees-—Contempt. 
78-31-11. Depositions. 
78-31-12. Conservation of property pendente l i te . 
78-31-13. Submit t ing law questions to court. 
78-31-14. Award—Form. 
78-31-15. Confirmation or modification by court on motion. 
78-31-16. Vacat ing by court—Grounds. 
78-31-17. Modification by court—Grounds. 
78-31-18. Notice of motion—Stay. 
78-31-19. Decree of court. 
78-31-20. Record to be filed with clerk of cour t—Entry of judgment . 
78-31-21. Judgment—Force and effect. 
78-31-22. Appeals. 
78-31-1. Written agreement for—Enforceable limited right to revoke.— 
Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration, in 
conformity with the provisions of this chapter, any controversy existing 
between them at the time of the agreement to submit, or they may agree 
to submit to arbitration any controversy which may arise in the future. 
Such an agreement shall be valid and enforceable, and no party shall have 
the power to revoke the submission without the consent of the other 
parties to the submission, except upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the rescission or revocation of any contract. 
Policy tha t work terms and conditions 
should result from voluntary agreement , 
34-20-1. 
Public t rans i t district labor disputes, 
11-20-32. 
Water disputes, informal a rb i t ra t ion by 
s ta te engineer, 73-2-16. 
Future disputes. 
An agreement to a rb i t r a t e a future dis-
pute is invalid and unenforceable. Shu-
maker v. Utex Explorat ion Co., 157 F . 
Supp. 68. 
Provisions of bylaws of corporation for 
the appraisement of values of capi tal stock 
of stockholder desiring to sell or t ransfer 
it was not an agreement for the arbi-
t ra t ion of future disputes. Shumaker v. 
Utex Explorat ion Co., 157 F . Supp. 68. 
Whether an agreement is one to arbi-
t r a te future disputes should depend upon 
i ts prospective operation at t ime of agree-
ment and not upon whether in l ight of 
subsequent developments i t la ter appears 
of vi ta l import to the par t ies . Shumaker 
v. Utex Explorat ion Co., 157 F . Supp. 68. 
This section provides for a rb i t ra t ion of 
disputes exist ing at the t ime the agree-
ment to a rb i t ra te is made which shall be 
binding on the par t ies ; it does not apply 
to agreements to a rb i t r a t e fu ture disputes; 
such agreements do not oust the courts 
of jurisdiction. Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-31-1; L. 1977, ch. 142, § 1 . 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-1 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
The 1977 amendment added "or they 
may agree to submit to arbi t ra t ion any 
controversy which may arise in the fu-
t u r e " to the first sentence. 
Comparable Provisions. 
This chapter is based on the 1925 Uni-
form Arbi t ra t ion Act which has been 
wi thdrawn by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
as superseded by the 1956 Uniform Arbi-
t rat ion Act. 
Cross-References. 
Affirmative defense, arbi t ra t ion and 
award as, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
8 (c ) . 
Board of labor, conciliation and arbi tra-
tion, Const. Art . XVI , § 2. 
Fees as full compensation for statutory 
boards of arbi t ra t ion, Const. Art . XXI , § 2. 
Fi re fighters' negotiations, 34-20a-7 to 
34-20a-9. 
Indus t r ia l commission to promote volun-
t a ry arbi t ra t ion of labor disputes, 35-1-16. 
Par tnership , single par tner may not sub-
mit to arbi t ra t ion, 48-1-6. 
365 
ARBITRATION 78-31-4 
Privileged nature of communications Validity and enforceability of provision 
made in course of grievance or arbitra- for binding arbitration, and waiver there* 
tion procedure provided for by collective of, 24 A. L. R. 3d 1325. 
bargaining agreement, 60 A. L. R. 3d 885. Validity of agreements to arbitrate dis-
State court's power to consolidate arbi- putes generally as a condition precedent 
tration proceedings, 64 A. L, R. 3d 528. to the bringing of an action, 26 A, L„ R. 
Validity and construction of provision 1077, 
for arbitration of disputes as to alimony Validity of agreement to submit all fu-
or support payments, or child visitation or ture questions to arbitration, 135 A. L. 
custody matters, 18 A. L. R. 3d 1264. R. 79. 
Validity and effect, and remedy in re- Waiver of arbitration provision in con-
spect, of contractual stipulation to submit tract, 117 A. L. R. 301, 161 A. L. R. 1426. 
disputes to arbitration in another juris-
diction, 12 A. L. R. 3d 892. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Construction. liberally construed. Richards v. Smith, 33 
Submissions to arbitration were to be U. 8, 91 P. 683, applying R. S. 1898, § 3223. 
78-31-2. Contents.—The arbitration agreement must state the question 
or questions in controversy with sufficient definiteness to present one or 
more issues or questions upon which an award may be based. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31-2. Arbitration and Award<§=>6. 
rirfvnr^i^'a -KT/t+Aa 6 C.J,S. Arbitration § 14 et seq. 
Compilers Notes. .
 A m J u r ^ ^ A r b i t r £ i o n a n d 
This section is identical to former sec- \ward § 11 
tion 104-36-2 (Code 1943) which was re- s 
pealed by Laws 1931, ch. 58, § 3. 
78-31-3. "Court" defined—The term "court" when used in this chapter 
means a district court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject 
matter. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
Supp., 104-31-3. This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-3 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
78-31-4. Arbitrators—Appointment by court on application.—Upon the 
application in writing of any party to the arbitration agreement, and 
upon notice to the other parties thereto, the court shall appoint an 
arbitrator or arbitrators in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the arbitration agreement does not prescribe a method for 
the appointment of arbitrators, in which case the arbitration shall be 
by three arbitrators. 
(2) When the arbitration agreement does prescribe a method for the 
appointment of arbitrators, and the arbitrators or any of them have not 
been appointed and the time within which they should have been appointed 
has expired. 
(3) When any arbitrator fails or is otherwise unable to act, and his 
successor has not been appointed in the manner in which he was appointed. 
Arbitrators appointed by the court shall have the same powers as if 
their appointment had been made in accordance with the agreement to 
arbitrate. 
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; 0. 1943, 
Supp., 104-31-4. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-4 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Collateral References. 
Arbitration and Award@=»26. 
6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 60. 
5 Am. Jur. 584, Arbitration and Award 
Validity and effect of arbitration agree-
ment provision that, upon one party's 
failure to appoint arbitrator, controversy 
may be determined by arbitrator appointed 
by other party, 47 A. L. R. 2d 1346. 
78-31-5. Application to be in writing.—Any application made under 
authority of this chapter shall be made in writing and heard in a summary 
way in the manner and upon the notice provided by law or rules of court 
for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly 
provided. 
6(b), (d), (e), History: It. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-31-5. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-5 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Cross-Reference. 
Motions and orders generally, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rules 
7(b), 43(e). 
CoUateral References. 
Arbitration and Award@^26. 
6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 60. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 584, Arbitration and 
Award § 86. 
78-31-6. Hearings — Time — Notice — Postponement. — The arbi-
trators shall appoint a time and place for the hearing and notify the parties 
thereof, and may adjourn the hearing from time to time if necessary, and, 
on application of either party and for good cause, may postpone the 
hearing to a time not extending beyond the date fixed for making the 
award. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-31-6. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36 6 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Admission of notice. 
It is sufficient if parties admit in their 
pleadings notice of meeting of board of 
arbitrators. CiannopuJos v. Pappas, 80 U. 
442, 15 P. 2d 353, applying Laws 1927, 
ch. 62. 
Right to produce evidence and be heard. 
The parties have a right to be heard 
on their proofs, and it is the duty of 
arbitrators to hear all the evidence ma-
terial to the matter in controversy. Gian-
nopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 
353, applying Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
CoUateral Ref erences. 
Arbitration and AwardO=*31, 32. 
6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 79 et seq. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 604, Arbitration and 
Award §§ 114-116. 
Insurance: necessity and sufficiency of 
notice of and hearing in proceedings before 
appraisers and arbitrators appointed to 
determine amount of loss, 25 A. L. R. 3d 
680. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Failure to file submission before hearing. 
Under R. S. 1898, §3223, the effect of 
failure to file submission in court before 
hearing was only to permit parties to 
revoke submission and prevent court from 
acquiring jurisdiction until filed, and did 
not affect right of arbitrators to proceed 
to hearing. Richards v. Smith, 33 U. 8, 
91 P. 683. 
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78-31-7. Failure of party to appear.—If any party neglects to appear 
before the arbitrators after reasonable notice, the arbitrators may never-
theless proceed to hear and determine the controversy upon the evidence 
which is produced before them. 
History: I*. 1951, ch. 58, §1 ; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31-7. Arbitration and Award031. 
Compiler's Notes. 2 C f S > VbitrS^io«n§784"A K-f •• A 
* . . . . 5 Am. Jur0 2d 607, Arbitration and 
This section is identical to former sec- Award $ 118 
tion 104-36-7 (Code 1943) which was s 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
78-31-8. Award—Time for making.—If the time within which the 
award shall be made is not fixed in the arbitration agreement, the award 
must be made within sixty days from the time of the appointment of the 
arbitrators, and an award made after the lapse of sixty days shall have 
no legal effect, unless the parties extend the time in which said award 
may be made, which extension, or any ratification, shall be in writing. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 97. 
Supp., 104-31-8. 5 Am. Jur. 2d 615, Arbitration and 
Compiler's Notes. Award § 128. 
This section is identical to former sec- Construction and effect of contractual 
tion 104-36-8 (Code 1943) which was re- or statutory provisions fixing time within 
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. which arbitration award must be made, 56 
„ « * i » * A. L. R. 3d 815. 
Collateral References. 
Arbitration and Award@=»50. 
78-31-9. Representation of parties—By attorney.—No one other than 
a party to the arbitration, or a person regularly employed by such party 
for other purposes, or a practicing attorney at law, shall be permitted by 
the arbitrator or arbitrators to represent before him or them any party 
to the arbitration. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31-9. Arbitration and Award<3=>31. 
nnmvrfwa "K f^-a 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 84. 
Compilers Notes.
 5 Am J u r < 2 d ^ Arbitration and 
This section is identical to former sec- Award § 113 
tion 104-36-9 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
78-31-10. Witnesses—Subpoena—Pees—Contempt.—The arbitrator or 
arbitrators, or a majority of them, may require any person to attend 
before him or them as a witness, and to bring with him any book or writing 
or other evidence. The fees for such attendance shall be the same as the 
fees of witnesses in courts of general jurisdiction. A subpoena shall issue 
in the name of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and 
shall be signed by the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, 
shall be directed to the person and shall be served in the same manner 
as a subpoena to testify before a district court. If any person so sum-
moned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey such subpoena, the court 
may, upon petition, compel the attendance of such person before the 
arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person for contempt in the same 
369 
78-31-11 JUDICIAL CODE 
manner as is provided for the attendance of witnesses or the punishment 
for their failure to attend district courts. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1 ; G. 1943, Subpoenas, Bales of Civil Procedure, 
Supp., 104-31-10. Rule 45. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Witnessed fees, 21-5-4. 
Collateral References. 
This section is identical to former sec- . . . . .. , . •,>>-*<>« o-i 
tion 104-36-10 (Code 1943) which was ^ b l t ' a t l . o n K »nd,.Awear9T ^ ' " * 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 6. cfA V b l t r ^ 1 0 * i 8 7 \
 fc.„ ». A 
e
 ' > > » 5 ^m. Jur. 2d 609, Arbitration and 
Cross-References. Award §121. 
Contempt generally, 78-32-1 et seq. Liability of parties to arbitration for 
Contempt of process of nonjudicial offi- costs, fees, and expenses, 57 A. L. B. 3d 
cer, 78-32-15. 633. 
78-31-11. Depositions.—Depositions may be taken with or without a 
commission in the same manner and for the same reasons as provided 
by law for the taking of depositions. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; O. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31-11. Arbitration and Award<£=>31. 
Compiler's Notes. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 87. 
Except for the deletion of "in actions 5 A m - J u r - 2<* 602> Arbitration and 
pending in the district courts" from the Award § 110. 
end, this section is identical to former 
section 104-36-11 (Code 1943) which was
 D i a c o v e r y i n a i d o f a r b i t ra t ion pro-
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. ceedings, 98 A. L. B. 2d 1247. 
Cross-Beference. 
Depositions and discovery generally, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26 to 37. 
78-31-12. Conservation of property pendente lite.—At any time before 
final determination of the arbitration the court may, upon application of 
a party to the submission, make such order or decree or take such pro-
ceedings as it may deem necessary for the preservation of the property 
or for securing satisfaction of the award. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31-12. Arbitration and Award®=>31. 
*vA«i«i w « vi+mm 6 c - J - s - Arbitration § 69. 
Compiler's Notes.
 5 A m J p r 9a K l » 7 l 
This section is identical to former sec- Award 8 90 
tion 104-36-12 (Code 1943) which was re- * 
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, §3 . 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 587, Arbitration and 
78-31-13. Submitting law questions to court.—The arbitrators may on 
their own motion, and shall by request of a party to the arbitration: 
(1) At any stage of the proceedings submit any question of law 
arising in the course of the hearing for the opinion of the court, stating 
the facts upon which the question arises, and such opinion when given 
shall bind the arbitrators in the making of their award. 
(2) State their final award, in the form of findings of fact, for the 
opinion of the court on the questions of law arising on the hearing. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
Supp., 104-31-13. This section is identical to former set-
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tion 104-36-13 (Code 1943) which was re-
peated by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Collateral References. 
Arbitration and Award<£»31. 
6 G.J.S. Arbitration and Award §§55, 
120. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 621, Arbitration and 
Award § 140. 
Necessity that arbitrators, in making 
awards, make specific or detailed findings 
of fact or conclusions of law, 82 A« L. B. 
2d 969. 
Waiver, or estoppel to assert, substan-
tive right or right to arbitrate as question 
for court or arbitrator, 26 A. L. R. 3d 604, 
78-31-14. Award—Form.—The award of the arbitrators, or of a ma-
jority of them, shall be drawn up in writing and signed by the arbitrators, 
or a majority of them. The award shall definitely deal with all matters 
of difference in the submission requiring settlement, but the arbitrators 
may, in their discretion, first make a partial award, which shall be enforce-
able in the same manner as the final award. Upon the making of an 
award the arbitrators shall deliver a true copy thereof to each of the 
parties thereto, or their attorneys, without delay. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943, 
Supp., 104-31-14. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-14 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Effect and conclusiveness of award. 
The award of arbitrators, acting within 
the scope of their authority, determines 
the rights of the parties to it as efficiently 
as a judgment secured by legal procedure, 
and is binding on the parties until set 
aside or its validity is questioned in some 
proper manner. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 
U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, applying Laws 1927, 
ch. 62. 
Partial award. 
This section makes provision for a par-
tial award, which shall have the same 
effect as a final award, and judgment may 
be entered for that part thereof which is 
final. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 
454, 15 P. 2d 353, applying Laws 1927, 
eh. 62. 
Where arbitrators find that a certain 
sum of money is due, such finding or 
award is an indication of a full and com-
plete execution of the submission. Gian-
nopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, 
applying Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
Collateral Bef erences. 
Arbitration and Award^=>51. 
6 C.J.S. Arbitration §95 et seq. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 613, Arbitration and 
Award § 125. 
Comment note: determination of validity 
of arbitration award under requirement 
that arbitrators shall pass on all matters 
submitted, 36 A. L. E. 3d 649. 
Concurrence of all arbitrators as con-
dition of binding award, 77 A. L. E. 838. 
Power of arbitrators to award injunc-
tion, 70 A. L. E. 2d 1055. 
Quotient arbitration award or appraisal, 
20 A. L. E. 2d 958. 
Eight of arbitrators to act on their own 
knowledge of facts, or factors relevant 
to questions submitted to them, in absence 
of evidence in that regard, 154 A. L. E. 
1210. 
78-31-15. Confirmation or modification by court on motion.—At any-
time within three months after the award is made, unless the parties 
shall extend the time in writing, any party to the arbitration may apply 
to the court for an order confirming the award, and the court shall grant 
such an order, unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as 
provided in the next two succeeding sections [78-31-16, 78-31-17]. Notice 
in writing of the motion must be served upon the adverse party, or his 
attorney, five days before the hearing thereof. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
Supp., 104-31-16. This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-15 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
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Collateral References. 
Arbitration and Award<£=»72. 
6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 120 et seq. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 626, Arbitration and 
Award § 145. 
Appealability of judgment confirming or 
setting aside arbitration award, 7 A. L. B. 
3d 608. 
Time for impeaching arbitration award, 
85 A. L. R. 2d 779. 
78-31-16. Vacating by court—Grounds.—In any of the following cases 
the court shall, after notice and hearing, make an order vacating the 
award, upon the application of any party to the arbitration: 
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other 
undue means. 
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them. 
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other mis-
behavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. 
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made. 
Whets an award is vacated, and the time within vrhiek the agreement 
required the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its 
discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, Fraud, bad faith or misconduct. 
Supp., 104-31-16. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-16 (Code 1943) which was 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Admissibility of affidavit or testimony of 
arbitrator. 
While an arbitrator may not by affidavit 
or testimony impeach his own award or 
show fraud or misconduct on the part of 
the arbitrators or any of them, testimony 
or affidavit of an arbitrator is admissible 
to establish what matters were presented 
to and considered by the arbitrators, and 
any arbitrator is a competent witness to 
establish such facts. Giannopulos v. Pap-
pas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, applving Laws 
1927, ch. 62. 
Disregard of evidence. 
Refusal to review material testimony is 
ground for setting aside the award. For 
example, substantial prejudice may be 
suffered by one of the parties by the 
failure or refusal of arbitrators to con-
sider items of expense properly admis-
sible in evidence, or to consider a part-
nership agreement between the parties, 
or to consider a lease. Giannopulos v. 
Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, applying 
Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
Fraud, bad faith, and prejudicial im-
position will vitiate award, even though 
contract of submission provides that such 
award shall be absolute and conclusive 
and without appeal. Bivans v. Utah Lake 
Land, Water & Power Co., 53 U. 601, 174 
P. 1126, applying C. L. 1907, §3228. 
If one party to arbitration agreement 
requests one of three arbitrators for fur-
ther time to present certain testimony, 
and is assured by arbitrator that he 
would be given an opportunity before the 
award was made to present such further 
evidence, which promise the arbitrator 
did not keep, and did not even convey 
request to other arbitrators, such mis-
behavior comes within subd. (3). Gian-
Jiopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, 
applying Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
Before misconduct of arbitrators under 
subd. (3) will afford ground for vacating 
award, it must appear that "the rights of 
any party have been prejudiced." Gian-
nopulos v. Papas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, 
applying Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
Motion to vacate. 
Material and competent statement of 
facts contained in motion to vacate, and 
in the supporting affidavits, if not denied, 
must be taken as true. Giannopulos v. 
Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, applying 
Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
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A pleading denominated an answer may, 
in legal effect, be regarded as a motion 
to vacate the award where it affirmatively 
sets out reasons why such should be done, 
and prays that the award be vacated and 
that plaintiff take nothing. In other words, 
the court may look at substance rather 
than the form of the document. Gian-
nopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, 
applying Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
Statutory grounds as exclusive. 
No other grounds for vacating or setting 
aside an award than those specified in this 
section can be taken advantage of. Gian-
nopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, 
applying Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
Vacation of awards in general 
Awards will not be disturbed on account 
of irregularities or informalities, or be-
cause court does not agree with award, 
so long as proceeding has been fair and 
honest, and substantial rights of parties 
have been respected. Bivans v. Utah Lake 
Landt Water & Power Co., 53 U. 601, 174 
P. 1126, applying C. L. 1907, § 3228. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Snpp., 104-31-17. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-17 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Collateral References, 
Arbitration and Award<&=>72. 
6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 154-156, 168. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 626, Arbitration and 
Award § 145. 
Comment note: power of court to re-
submit matter to arbitrators for correction 
Ordinarily a court has no authority to 
review the action of arbitrators to correct 
errors or to substitute its conclusion for 
that of the arbitrators acting honestly 
and within the scope of their authority« 
Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 
353, applying Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
Collateral References. 
Arbitration and Award@=>75-82. 
6 C.J.8. Arbitration § 149 et seq. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 643 et seq., Arbitration 
and Award § 167 et seq. 
Arbitrator's consultation with outsider 
or outsiders as misconduct justifying vaca-
tion of award, 47 A. L. R. 2d 1362. 
Arbitrator's viewing or visiting premises 
or property alone as misconduct justifying 
vacation of award, 27 A. L. R. 2d 1160. 
Improper attempt by influencing or by 
attempting to influence decision as ground 
for revocation of arbitration, or for avoid-
ance of award thereunder, 8 Ae L. R. 1082. 
Setting aside arbitration award on 
ground of interest or bias of arbitrators, 
56 A. L. R. 3d 697. 
or clarification, because of ambiguity or 
error in, or omission from, arbitration 
award, 37 A. L. R. 3d 200. 
Disqualification of arbitrator by court 
or stay of arbitration proceedings prior 
to award on ground of interest, bias, preju-
dice, collusion or fraud of arbitrators, 65 
A. L. R. 2d 755. 
Power of arbitrator to correct, or power 
of court to correct or resubmit, nonlabor 
award because of incompleteness or failure 
to pass on all matters submitted, 36 A. L. 
R. 3d 939. 
Quotient arbitration award or appraisal, 
20 A. L. R. 2d 958. 
78-31-17. Modification by court—Grounds.—In any of the following 
cases the court shall, after notice and hearing, make an order modifying 
or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbi-
tration : 
(1) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an 
evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property, 
referred to in the award. 
(2) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted 
to them. 
(3) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting 
the merits of the controversy. 
The order must modify and correct the award so as to effect the intent 
thereof. 
373 
78-31-18 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-31-18. Notice of motion—Stay.—Notice of a motion to vacate, mod-
ify or correct an award shall be served upon the adverse party or his 
attorney, within three months after an award is filed or delivered, as 
prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in a civil action. For 
the purposes of the motion any judge who might make an order to stay 
the proceedings in an action brought in the same court may make an 
order, to be served with the notice of motion, staying the proceedings of 
the adverse party to enforce the award. 
History: L, 1951, ch. 58, $ 1 ; G. 1943, Cross-Reference. 
Supp., 104-31-18. Service of notices, Rules of Civil Pro-
Compiler's Notes. c e d u r e > B u l e 6<d>> <e>' 
This section is identical to former see- Collateral References, 
tion 104-36-18 (Code 1943) which was Arbitration and Award <S=>77. 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 147, 165. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 656, Arbitration and 
Award § 185. 
78-31-19. Decree of court.—Upon the granting of an order confirming, 
modifying, correcting or vacating an award, judgment or decree shall 
be entered in conformity therewith. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-31-19. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-19 (Code 1943) which was 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, §3 . 
Collateral References. 
Arbitration and Award^»75-84. 
6 CJ.S. Arbitration §§ 129, 145 et seq. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 642, Arbitration and 
Award § 166. 
78-31-20. Record to be filed with clerk of court—Entry of judgment.— 
The party moving for an order confirming, modifying, correcting or 
vacating an award shall, at the time such motion is filed with the clerk, 
file, unless the same have theretofore been filed, the following papers 
with the clerk : 
(1) The written contract, or a verified copy thereof, containing the 
agreement for the submission, the selection or appointment of the arbi-
trator or arbitrators, and each written extension of the time, if any, 
within which to make the award. 
(2) The award. 
(3) Every notice, affidavit and other paper used upon an application 
to confirm, modify, correct or vacate the award, and each order made 
upon such application. The judgment or decree shall be entered and 
docketed as if it were rendered in a civil action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Purpose of section. 
Supp., 104-31-20. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-20 (Code 1943) which waa 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3 except 
that in the former statute the last sen-
tence appeared as a separate paragraph 
rather than as part of snbd. (3). 
This section provides a method by which 
an award, made as provided by this chap-
ter, may be given legal sanction and re-
duced to judgment by summary proceed-
ings in the nature of a motion filed in 
court. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 
15 P. 2d 353, applying Laws 1927, ch. 62. 
Collateral References. 
Arbitration and Award^=73. 
6 C.J.8. Arbitration § 146. 
374 
ARBITRATION 78-31-22 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Tiling of award. 
Under R.S. 1898, §§3223 and 3227, it 
was not duty of arbitrators to file their 
award with clerk; parties could, if they 
wished award to have force and effect of 
judgment, file award with clerk. Richards 
v. Smith, 33 U. 8, 91 P. 683, 
78-31-21. Judgment—Force and effect.—The judgment or decree so 
entered and docketed shall have the same force and effect in all respects 
as, and shall be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment 
or decree; and it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in the court 
in which it is entered. 
History: L. 1951, di. 58, §1 ; 0. 1943, 
Supp., 104-31-2L 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-21 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Collateral References. 
Arbitration and Award^=»82. 
6 C.J.8. Arbitration §§ 97, 148. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 642, Arbitration and 
Award § 166. 
Award or decision by arbitrators as 
precluding return of case to or its re-
consideration by them, 104 A. L. B. 710. 
78-31-22. Appeals.—An appeal may be taken from the final judgment 
or decree entered by the court. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 58, §1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-31-22. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-22 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Order as appealable. 
Order of court in arbitration case, set-
ting aside award and ordering new hear-
ing without order for resubmission but 
also affirmatively ordering plaintiffs and 
interveners to present their claims for 
damages to receiver of defendant corpo-
ration, held final and appealable order 
within C.L. 1907, §§ 3230 and 3300. Bivans 
v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 
53 U. 601, 174 P. 1126. 
Collateral References. 
Arbitration and Award^=>73. 
6 C.J.8. Arbitration § 161 et seq. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d 626, Arbitration and 
Award § 145. 
Appealability of judgment confirming or 
setting aside arbitration award, 7 A. L. B. 
3d 608. 
Section 78-32-1. 
78-32-2. 
78-32-3. 
78-32-4. 
78-32-5. 
78-32-6. 
78-32-7. 
78-32-8. 
78-32-9. 
78-32-10. 
78-32-11. 
78-32-12. 
78-32-13. 
78-32-14. 
78-32-15. 
78-32-16. 
CHAPTER 32 
CONTEMPT 
Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
Re-entry after eviction from real property. 
In immediate presence of court; summary action—Without immediate 
presence; procedure. 
Warrant of arrest, commitment or order to show cause may issue. 
Bail. 
Duty of sheriff. 
Bail bond—Form-
Officer's return. 
Hearing. 
Judgment. 
Damages to party aggrieved. 
Imprisonment to compel performance. 
Procedure when party charged fails to appear. 
Excuse for nonappearance—Unnecessary restraint forbidden. 
Contempt of process of nonjudicial officer. 
Procedure. 
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CHAPTER 31 
ARBITRATION 
78-31-1. Written agreement for, etc. 
Constitutionality. 
The amendment of this section to permit 
valid and enforceable agreements for arbi-
tration of future disputes does not violate 
Art. I, § 11, Art. I, § 7, nor Art. VI, § 28 of the 
state Constitution. Lindon City v. Engineers 
Constr. Co. (1981) 636 P 2d 1070. 
Municipal corporations. 
Absent a statutory prohibition, a munici-
pal corporation has the power to submit to 
arbitration any claim asserted by or against 
Cross-References. 
Defense costs in criminal actions, contempt 
based on failure of convicted defendant to 
pay, 77-32a-7 to 77-32a-12. 
Disobedience of district court order by 
city court. 
City court judge was not in contempt for 
failing to comply with a judgment of the dis-
trict court where that order was not served 
upon him by writ, but was returned to the 
city court together with other papers in the 
Separate mortgages foreclosed in single 
action. 
Where two parcels of realty, subject to sep-
arate mortgages executed by the same mort-
gagor to the same mortgagee, were foreclosed 
in the same action with judgment being 
awarded for a combined amount, and the evi-
dence established that one of the parcels was 
offered and sold separately at the foreclosure 
sa)e and that the other parcel remained 
unsold, it was error for trial court to apply 
the sale price against the combined amount 
78-32-9. Hearing. 
Rights of one charged with contempt. 
In a prosecution for contempt, not commit-
ted in the presence of the court, due process 
it; the application of this section to permit 
valid and enforceable agreements for future 
disputes where one party was a municipal 
corporation did not violate Art. VI, §28 of 
the state Constitution. Lindon City v. Engi-
neers Constr. Co. (1981) 636 P 2d 1070. 
Law Reviews. 
Alternatives to the Tort System for the 
Nonmedical Professions: Can They Do the 
Job?, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 57. 
file on order of remand. State v. Giles (1978) 
576 P 2d 876. 
bindings of fact required. 
To justify a finding of contempt and the 
imposition of a jail sentence, there must be 
ihade written findings of fact and judgment 
Supported by clear and convincing proof that 
the party knew what was required of him, 
^nd having the ability to comply, willfully 
^nd knowingly failed and refused to do so. 
Thomas v. Thomas (1977) 569 P 2d 1119. 
Awarded in the foreclosure judgment and 
3 ward a deficiency judgment for the remain-
ing balance; if the sale price was less than 
the portion of the foreclosure judgment, plus 
costs, secured by the sold parcel, a deficiency 
Judgment could have been awarded for such 
difference; however, before deficiency judg-
ment could be entered with respect to the 
Unsold parcel, such parcel would have to be 
Sold and the proceeds applied against the 
indebtedness and costs secured thereby. 
Sawden & Associates v Smith (1982) 646 P 
2d 711. 
of law requires that the person charged be 
advised of the nature of the action against 
him, have assistance of counsel, if requested. 
CHAPTER 32 
CONTEMPT 
78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
78-32-2. Re-entry after eviction from *eal property. 
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Lien of attorney and discharge thereof. 
Where attorney's fee has been allowed 
by court in foreclosure suit, and amount 
of fee has been adjudicated and made 
part of judgment, attorney has interest 
in judgment and lien thereon to extent 
of amount allowed, and lien cannot be 
discharged by payment to anyone except 
attorney who, to amount of lien, is deemed 
equitable assignee of judgment. Gray v. 
Denhalter, 17 U. 312, 53 P. 976, applying 
Laws 1894, ch. 29, p. 25. 
Necessity that court determine and fix fee. 
Under this section it is error for the 
court to fix a 10% attorney's fee without 
determining whether it is a reasonable 
one. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 
145 P. 1036, applying C. L. 1907, §§ 3504, 
3505. 
Under this section, the trial court cannot 
escape the responsibility of determining 
and declaring what amount shall be al-
lowed as an attorney's fee despite any 
stipulation of the parties upon that sub]ect 
contained in either note or mortgage. Jen-
sen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 145 P. 1036, 
applying C. L. 1907, §§ 3504, 3505. 
Purpose. 
Statute was enacted to pi event division 
of fees provided for in mortgage between 
attorney and mortgagee and to allow only 
such reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed 
against defendant as were actually agreed 
to be paid, or were paid, for attorney's 
services. McClure v. Little, 15 U. 379, 49 
P. 298, 62 Am. St. Rep. 938, construing 
Laws 1894, ch. 39, p. 25. 
This section was adopted to protect 
debtors against being required to pay 
excessive attorney's fees in foreclosure 
suits. It was not, however, intended that 
personal actions upon notes should be 
affected. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 
145 P. 1036, construing C. L. 1907, §§ 3504, 
3505. 
"Seasonable" fee. 
This section contemplates a reasonable 
sum as an attorney's fee, independently 
of provisions of note or mortgage. By a 
"reasonable fee," is meant one which is 
reasonable under the facts and circum-
stances of each case, which must depend 
upon the amount in controversy, the labor 
and the responsibility imposed upon the 
attorney in obtaining judgment. A smaller 
fee would be more reasonable in a default 
case than in a contested one. Jensen v. 
Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 145 P. 1036, con-
struing C. L. 1907, §§ 3504, 3505. 
Collateral References. 
MortgagesO=>581(5). 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 812. 
55 Am. Jur. 2d 590 et seq., Mortgages 
§ 625 et seq. 
Attorney's compensation in absence of 
contract or statute fixing amount, 57 A. L. 
R. 3d 475. 
Attorney's fees in matters involving real 
property mortgages and deeds of trust, 
58 A. L. R. 3d 215. 
CHAPTER 38 
NUISANCE, WASTE, AND OTHER DAMAGE 
Section 78-38-1. "Nuisance" defined—Right of action for—Judgment. 
78-38-2. Right of action for waste—Damages. 
78-38-3. Right of action for injuries to trees—Damage. 
78-38-4. Limited damages in certain cases. 
78-38-1. "Nuisance" defined—Right of action for—Judgment.—Any-
thing which is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the senses, 
or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with 
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and the 
subject of an action. Such action may be brought by any person whose 
property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened 
by nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or 
abated, and damages may also be recovered. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
Supp., 104-38-1. This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-56-1 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, §3. 
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Form and certainty. 
A judgment or decree was to be in 
plain and intelligible language; the prop-
erty which was the subiect of judgment 
was to be described with sufficient cer-
tainty to leave its identity free from 
doubt. Smith v. Phillips, 6 U. 376, 23 P. 
932; City of Springville v. Holley, 6 U. 
378, 23 P. 933. 
Where statute did not require judg-
ment to be in any particular form, ordi-
narily judgment was sufficient if by use 
of proper language it was stated what 
prevailing party was to receive and what 
losing party was required to do, pay, or 
discharge. Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 
37 U. 520, 109 P 817. 
Judgment for "the sum of 242.98" was 
sufficients ceitain. Snow v. West, 37 XJ. 
528, 110 P. 52. 
Fact that judgment read "defendant," 
instead of "defendants," was not fatal, 
since such irregularity was not matter of 
jurisdiction so as to make judgment void. 
Higgs v. Burton, 58 U. 99, 197 P. 728. 
No particular form or words was essen-
tial to constitute a ludgment, provided 
they were such as to indicate with reason-
able certainty a final determination of the 
rights of theparties and the relief granted 
or denied. But in order that the document 
be a judgment it had to be sufficiently 
definite and certain as to be susceptible 
of enforcement; it had to specify the 
relief granted or denied; it had to 
determine the rights of the parties, and 
describe the parties for or against whom 
it was rendered. If it did not order, ad-
judge, or decree anything, it had not even 
the first essential requisite of a judgment. 
Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73 U. 563, 276 P. 
159. 
Judgment in favor of one not a party. 
In the absence of a court order substi-
tuting the person in whose favor judg-
ment was finally rendered for the orig-
inal party, judgment would be reversed, 
because there was, in effect, no judgment 
in the case. Lowell v. Parkinson, 4 U. 
64, 6 P. 58, applying Civil Practice Act 
of 1870. 
Orders distinguished. 
Order was decision of a motion, while 
judgment was decision of trial. Cox v. 
Dixie Power Co., 81 U. 94, 16 P. 2d 916. 
Order granting restitution of moneys 
collected on execution after motion for 
new trial was granted, made without no-
tice or hearing, did not have effect of 
binding judgment. Cox v. Dixie Power 
Co., 81 U. 94, 16 P. 2d 916. 
Validation of invalid judgment by statute. 
Legislature could not validate void 
judgments but where court had jurisdic-
tion of subject matter of suit and of per-
son of defendant, legislature could vali-
date judgment which was defective for 
omission of some essential step which leg-
islature had right to dispense with. In 
re Christiensen's Estate, 17 U. 412, 53 P. 
1003, 41 L. B. A. 504, 70 Am. St. Rep. 794. 
What are "judgments." 
An order of a district court, on appeal 
from probate court, refusing to confirm 
sale of decedent's real estate, was not a 
"judgment." In re Estate of Gibbs, 4 U. 
97, 6 P. 525. 
A verdict could not be regarded as a 
judgment. Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73 U. 
563, 276 P. 159. 
A document denominated "Judgment on 
Verdict," which had not even the first 
essential requisite of a judgment, was not 
appealable. Such a document, when filed 
in the clerk's office, was no more than an 
order for a judgment, or an order direct-
ing the clerk to enter and docket a judg-
ment nunc pro tunc. Ellinwood v. Ben-
nion, 73 U. 563, 276 P. 159. 
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims And/Or Involving Multiple 
Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form 
of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall 
not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order 
or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
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of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Rule 54(b) was amended by the Su-
preme Court effective May 21, 1976. The 
amendment inserted references to multiple 
parties and to adjudication of rights and 
liabilities of all the parties; and made 
minor changes in phraseology. 
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 54(b), 
except for its substitution of "and/or" 
for "or" after "third-party claim," and 
its insertion of "by the court" after "ex-
press determination," both in the first 
sentence. 
Gross-Reference. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 62(h). 
Absence of express determination. 
In action based on alleged breach of 
loan agreement, where trial court improp-
erly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's com-
plaint with prejudice and granted defend-
ant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and 
cross-claim, judgment on cross-claim and 
counterclaim would be subject, on remand, 
to revision since all claims presented had 
not been adjudicated and since trial court 
made no express determination as required 
by this section. M. & S. Constr. & Engi-
neering Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 IT. 
(2d) 139, 467 P. 2d 410. 
Collateral References. 
Judgment in favor of less than all 
parties to contract as bar to action 
against other parties, 3 A. L. R. 124. 
Operation and effect of Rule 54(b) 
governing entry of judgment on multiple 
claims, 38 A. L. R. 2d 377. 
Right to judgment, levy or lien against 
individual in action under statute per-
mitting persons associated in business 
under a common name to be sued in that 
name, 100 A. L. R. 997. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Joint obligations. 
In suit on joint contract, recovery could 
be had against one or the other, or both, 
of the defendants. Ruffati v. Societe 
Anonyme Des Mines De Lexington, 10 U. 
386, 37 P. 591. 
Affirmance of joint judgment as to one 
party, reversal as to another. 
Supreme Court could affirm a joint 
judgment as to one appellant and reverse 
it as to another unless in doing so injus-
tice resulted to party against whom judg-
ment was affirmed. Sweatman v. Linton, 
66 U. 208, 241 P. 309, distinguished in 86 
U. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, 86 U. 522, 46 P. 
2d 672. 
(c) Demand for Judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is 
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has 
not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against 
one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the 
case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side 
as between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by Default. A judgment by default shall not be 
different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for 
in the demand for judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This Rule is similar in substance to Fed. 
Rule 54(e), but differs from it in text. 
Application. 
One cannot recover on an implied con-
tract where he pleads and attempts to 
prove an express contract, seeking no 
amendment of his pleading, demanding no 
relief under and urging no claim under a 
quantum meruit or other theory, since a 
defendant must be extended every reason-
able opportunity to meet an adversary's 
claim. Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 U. 
(2d) 175, 264 P. 2d 279. 
A party must not be prejudiced in any 
way by the introduction of new issues, but 
where a partnership issue was raised at 
the trial, was not objected to by defend-
ant, and both sides went into facts of the 
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(b) Amendment. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Party must be deemed to have abandoned 
its motion to amend a particular finding, when 
it permitted trial court to enter a final order 
denying its written motion to amend without 
(c) Demand for Judgment. 
(2) Judgment by Default. 
Attorney fees and costs. 
District court's award of attorney fees in ex-
cess of the fees demanded in the complaint and 
of costs where no costs were demanded was 
proper where the proof at trial showed the 
party entitled to such relief. Pope v. Pope 
(1978) 589 P 2d 752. 
(d) Costs. 
Depositions. 
Defendant was not entitled to the cost of 
taking depositions where the depositions were 
not used at trial and there was no evidence 
presented that they were necessarily incurred 
for the preparation of defendant's case. Nelson 
v. Newman (1978) 583 P 2d 601. 
Memorandum of costs filed before judg-
ment. 
Where memorandum of costs if filed before 
judgment, and costs in specific amounts are 
awarded in that judgment, then a party may 
move to alter or amend the costs in the judg-
ment under Rule 59 and the time limits con-
tained therein, and is not limited to challenge 
securing a ruling on its claimed pending motion 
to amend the particular finding. Zions First 
Nat. Bank v. C'est Bon Venture (1980) 613 P 
2d 515. 
Nature of relief sought. 
Complaint for foreclosure of a lien was de-
fective because of the nature of relief sought 
even though it did not demand judgment for 
personal liability on contract and judgment 
was granted for such personal liability, since 
this rule provides that a judgment shall grant 
the relief to which a party is entitled even 
though it is not demanded. Motivated Man-
agement International v. Finney (1979) 604 P 
2d 467. 
ing the costs under the procedure of this rule. 
Nelson v. Newman (1978) 583 P 2d 601. 
Objection to costs claimed. 
Defendant waived any error as to the costs 
allowed the plaintiff where defendant waited 
23 days after filing of cost bill filing any objec-
tion. Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe (1978) 576 P 
2d 847. 
Statutory limits. 
Award of costs in excess of those expressly 
allowed by statute for service of subpoena, 
witness fees and preparation of model, photo-
graphs and certified copies of documents was 
improper even though the costs represented 
RULE 53 
MASTERS 
(e) Report. 
(2) In Nonjury Actions. 
Failure to object. 
One who made no objection to master's re-
port as required by this subdivision could not 
question the report for the first time on appeal 
from district court order adopting the master's 
findings. Score v. Wilson (1980) 611 P 2d 367. 
PART VII 
Judgment 
RULE 54 
JUDGMENT; COSTS 
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims, etc. 
Denial of motion to dismiss. 
This rule does not necessarily mean there is 
a final judgment merely because the court's 
order so recites; there was in fact no final 
judgment where the trial court denied defen-
dant's motion to dismiss, thus leaving the par-
ties in court, then entered an order that such 
denial was a final judgment. Little v. Mitchell 
(1979) 604 P 2d 918. 
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Arbitration 
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Effective 
April 1, 1982 
For the Submission 
of existing disputes:-
We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree to 
submit to arbitration under the Construction 
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association the following contro-
versy: (cite briefly J. We further agree that the 
above controversy be submitted to (one) (three) 
Arbitrators) selected from the panels of Arbi-
trators of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. We further agree that we will faithfully 
observe this agreement and the Rules and that 
we will abide by and perform any award ren-
dered by the Arbitrator(s) and that a judgment 
of the Court having jurisdiction may be entered 
upon the award. 
Standard Arbitration Clause 
Parties may refer to these Rules in their con-
tracts. For this purpose, the following clause 
may be used: 
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relat-
ing to this contract, or the breach thereof shall 
be settled by arbitration in accordance with the 
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association, and judg-
ment upon the award rendered by the Arbitra-
tors) may be entered in any Court having 
jurisdiction thereof 
American Arbitration Association 
Arbitration is the voluntary submission of a dispute 
to a disinterested person or persons for final deter-
mination. And to achieve orderly, economical and 
expeditious arbitration, in accordance with federal 
and state laws, the American Arbitration Associa-
tion is available to administer arbitration cases 
under various specialized rules. 
The American Arbitration Association maintains 
throughout the United States a National Panel of 
Arbitrators consisting of experts in all trades and 
professions. By arranging for arbitration under the 
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, parties 
may obtain the services of arbitrators who are fa-
miliar with the construction industry. 
The American Arbitration Association shall estab-
lish and maintain as members of its National Panel 
of Arbitrators individuals competent to hear and 
determine disputes administered under the Con-
struction Industry Arbitration Rules. The Associa-
tion shall consider for appointment to the Con-
struction Industry Panel persons recommended by 
the National Construction Industry Arbitration 
Committee as qualified to serve by virtue of their 
experience in the construction field. 
The Association does not act as arbitrator. Its func-
tion is to administer arbitrations in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties and to maintain 
Panels from which arbitrators may be chosen by 
parties. Once designated, the arbitrator decides the 
issues and an award is final and binding. 
When an agreement to arbitrate is written into a 
construction contract, it may expedite peaceful 
settlement without the necessity of going to arbi-
tration at all. Thus, the arbitration clause is a form 
of insurance against loss of good will. 
3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Agreement of Parties 5 
2. Name of Tribunal 5 
3. Administrator 5 
4. Delegation of Duties 5 
5. National Panel of Arbitrators 5 
6. Office of Tribunal 6 
7. Initiation under an Arbitration Provision 
in a Contract 6 
8. Change of Claim or Counterclaim 6 
9. Initiation under a Submission 7 
10. Pre-Hearing Conference 7 
11. Fixing of Locale 7 
12. Qualifications of Arbitrator 7 
13. Appointment from Panel 7 
14. Direct Appointment by Parties 8 
15. Appointment of Arbitrator by Party-
Appointed Arbitrators 8 
16. Nationality of Arbitrator in International 
Arbitration 9 
17. Number of Arbitrators 9 
18. Notice to Arbitrator of Appointment 9 
19. Disclosure and Challenge Procedure 9 
20. Vacancies 10 
21. Time and Place 10 
22. Representation by Counsel 10 
23. Stenographic Record 10 
24. Interpreter 10 
25. Attendance at Hearings 1 
26. Adjournments 1 
27. Oaths 1 
28. Majority Decision 1 
29. Order of Proceedings 1 
30. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party 12 
31. Evidence 12 
32. Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of 
Documents 12 
33. Inspection or Investigation 13 
34. Conservation of Property 13 
35. Closing of Hearings 13 
36. Reopening of Hearings 13 
37. Waiver of Oral Hearings 14 
38. Waiver of Rules , 14 
39. E xtensions of Time 14 
40. Communication with Arbitrator and 
Serving of Notices 14 
41. Time of Award 14 
42. Form of Award 15 
43. Scope of Award 15 
44. Award upon Settlement 15 
45. Delivery of Award to Parties 15 
46. Release of Documents for Judicial 
Proceedings 15 
47. Applications to Court 15 
48. Administrative Fees 16 
49. Fee when Oral Hearings are Waived 16 
50. Expenses 16 
51. Arbitrator's Fee 17 
52. Deposits 17 
53. Interpretation and Application of Rules... 17 
Administrative Fee Schedule 18 
Construction Industry 
Arbitration Rules 
1. Agreement of Parties 
The parties shall be deemed to have made these 
Rules a part of their arbitration agreement when-
ever they have provided for arbitration under the 
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. These 
Rules and any amendment thereof shall apply in 
the form obtaining at the time the arbitration is in-
itiated. 
2. Name of Tribunal 
Any Tribunal constituted by the parties for the 
settlement of their dispute under these Rules shall 
be called the Construction Industry Arbitration 
Tribunal, hereinafter called the Tribunal. 
3. Administrator 
When parties agree to arbitrate under these Rules, 
or when they provide for arbitration by the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association, hereinafter called 
AAA, and an arbitration is initiated hereunder, 
they thereby constitute AAA the administrator of 
the arbitration. The authority and duties of the 
administrator are prescribed in the agreement of 
the parties and in these Rules. 
4 . Delegation of Duties 
The duties of the AAA under these Rules may be 
carried out through Tribunal Administrators, or 
such other officers or committees as the AAA may 
direct. 
5. National Panel of Arbitrators 
In cooperation with the National Construction 
Industry Arbitration Committee, the AAA shall 
establish and maintain a National Panel of Con-
struction Arbitrators, hereinafter called the Panel, 
and shall appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators there-
from as hereinafter provided. A neutral arbitrator 
selected by mutual choice of both parties or their 
appointees, or appointed by the AAA, is herein-
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after called the arbitrator, whereas an arbitrator 
selected unilaterally by one party is hereinafter 
called the party-appointed arbitrator. The term 
arbitrator may hereinafter be used to refer to one 
arbitrator or to a Tribunal of multiple arbitrators. 
6. Office of Tribunal 
The general office of a Tribunal is the headquarters 
of the AAA, which may, however, assign the ad-
ministration of an arbitration to any of its Region-
al Offices. 
7. Initiation under an Arbitration Provi-
sion in a Contract 
Arbitration under an arbitration provision in a con-
tract shall be initiated in the following manner: 
The initiating party shall, within the time specified 
by the contract, if any, file with the other party a 
notice of an intention to arbitrate (Demand), which 
notice shall contain a statement setting forth the 
nature of the dispute, the amount involved, and 
the remedy sought; and shall file three copies of 
said notice with any Regional Office of the AAA, 
together with three copies of the arbitration pro-
visions of the contract and the appropriate filing 
fee as provided in Section 48 hereunder. 
The AAA shall give notice of such filing to the 
other party. A party upon whom the demand for 
arbitration is made may file an answering state-
ment in duplicate with the AAA within seven days 
after notice from the AAA, simultaneously send-
ing a copy to the other party. If a monetary claim 
is made in the answer the appropriate administra-
tive fee provided in the Fee Schedule shall be for-
warded to the AAA with the answer. If no answer 
is filed within the stated time, it will be treated as 
a denial of the claim. Failure to file an answer shall 
not operate to delay the arbitration. 
8. Change of Claim or Counterclaim 
After filing of the claim or counterclaim, if either 
party desires to make any new or different claim 
or counterclaim, same shall be made in writing and 
filed with the AAA, and a copy thereof shall be 
mailed to the other party who shall have a period 
of seven days from the date of such mailing within 
which to file an answer with the AAA. However, 
after the arbitrator is appointed no new or differ-
ent claim or counterclaim may be submitted with-
out the arbitrator's consent. 
9. Initiation under a Submission 
Parties to any existing dispute may commence an 
arbitration under these Rules by filing at any Re-
gional Office two copies of a written agreement to 
arbitrate under these Rules (Submission), signed 
by the parties. It shall contain a statement of the 
matter in dispute, the amount of money involved, 
and the remedy sought, together with the appro-
priate filing fee as provided in the Fee Schedule. 
10. Pre-Hearing Conference 
At the request of the parties or at the discretion of 
the AAA a pre-hearing conference with the admin-
istrator and the parties or their counsel will be 
scheduled in appropriate cases to arrange for an 
exchange of information and the stipulation of un-
contested facts so as to expedite the arbitration 
proceedings. 
11. Fixing of Locale 
The parties may mutually agree on the locale where 
the arbitration is to be held. If any party requests 
that the hearing be held in a specific locale and the 
other party files no objection thereto within seven 
days after notice of the request is mailed to such 
party, the locale shall be the one requested. If a 
party objects to the locale requested by the other 
party, the AAA shall have power to determine the 
locale and its decision shall be final and binding. 
12. Qualifications of Arbitrator 
Any arbitrator appointed pursuant to Section 13 
or Section 15 shall be neutral, subject to disquali-
fication for the reasons specified in Section 19. If 
the agreement of the parties names an arbitrator or 
specifies any other method of appointing an arbi-
trator, or if the parties specifically agree in writing, 
such arbitrator shall not be subject to disqualifica-
tion for said reasons. 
13. Appointment from Panel 
If the parties have not appointed an arbitrator and 
have not provided any other method of appoint-
ment, the arbitrator shall be appointed in the fol-
lowing manner: Immediately after the filing of the 
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Demand or Submission, the AAA shall submit si-
multaneously to each party to the dispute an iden-
tical list of names of persons chosen from the Panel. 
Each party to the dispute shall have seven days 
from the mailing date in which to cross off any 
names to which it objects, number the remaining 
names to indicate the order of preference, and re-
turn the list to the AAA. If a party does not return 
the list within the time specified, all persons named 
therein shall be deemed acceptable. From among 
the persons who have been approved on both lists, 
and in accordance with the designated order of 
mutual preference, the AAA shall invite the accep-
tance of an arbitrator to serve. If the parties fail to 
agree upon any of the persons named, or if accept-
able arbitrators are unable to act, or if for any 
other reason the appointment cannot be made 
from the submitted lists, the AAA shall have the 
power to make the appointment from other mem-
bers of the Panel without the submission of any 
additional lists. 
14. Direct Appointment by Parties 
If the agreement of the parties names an arbitrator 
or specifies a method of appointing an arbitrator, 
that designation or method shall be followed. The 
notice of appointment, with name and address of 
such arbitrator, shall be filed with the AAA by the 
appointing party. Upon the request of any such 
appointing party, the AAA shall submit a list of 
members of the Panel from which the party may 
make the appointment. 
If the agreement specifies a period of time within 
which an arbitrator shall be appointed, and any 
party fails to make such appointment within that 
period, the AAA shall make the appointment. 
If no period of time is specified in the agreement, 
the AAA shall notify the parties to make the ap-
pointment, and if within seven days after mailing 
of such notice such arbitrator has not been so ap-
pointed, the AAA shall make the appointment. 
15. Appointment of Arbitrator by Party-
Appointed Arbitrators 
If the parties have appointed their party-appointed 
arbitrators or if either or both of them have been 
appointed as provided in Section 14, and have au-
thorized such arbitrator to appoint an arbitrator 
within a specified time and no appointment is made 
within such time or any agreed extension thereof, 
the AAA shall appoint an arbitrator who shall act 
as Chairperson. 
If no period of time is specified for appointment 
of the third arbitrator and the party-appointed ar-
bitrators do not make the appointment within seven 
days from the date of the appointment of the last 
party-appointed arbitrator, the AAA shall appoint 
the arbitrator who shall act as Chairperson. 
If the parties have agreed that their party-appointed 
arbitrators shall appoint the arbitrator from the 
Panel, the AAA shall furnish to the party-appointed 
arbitrators, in the manner prescribed in Section 13, 
a list selected from the Panel, and the appointment 
of the arbitrator shall be made as prescribed in 
such Section. 
16. Nationality of Arbitrator in Interna-
tional Arbitration 
If one of the parties is a national or resident of a 
country other than the United States, the arbitra-
tor shall, upon the request of either party, be ap-
pointed from among the nationals of a country 
other than that of any of the parties. 
17. Number of Arbitrators 
If the arbitration agreement does not specify the 
number of arbitrators, the dispute shall be heard 
and determined by one arbitrator, unless the AAA, 
in its discretion, directs that a greater number of 
arbitrators be appointed. 
18. Notice to Arbitrator of Appointment 
Notice of the appointment of the arbitrator, wheth-
er mutually appointed by the parties or appointed 
by the AAA, shall be mailed to the arbitrator by 
the AAA, together with a copy of these Rules, and 
the signed acceptance of the arbitrator shall be filed 
prior to the opening of the first hearing. 
19. Disclosure and Challenge Procedure 
A person appointed as neutral arbitrator shall dis-
close to the AAA any circumstances likely to af-
fect his or her impartiality, including any bias or 
any financial or personal interest in the result of 
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the arbitration or any past or present relationship 
with the parties or their counsel. Upon receipt of 
such information from such arbitrator or other 
source, the AAA shall communicate such informa-
tion to the parties and, if it deems it appropriate 
to do so, to the arbitrator and others. Thereafter, 
the AAA shall determine whether the arbitrator 
should be disqualified and shall inform the parties 
of its decision, which shall be conclusive. 
20. Vacancies 
If any arbitrator should resign, die, withdraw, re-
fuse, be disqualified or be unable to perform the 
duties of office, the AAA shall, on proof satisfac-
tory to it, declare the office vacant. Vacancies shall 
be filled in accordance with the appUcable provision 
of these Rules. In the event of a vacancy in a panel 
of neutral arbitrators, the remaining arbitrator or 
arbitrators may continue with the hearing and de-
termination of the controversy, unless the parties 
agree otherwise. 
21. Time and Place 
The arbitrator shall fix the time and place for each 
hearing. The AAA shall mail to each party notice 
thereof at least five days in advance, unless the par-
ties by mutual agreement waive such notice or mod-
ify the terms thereof. 
22. Representation by Counsel 
Any party may be represented by counsel. A party 
intending to be so represented shall notify the 
other party and the AAA of the name and address 
of counsel at least three days prior to the date set 
for the hearing at which counsel is first to appear. 
When an arbitration is initiated by counsel, or 
where an attorney replies for the other party, such 
notice is deemed to have been given. 
23. Stenographic Record 
The AAA shall make the necessary arrangements 
for the taking of a stenographic record whenever 
such record is requested by a party. The requesting 
party or parties shall pay the cost of such record as 
provided in Section 50. 
24. Interpreter 
The AAA shall make the necessary arrangements 
for the services of an interpreter upon the request 
of one or both parties, who shall assume the cost 
of such services. 
25 . Attendance at Hearings 
Persons having a direct interest in the arbitration 
are entitled to attend hearings. The arbitrator shall 
otherwise have the power to require the retirement 
of any witness or witnesses during the testimony 
of other witnesses. It shall be discretionary with 
the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the 
attendance of any other persons. 
26. Adjournments 
The arbitrator may adjourn the hearing, and must 
take such adjournment when all of the parties agree 
thereto. 
27. Oaths 
Before proceeding with the first hearing or with 
the examination of the file, each arbitrator may 
take an oath of office, and if required by law, shall 
do so. The arbitrator may require witnesses to tes-
tify under oath administered by any duly qualified 
person or, if required by law or demanded by ei-
ther party, shall do so. 
28. Majority Decision 
Whenever there is more than one arbitrator, all de-
cisions of the arbitrators must be by at least a ma-
jority. The award must also be made by at least a 
majority unless the concurrence of all is expressly 
required by the arbitration agreement or by law. 
29. Order of Proceedings 
A hearing shall be opened by the filing of the oath 
of the arbitrator, where required, and by the record-
ing of the place, time, and date of the hearing, the 
presence of the arbitrator and parties, and counsel, 
if any, and by the receipt by the arbitrator of the 
statement of the claim and answer, if any. 
The arbitrator may, at the beginning of the hearing, 
ask for statements clarifying the issues involved. 
The complaining party shall then present its claims, 
proofs and witnesses, who shall submit to questions 
or other examination. The defending party shall 
then present its defenses, proofs and witnesses, who 
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shall submit to questions or other examination. 
The arbitrator may vary this procedure but shall 
afford full and equal opportunity to the parties for 
the presentation of any material or relevant proofs. 
Exhibits, when offered by either party, may be 
received in evidence by the arbitrator. 
The names and addresses of all witnesses and ex-
hibits in order received shall be made a party of 
the record. 
30. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party 
Unless the law provides to the contrary, the arbitra-
tion may proceed in the absence of any party, who, 
after due notice, fails to be present or fails to ob-
tain an adjournment. An award shall not be made 
solely on the default of a party. The arbitrator shall 
require the party who is present to submit such 
evidence as deemed necessary for the making of an 
award. 
31. Evidence 
The parties may offer such evidence as they desire 
and shall produce such additional evidence as the 
arbitrator may deem necessary to an understand-
ing and determination of the dispute. An arbitra-
tor authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or doc-
uments may do so upon the request of any party, 
or independently. The arbitator shall be the judge 
of the admissibility of the evidence offered and 
conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be 
necessary. All evidence shall be taken in the presence 
of all of the arbitrators and all of the parties, except 
where any of the parties is absent in default or has 
waived his or her right to be present. 
32. Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of 
Documents 
The arbitrator may receive and consider the evi-
dence of witnesses by affidavit, giving it such 
weight as seems appropriate after consideration of 
any objections made to its admission. 
All documents not filed with the arbitrator at the 
hearing, but arranged for at the hearing or subse-
quently by agreement of the parties, shall be filed 
with the AAA for transmission to the arbitrator. 
All parties shall be afforded opportunity to exam-
ine such documents. 
33. Inspection or Investigation 
An arbitrator finding it necessary to make an in-
spection or investigation in connection with the 
arbitration shall direct the AAA to so advise the 
parties. The arbitrator shall set the time and the 
AAA shall notify the parties thereof. Any party 
who so desires may be present at such inspection 
or investigation. In the event that one or both par-
ties are not present at the inspection or investiga-
tion, the arbitrator shall make a verbal or written 
report to the parties and afford them an opportu-
nity to comment. 
34. Conservation of Property 
The arbitrator may issue such orders as may be 
deemed necessary to safeguard the property which 
is the subject matter of the arbitration without 
prejudice to the rights of the parties or to the final 
determination of the dispute. 
35. Closing of Hearings 
The arbitrator shall specifically inquire of the par-
ties whether they have any further proofs to offer 
or witnesses to be heard. Upon receiving negative 
replies, the arbitrator shall declare the hearings 
closed and a minute thereof shall be recorded. If 
briefs are to be filed, the hearings shall be declared 
closed as of the final date set by the arbitrator for 
the receipt of briefs. If documents are to be filed as 
provided for in Section 32 and the date set for their 
receipt is later than that set for the receipt of briefs, 
the later date shall be the date of closing the hear-
ing. The time limit within which the arbitrator is 
required to make an award shall commence to run, 
in the absence of other agreements by the parties, 
upon the closing of the hearings. 
36. Reopening of Hearings 
The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrator at 
will, or upon application of a party at any time be-
fore the award is made. If the reopening of the hear-
ing would prevent the making of the award within 
the specific time agreed upon by the parties in the 
contract out of which the controversy has arisen, 
the matter may not be reopened, unless the parties 
agree upon the extension of such time limit. When 
no specific date is fixed in the contract, the arbitra-
tor may reopen the hearings, and the arbitrator 
shall have thirty days from the closing of the re-
opened hearings within which to make an award. 
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37. Waiver of Oral Hearings 
The parties may provide, by written agreement, for 
the waiver of oral hearings. If the parties are un-
able to agree as to the procedure, the AAA shall 
specify a fair and equitable procedure. 
38. Waiver of Rules 
Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after 
knowledge that any provision or requirement of 
these Rules has not been complied with and who 
fails to state an objection thereto in writing, shall 
be deemed to have waived the right to object. 
39. Extensions of Time 
The parties may modify any period of time by 
mutual agreement. The AAA for good cause may 
extend any period of time established by these 
Rules, except the time for making the award. The 
AAA shall notify the parties of any such extension 
of time and its reason therefor. 
40. Communication with Arbitrator and 
Serving of Notices 
There shall be no communication between the par-
ties and an arbitrator other than at oral hearings. 
Any other oral or written communications from 
the parties to the arbitrator shall be directed to the 
AAA for transmittal to the arbitrator. 
Each party to an agreement which provides for ar-
bitration under these Rules shall be deemed to have 
consented that any papers, notices or process nec-
essary or proper for the initiation or continuation 
of an arbitration under these Rules and for any 
court action in connection therewith or for the 
entry of judgment on any award made thereunder 
maybe served upon such party by mail addressed to 
such party or its attorney at the last known ad-
dress or by personal service, within or without the 
state wherein the arbitration is to be held (whether 
such party be within or without the United States 
of America), provided that reasonable opportunity 
to be heard with regard thereto has been granted 
such party. 
41. Time of Award 
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitra-
toi and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or 
specified by law, not later than thirty days from 
the date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings 
have been waived, from the date of transmitting 
the final statements and proofs to the arbitrator. 
42. Form of Award 
The award shall be in writing and shall be signed 
either by the sole arbitrator or by at least a major-
ity if there be more than one. It shall be executed 
in the manner required by law. 
43. Scope of Award 
The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief 
which is just and equitable and within the terms of 
the agreement of the parties. The arbitrator, in the 
award, shall assess arbitration fees and expenses as 
provided in Sections 48 and 50 equally or in favor 
of any party and, in the event any administrative 
fees or expenses are due the AAA, in favor of the 
AAA. 
44. Award upon Settlement 
If the parties settle their dispute during the course 
of the arbitration, the arbitrator, upon their re-
quest, may set forth the terms of the agreed settle-
ment in an award. 
45. Delivery of Award to Parties 
Parties shall accept as legal delivery of the award 
the placing of the award or a true copy thereof in 
the mail by the AAA, addressed to such party at 
its last known address or to its attorney, or person-
al service of the award, or the filing of the award 
in any manner which may be prescribed by law. 
46. Release of Documents for Judicial Pro-
ceedings 
The AAA shall, upon the written request of a par-
ty furnish to such party, at its expense, certified 
facsimiles of any papers in the AAA's possession 
that may be required in judicial proceedings re-
lating to the arbitration. 
47. Applications to Court 
No judicial proceedings by a party relating to the 
subject matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a 
waiver of the party's right to arbitrate. 
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The AAA is not a necessary party in judicial pro-
ceedings relating to the arbitration. 
Parties to these Rules shall be deemed to have con-
sented that judgment upon the award rendered by 
the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Federal or 
State Court having jurisdiction thereof. 
48. Administrative Fees 
As a not-for-profit organization, the AAA shall 
prescribe an administrative fee schedule and a 
refund schedule to compensate it for the cost of 
providing administrative services. The schedule in 
effect at the time of filing or the time of refund 
shall be applicable. 
The administrative fees shall be advanced by the 
initiating party or parties in accordance with the 
administrative fee schedule, subject to final appor-
tionment by the arbitrator in the award. 
When a matter is withdrawn or settled, the refund 
shall be made in accordance with the refund sched-
ule. 
The AAA, in the event of extreme hardship on the 
part of any party, may defer or reduce the admin-
istrative fee. 
49. Fee when Oral Hearings are Waived 
Where all oral hearings are waived under Section 
37 the Administrative Fee Schedule shall apply. 
50. Expenses 
The expenses of witnesses for either side shall be 
paid by the party producing such witnesses. 
The cost of the stenographic record, if any is made, 
and all transcripts thereof, shall be prorated equal-
ly between the parties ordering copies, unless they 
shall otherwise agree, and shall be paid for by the 
responsible parties directly to the reporting agency. 
All other expenses of the arbitration, including re-
quired traveling and other expenses of the arbitra-
tor and of AAA representatives, and the expenses 
of any witness or the cost of any proofs produced 
at the direct request of the arbitrator, shall be 
borne equally by the parties, unless they agree 
otherwise, or unless the arbitrator in the award as-
sesses such expenses or any part thereof against 
any specified party or parties. 
51. Arbitrator's Fee 
Unless the parties agree to terms of compensation, 
members of the National Panel of Construction 
Arbitrators will serve without compensation for 
the first two days of service. 
Thereafter, compensation shall be based upon the 
amount of service involved and the number of hear-
ings. An appropriate daily rate and other arrange-
ments will be discussed by the administrator with 
the parties and the arbitrator(s). If the parties fail 
to agree to the terms of compensation, an appro-
priate rate shall be established by the AAA, and 
communicated in writing to the parties. 
Any arrangement for the compensation of an arbi-
trator shall be made through the AAA and not di-
rectly by the arbitrator with the parties. The terms 
of compensation of neutral arbitrators on a Tribun-
al shall be identical. 
52. Deposits 
The AAA may require the parties to deposit in ad-
vance such sums of money as it deems necessary to 
defray the expense of the arbitration, including 
the arbitrator's fee if any, and shall render an ac-
counting to the parties and return any unexpended 
balance. 
53. Interpretation and Application of 
Rules 
The arbitrator shall interpret and apply these Rules 
insofar as they relate to the arbitrator's powers 
and duties. When there is more than one arbitrator 
and a difference arises among them concerning the 
meaning or application of any such Rules, it shall 
be decided by a majority vote. If that is unobtain-
able, either an arbitrator or a party may refer the 
question to the AAA for final decision. All other 
Rules shall be interpreted and applied by the AAA. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE FEE SCHEDULE OTHER SERVICE CHARGES 
A filing fee of $200 will be paid at the time the 
case is initiated. 
The balance of the administrative fee of the AAA 
is based upon the amount of each claim and coun-
terclaim as disclosed when the claim and counter-
claim are filed, and is due and payable prior to the 
notice of appointment of the neutral arbitrator. 
In those claims and counterclaims which are not 
for a monetary amount, an appropriate adminis-
trative fee will be determined by the AAA, pay-
able prior to such notice of appointment. 
Amount of Claim 
or Counterclaim 
$1 to $20,000 
$20,000 to $40,000 
$40,000 to $80,000 
$80,000 to 160,000 
$160,000 to $5,000,000 
Fee for Claim 
or Counterclaim 
3% (minimum $200) 
$ 600, plus 2% of excess 
over $20,000 
$1,000, plus 1% of excess 
over $40,000 
$1,400, plus Vi% of excess 
over $80,000 
$ 1,800, plus lA% of excess 
over $160,000 
Where the claim or counterclaim exceeds $5 million, 
an appropriate fee will be determined by the AAA. 
If there are more than two parties represented in 
the arbitration, an additional 10% of the adminis-
trative fee will be due for each additional repre-
sented party. 
When no amount can be stated at the time of filing, 
the administrative fee is $500, subject to adjust-
ment in accordance with the schedule as soon as 
an amount can be disclosed. 
$50 payable by a party causing an adjournment of 
any scheduled hearing; 
$100 payable by a party causing a second or ad-
ditional adjournment of any scheduled hearing; 
$50 payable by each party for each second and 
subsequent hearing which is either clerked by the 
AAA or held in a hearing room provided by the 
AAA. 
REFUND SCHEDULE 
If the AAA is notified that a case has been settled 
or withdrawn before it mails a notice of appoint-
ment of a neutral arbitrator, all of the fee in excess 
of $200 will be refunded. 
If the AAA is notified that a case is settled or with-
drawn thereafter but at least 48 hours before the 
date and time set for the first hearing, one-third of 
the fee in excess of $200 will be refunded. 
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